“That which can fall to the lot of any man, no matter how base or despised he may be, is not a good. But wealth falls to the lot of the pander and the trainer of gladiators; therefore wealth is not a good.”
“Another wrong premise,” they say, “for we notice that goods fall to the lot of the very lowest sort of men, not only in the scholar’s art, but also in the art of healing or in the art of navigating.”
These arts, however, make no profession of greatness of soul; they do not rise to any heights nor do they frown upon what fortune may bring. It is virtue that uplifts man and places him superior to what mortals hold dear; virtue neither craves overmuch nor fears to excess that which is called good or that which is called bad.
Chelidon, one of Cleopatra’s eunuchs, possessed great wealth; and recently Natalis—a man whose tongue was as shameless as it was dirty, a man whose mouth used to perform the vilest offices—was the heir of many, and also made many his heirs. What then? Was it his money that made him unclean, or did he himself besmirch his money?
Money tumbles into the hands of certain men as a shilling tumbles down a sewer. Virtue stands above all such things. It is appraised in coin of its own minting; and it deems none of these random windfalls to be good.
But medicine and navigation do not forbid themselves and their followers to marvel at such things. One who is not a good man can nevertheless be a physician, or a pilot, or a scholar—yes, just as well as he can be a cook! He to whose lot it falls to possess something which is not of a random sort, cannot be called a random sort of man; a person is of the same sort as that which he possesses.
A strong box is worth just what it holds; or rather, it is a mere accessory of that which it holds. Whoever sets any price upon a full purse except the price established by the count of the money deposited therein? This also applies to the owners of great estates: they are only accessories and incidentals to their possessions.
—from Seneca, Moral Letters 87
I appreciate why the Peripatetics wished to describe the good through its circumstances, and how they sought to explain the virtues within their proper setting, but the danger is that we then conflate our happiness with our conveniences, and we confuse the perfection of our own nature with the perfection of other natures.
While there is no doubt that pebbles, or trees, or dogs have a particular goodness within them, it would be ridiculous to use this as a benchmark for the excellence of a man; look to the essence of the thing itself, not at its accidental relation to outside things. This is why the neighborhood I live in, and the contents of my bank account, and the list of people who happen to send me Christmas cards will never determine my inner worth.
I know full well how a life of poverty, sickness, and loneliness can be an incredible burden, and yet that which is difficult should not be mistaken for that which is impossible. Instead of yearning for a change in my fortune, let me work on an increase of my character, which has the power to transform any obstacle into an opportunity for greater understanding and love.
The Peripatetic can’t have it both ways. Don’t tell me that happiness is defined as the activity of a rational soul, and then add that certain amounts of money, health, and friends are also necessary conditions. It reminds me of those shifty bosses, who keep modifying the terms for a promotion, or those fake Christians, who say that you are justified by faith, except when you don’t put enough cash in the collection basket.
The Stoics refused, therefore, to speak of wealth, or any aspect of fortune, as a good. There is no direct connection between property and propriety, whatever the experts might say, because a state of affairs that is largely beyond our power does not reflect the merit of the judgements that are entirely within our power.
Can the circumstances somehow take on a quality of goodness for us? Yes, but only indirectly, insofar as we choose to make an appropriate use of them, in harmony with our natural calling to a life of the virtues. Therefore, you will find some people who employ their money to make themselves better, while you will find others who merely treat their affluence as an excuse to become worse.
This further applies to all of our human skills, so that however gifted a man may be at writing a book, or healing a patient, or sailing across the ocean, his goodness, in the one way that really matters, must proceed from the integrity of his conscience. I once met a fellow who was, by all accounts, one of the most brilliant chefs of our generation, though this did not stop him from simultaneously being one of the biggest scoundrels of our generation.
May I still refer to the “good” in a casual sense, as a general expression of distinction and approval? I suspect there is little harm in it, as long as I never lose sight of the absolute measure. Most anyone can attach himself to riches, but it will take a very special sort of person to stand out as a source of the greatest value.
—Reflection written in 2/2014
IMAGE: Jacopo Bassano, Lazarus and the Rich Man (1545)