Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 22

Again, of good things some consist in motion and some consist in a state. 

For such things as joy, good spirits, and temperate conversation consist in motion, whereas such things as a well-ordered quietude, undisturbed rest, and a manly attention consist in a state. 

Of things which consist in a state, some also consist in a condition, such as the virtues; others are only in a state, such as the above mentioned. 

Not only the virtues consist in a condition, but also the crafts which are transformed in the virtuous man by his virtue and so become unchangeable; for they become quasi-virtues. 

And they say that the so-called practices are also among the goods which consist in a condition, such as love of music, love of letters, love of geometry, and the like. 

For there is a method which selects those elements in such crafts which have an affinity to virtue, by referring them to the goal of life. 

IMAGE: Albrecht Dürer, St. Jerome in His Study (1514) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 21

And every good is worth choosing; for it is pleasing and approved of and praiseworthy. 

And every bad thing is worth avoiding. 

For the good, insofar as it stimulates reasonable choice, is worth choosing; and insofar as it is subject to choice without suspicion, it is pleasing. 

And, moreover, insofar as one would reasonably suppose that it is one of the products of virtue, it is praiseworthy. 

IMAGE: Edmund Leighton, The Dedication (1908) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 20

Again, of good things, some are worth choosing for their own sakes, whereas some are instrumental. 

All those which are subject to reasonable choice for the sake of nothing else are worth choosing for their own sakes, whereas those which are subject to reasonable choice because they produce other things are said to be worth choosing in the instrumental sense. 

IMAGE: John Everett Millais, The Pearl of Great Price (1864) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 19

Of good things, some are final, some are instrumental, and some are both. 

For the prudent man and one’s friend are only instrumental goods, but joy and good spirits and confidence and prudent walking are only final goods; all the virtues are both instrumental and final goods since they both produce happiness and fulfill it, becoming parts of it. 

Analogously, of bad things some are instrumental to unhappiness, some are final, and some are both. 

For the imprudent man and one’s enemy are only instrumental bad things, but pain and fear and theft and imprudent questioning and similar things are only final bad things; the vices are both instrumental and final bad things since they produce unhappiness and fulfill it, becoming parts of it. 

IMAGE: Rebecca Dulcibella Orpen, The Philosopher's Morning Walk (c. 1880) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 18

Of the goods in the soul, some are dispositions, some are conditions but not dispositions, and some are neither conditions nor dispositions. 

All the virtues are dispositions, whereas practices are only conditions but not dispositions, for example, prophecy and the like. 

Virtuous activities—for example, prudent action and the possession of temperance and the like—are neither conditions nor dispositions. 

Similarly, of the bad things in the soul, some are dispositions, some are conditions but not dispositions, and some are neither conditions nor dispositions. 

All the vices are dispositions, whereas tendencies, such as enviousness, resentfulness, and such things, are only conditions and not dispositions; so too for diseases and ailments, such as greed, love of drink, and the like. 

Vicious activities such as imprudent action, unjust action, and things like that are neither conditions nor dispositions. 

IMAGE: Lorenzo Lotto, Allegory of Virtue and Vice (1505) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 17

Of good things, some are in the soul, some external, and some neither in the soul nor external. 

In the soul are the virtues and virtuous conditions and in general praiseworthy activities. 

External are friends and acquaintances and things like that. 

Neither in the soul nor external are virtuous men and in general those who have the virtues. 

Similarly, of bad things, some are in the soul, some external, and some neither in the soul nor external. 

In the soul are the vices together with wicked conditions and in general blameworthy activities. 

External are enemies together with their various forms. 

Neither in the soul nor external are base men and all those who have the vices. 

IMAGE: Frederic Remington, The Scout: Friends or Foes? (c. 1905) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 16

All good things are beneficial and well used and advantageous and profitable and virtuous and fitting and honorable; there is an affinity to them. 

