One
man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it down to his
account as a favor conferred.
Another
is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his
debtor, and he knows what he has done.
A
third in a manner does not even know what he has done, but he is like a vine
that has produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced
its proper fruit.
As
a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a bee when it has
made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act, does not call out for
others to come and see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine goes on to
produce again the grapes in season.
Must
a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it? Yes,
but this very thing is necessary, the observation of what a man is doing. For,
it may be said, it is characteristic of the social animal to perceive that he
is working in a social manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also
should perceive it.
It
is true what you say, but you do not rightly understand what is now said. And
for this reason you will become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even
they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if you will choose to
understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason you will
omit any social act.
—Marcus
Aurelius, Meditations, Book 5 (tr
Long)
The good
or bad within my actions will come not only from what I do, but also from the
disposition with which I do it. Merit is not only in the deed, but also in its
relationship to the doer.
Some
people will expect payment for an act of kindness, which, of course, ceases to
make it a kindness. It is actually a transaction. I should be able to recognize
such people immediately, because they will always attach conditions to the
giving of their gifts, which now makes them investments, and terms for their
promises, which now makes them contracts.
When the
good of another becomes a means for my own profit, this is no longer really a
good deed.
Other
people may not demand any external compensation in return, so I may more
readily think of this as an expression of sincerity. I should not so quickly
deceive myself. They are also seeking something else in return, an internal
sense of thinking well of themselves, of self-praise, of importance and
superiority, It is what my great-grandmother used to call “lording it over”
someone.
When the
goal is gratification instead of service, this still isn’t really a good deed.
There are
people, however, for whom the goodness of the act is itself its own purpose,
where action and intention are in complete convergence. They do what they
should do, because it fulfills their very nature, and is for the benefit of all
of Nature. I can recognize such people because they do not need recognition.
They are content to simply produce good and abundant fruit.
When the
deed is rightly done, nothing more is required. One gladly moves forward to the
next opportunity to be of service.
Marcus
Aurelius offers a qualification here, however, so that we do not misunderstand.
The horse will run, the dog will hunt, and the vine will produce fruit from instinct,
with no conscious reflection on those actions. They do not know what they are
doing in the same way that human beings do, and they are simply moved to do so.
Human nature, however, adds the power of reason into the mix.
I should
certainly do well for only its own sake, seeking no further reward or
gratification. Yet this does not mean that I should not be aware of what I do and
why I do it, or that others should not be aware of what I do and why I do it.
The good sought for itself does not exclude a perception of that good, as is so
fitting and necessary for all human action.
Simply
put, because I should never do good only so that it can be observed, does not
mean I and others should not observe that I am doing good. Humility is not the
same thing as ignorance, and while a man should always be humble, he should
never be ignorant.
Written in 3/2006
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