Conversely, all bad things are harmful and ill used and disadvantageous and unprofitable and base and unfitting and shameful, and there is no affinity to them. 

The Stoics say that "good" is used in many senses; the primary sense, which plays a role like that of a source for the other senses, is that which is stated as follows: that from which it characteristically results that one is benefited, or he by whom it results that one is benefited, and what is good in the primary sense is the cause. 

The second sense is that in accordance with which it characteristically results that one is benefited.  

A more general sense, and one extending also to the previous cases, is that which is such as to benefit. 

Similarly, the bad too is defined in outline by analogy with the good: that from which, or by whom, it characteristically results that one is harmed, and that in accordance with which it characteristically results that one is harmed; more general than these is that which is such as to harm. 

IMAGE: Victor Orsel, Good and Evil (1832) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 15

Again, the Stoics say that every base man is mad, being ignorant of himself and his own concerns; and that is madness. 

And ignorance is the vice opposite to prudence; and a certain relative disposition of this, which makes one’s impulses unstable and fluttery, is madness. That is why they give an outline of madness as follows: a fluttery ignorance.  

Again, of good things, some are attributes of all prudent men all the time, and some are not. 

Every virtue and prudent sense-perception and prudent impulse and the like are attributes of all prudent men on every occasion; but joy and good spirits and prudent walking are not attributes of all prudent men and not all the time. 

Analogously, of bad things too, some are attributes of all imprudent men all the time, and some are not. 

Every vice and imprudent sense-perception and imprudent impulse and the like are attributes of all imprudent men all the time; but pain and fear and imprudent answering are not attributes of all imprudent men and not on every occasion. 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 14

The Stoics say that only the wise man is a good prophet and poet and public speaker and dialectician and critic, but not every wise man, since some of these crafts also require a mastery of certain theorems. 

And prophecy is a theoretical knowledge of signs, significant for human life, given by the gods or daimons. The forms of prophecy are similarly described. 

They say that only the wise man is a priest but that no base man is. 

For the  priest must be experienced in the laws concerning sacrifices and prayers and purifications and foundations and all such things, and in addition he also needs ritual sanctity and piety and experience of service to the gods, and needs to be intimate with the nature of divinity. 

And the base man has not one of these features, and that is why all imprudent men are impious. 

For impiety, being a vice, is ignorance of the service to the gods, whereas piety is, as we said, a knowledge of service to the gods. 

Similarly they say that the base are not holy either; for holiness is defined in outline as justice toward the gods, whereas the base deviate in many respects from just action toward the gods, which is why they are unholy and impure and unsanctified and defiled, and to be barred from festivals. 

For they say that participating at a festival is a prerogative of the virtuous man, a festival being a time in which one should be concerned with the divine for the sake of honoring the gods and for the sake of the appropriate observations; and that is why the participant in a festival should accommodate himself to this sort of role with piety. 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 13

The Stoics call "practices" the love of music, of letters, of horses, of hunting, and, broadly speaking, the so-called general crafts. 

They are not knowledge, but they leave them in the class of virtuous conditions, and consistently they say that only the wise man is a music lover and a lover of letters, and analogously in the other cases. 

They give a definition of a "practice" as follows: a method using a craft or some part of a craft that leads us to what is in accord with virtue. 

IMAGE: Rembrandt, The Scholar at the Lectern (1641) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 12

And the Stoics also say that the wise man does everything which he does well—obviously. 

For in the sense that we say that the flute player or kithara player does everything well, it being understood that we refer to what the one does in his flute playing and the other in his kithara playing, in the same sense we say that the prudent man does everything well, both what he does and, by Zeus, what he does not do too. 

For they thought that the opinion that the wise man does everything well follows from his accomplishing everything in accordance with right reason and, as it were, in accordance with virtue, which  is a craft concerned with one’s entire life. 

Analogously, the base man too does everything which he does badly and in accordance with all the vices. 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 11

Consistently with this, the Stoics hold also that the wise man acts with good sense, and dialectically and sympotically and erotically; but the erotic man is so called in two senses, the one who is virtuous and gets his quality from virtue, and the one who is blamed, who gets his quality from vice—a sort of sex fiend. . . . 

And being worthy of sexual love means the same as being worthy of friendship, and not the same as being worthy of being enjoyed; for he who is worthy of virtuous sexual love is properly worthy of sexual love. 

They understand virtue exercised at a symposium as similar to virtue in sexual matters, the one being knowledge that is concerned with what is appropriate at a symposium, namely, of how one should run symposia and how one should drink at them; and the other is knowledge of how to hunt for talented young boys, which encourages them to virtuous knowledge, and in general, knowledge of proper sexual activity. 

That is why they say that the sensible man will engage in sexual activity. And sexual activity just by itself is an indifferent, since at times it also occurs among base men. But sexual love is not desire, nor is it directed at any base object, but is an effort to gain friendship resulting from the appearance of beauty. 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 10

There is nothing between virtue and vice. 

For all human beings have from nature inclinations toward virtue and, according to Cleanthes, are like half lines of iambic verse; hence, if they remain incomplete they are base, but if they are completed they are virtuous. 

The Stoics also say that the wise man does everything in accordance with all the virtues; for his every  action is perfect and so is bereft of none of the virtues. 

IMAGE: Dai Jin, Employing Virtue (c. 1450) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 9

The Stoics say that there are several virtues and that they are inseparable from each other. 

And that in substance they are identical with the leading part of the soul; accordingly, they say that every virtue is and is called a "body"; for the intellect and the soul are bodies. For they believe that the inborn pneuma (breath) in us, which is warm, is soul. 

And they also want to claim that the soul in us is an animal, since it lives and has sense-perception, and especially so the leading part of it, which is called "intellect". 

That is why every virtue too is an animal, since in substance it is the same as the intellect; accordingly, they say also that prudence acts prudently. For it is consistent for them to speak thus. 

IMAGE: Pieter Boel, Fighting Animals as an Allegory of the Combat between Virtue and Vice (c. 1660) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 8

Diogenes of Babylon says that there are two senses of "things worth choosing for their own sake and worth choosing in the final sense": those set out in the previous division, which are the virtues, and those which have in themselves the cause of being worth choosing, and this is a property of every good thing. 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 7

All the virtues which are forms of knowledge and crafts have common theorems and the same goal, as was said, and consequently they are inseparable; for he who has one has them all, and he who acts with one virtue acts with all. 

They differ from each other in their topics. 

For the topics of prudence are, in the first instance, considering and doing what is to be done and, in the second instance, considering what one should distribute and what one should choose and what one should endure, for the sake of doing what is to be done without error. 

The topic of temperance is, in the first instance, to make the impulses stable and to consider them and, in the second instance, to consider the topics of the other virtues for the sake of behaving without error in one’s impulses. 

And similarly courage, in the first instance considers everything which one should endure and, in the second instance, the topics of the other virtues. 

And justice, in the first instance, looks to what is due to each person and, in the second instance, the other topics too. 

For all the virtues consider the topics of all the virtues and those which are subordinate to each other. 

For Panaetius used to say that what happened in the case of the virtues was like what would happen if there were one target set up for many archers, and this target had on it lines that differed in color; and then each were to aim at hitting the target—one by striking the white line, it might be, another by striking the black, and another by striking another colored line. 

For just as these archers make their highest goal the hitting of the target, but each sets before himself a different manner of hitting it, in the same way too all the virtues make being happy their goal, and this lies in living in agreement with nature, but each virtue achieves this in a different manner. 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 6

They say, then, that these virtues just listed are perfect in our lives and consist of theorems; but others supervene on them, which are no longer crafts but rather certain capabilities that come as a result of practice, for example, health of the soul and its soundness and strength and beauty. 

For just as the health of the body is a good blend of the hot and cold and wet and dry elements in the body, so too the health of the soul is a good blend of the beliefs in the soul. 

And similarly, just as strength of the body is a sufficient tension in the sinews, so too the strength of the soul is a sufficient tension in judging and acting and in not doing so. 

And just as beauty of the body is a symmetry of its limbs constituted with respect to each other and to the whole, so too the beauty of the soul is a symmetry of reason and its parts with respect to the whole of it and to each other. 

IMAGE:Leonardo da Vinci, Vitruvian Man (c. 1492) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 5

The goal of all these virtues is to live consistently with nature. 

Each one enables a human being to achieve this goal in his own way; for a human has from nature inclinations to discover what is appropriate, and to stabilize his impulses, and to stand firm, and to distribute fairly.  

And each of the virtues does what is consonant with these inclinations and does its own job, thus enabling a human being to live consistently with nature. 

IMAGE: Dosso Dossi, Jupiter, Mercury, and Virtue (1524) 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 4

Of virtues some are primary, some subordinate to the primary. 

There are four primary virtues: prudence, temperance, courage, justice. 

And prudence concerns appropriate acts; temperance concerns human impulses; courage  concerns instances of standing firm; justice concerns distributions. 

Of those subordinate to these, some are subordinate to prudence, some to temperance, some to courage, some to justice. 

To prudence are subordinate deliberative excellence, good calculation, quick-wittedness, good sense, a good sense of purpose, resourcefulness. 

To temperance: organization, orderliness, modesty, self-control. 

To courage: endurance, confidence, great-heartedness, stout-heartedness, love of work. 

To justice: piety, good-heartedness, public-spiritedness, fair dealing. 

They say, then, that deliberative excellence is a knowledge of the type and manner of actions which we must perform in order to act advantageously. 

Good calculation is knowledge which draws up a balance and summarizes the value of what happens and is produced. 

Quick-wittedness is knowledge which instantly finds out what the appropriate action is. 

Good sense is knowledge of what is better and worse.

A good sense of purpose is knowledge that achieves its goal in each action. 

Resourcefulness is knowledge that discovers a way out of difficulties. 

Organization is knowledge of when one is to act and what [to do] after what and in general of the ordering of actions. 

Orderliness is knowledge of appropriate and inappropriate motions.

Modesty is knowledge which is cautious about proper criticism.

Self-control is an unsurpassable knowledge of what is revealed by right reason. 

Endurance is knowledge which stands by correct decisions. 

Confidence is knowledge in virtue of which we know that we shall meet with nothing which is terrible. 

Great-heartedness is knowledge which makes one superior to those things which naturally occur among both virtuous and base men. 

Stout-heartedness is knowledge in a soul which makes it the soul invincible. 

Love of work is a knowledge which achieves its goal by labor, not being deterred by hard work. 

Piety is knowledge of service to the gods. 

Good-heartedness is knowledge which does good to others. 

Public-spiritedness is knowledge of fairness in a community. 

Fair dealing is knowledge of how to deal with one’s neighbors blamelessly. 

Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 3

Prudence is knowledge of what one is to do and not to do and what is neither, or the knowledge in a naturally social and rational animal of good things, bad things, and what is neither, and they say that this definition is to be understood to apply in the case of the rest of the virtues too. 

Temperance is knowledge of what is to be chosen and avoided and what is neither. 

Justice is knowledge of the distribution of proper value to each person. 

Courage is knowledge of what is terrible and what is not terrible and what is neither. 

Folly is ignorance of good things, bad things, and what is neither, or ignorance of what one is to do and not to do and what is neither. 

Wantonness is ignorance of what is worth choosing and worth avoiding and what is neither. 

Injustice is ignorance of the distribution of proper value to each person. 

Cowardice is ignorance of what is terrible and what is not terrible and what is neither. 

They define the other virtues and vices similarly, following what has been said.