TEXT: Diogenes Laërtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book 9: The Eleatics, Atomists, Pyrrhonists (tr C.D. Yonge)

Diogenes Laërtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, 

Book 9: The Eleatics, Atomists, Pyrrhonists(tr C.D. Yonge, 1895)

LIFE OF HERACLITUS.

I. Heraclitus was the son of Blyson, or, as some say, of Heracion, and a
citizen of Ephesus. He flourished about the sixty-ninth olympiad.

II. He was above all men of a lofty and arrogant spirit, as is plain from
his writings, in which he says, “Abundant learning does not form the
mind; for if it did, it would have instructed Hesiod, and Pythagoras,
and likewise Xenophanes, and Hecatæus. For the only piece of real wisdom
is to know that idea, which by itself will govern everything on every
occasion.” He used to say, too, that Homer deserved to be expelled from
the games and beaten, and Archilochus likewise. He used also to say,
“It is more necessary to extinguish insolence, than to put out a fire.”
Another of his sayings was, “The people ought to fight for the law, as
for their city.” He also attacks the Ephesians for having banished his
companion Hermodorus, when he says, “The Ephesians deserve to have all
their youth put to death, and all those who are younger still banished
from their city, inasmuch as they have banished Hermodorus, the best man
among them, saying, ‘Let no one of us be pre-eminently good; and if there
be any such person, let him go to another city and another people.’”

And when he was requested to make laws for them, he refused, because the
city was already immersed in a thoroughly bad constitution. And having
retired to the temple of Diana with his children, he began to play
at dice; and when all the Ephesians flocked round him, he said, “You
wretches, what are you wondering at? is it not better to do this, than to
meddle with public affairs in your company?”

III. And at last, becoming a complete misanthrope, he used to live,
spending his time in walking about the mountains; feeding on grasses
and plants, and in consequence of these habits, he was attacked by the
dropsy, and so then he returned to the city, and asked the physicians, in
a riddle, whether they were able to produce a drought after wet weather.
And as they did not understand him, he shut himself up in a stable for
oxen, and covered himself with cow-dung, hoping to cause the wet to
evaporate from him, by the warmth that this produced. And as he did
himself no go good in this way, he died, having lived seventy years; and
we have written an epigram upon him which runs thus:—

    I’ve often wondered much at Heraclitus,
    That he should chose to live so miserably,
    And die by such a miserable fate.
    For fell disease did master all his body,
    With water quenching all the light of his eyes,
    And bringing darkness o’er his mind and body.

But Hermippus states, that what he asked the physicians was this, whether
any one could draw off the water by depressing his intestines? and
when they answered that they could not, he placed himself in the sun,
and ordered his servants to plaster him over with cow-dung; and being
stretched out in that way, on the second day he died, and was buried
in the market-place. But Neanthes, of Cyzicus says, that as he could
not tear off the cow-dung, he remained there, and on account of the
alteration in his appearance, he was not discovered, and so was devoured
by the dogs.

IV. And he was a wonderful person, from his boyhood, since, while he was
young, he used to say that he knew nothing but when he had grown up, he
then used to affirm that he knew everything. And he was no one’s pupil,
but he used to say, that he himself had investigated every thing, and
had learned everything of himself. But Sotion relates, that some people
affirmed that he had been a pupil of Xenophanes. And that Ariston, stated
in his account of Heraclitus, that he was cured of the dropsy, and died
of some other disease. And Hippobotus gives the same account.

V. There is a book of his extant, which is about nature generally, and it
is divided into three discourses; one on the Universe; one on Politics;
and one on Theology. And he deposited this book in the temple of Diana,
as some authors report, having written it intentionally in an obscure
style, in order that only those who were able men might comprehend it,
and that it might not be exposed to ridicule at the hands of the common
people. Timon attacks this man also, saying:—

    Among them came that cuckoo Heraclitus
    The enigmatical obscure reviler
    Of all the common people.

Theophrastus asserts, that it was out of melancholy that he left some
of his works half finished, and wrote several, in completely different
styles; and Antisthenes, in his Successions, adduces as a proof of his
lofty spirit, the fact, that he yielded to his brother the title and
privileges of royalty.[121] And his book had so high a reputation, that
a sect arose in consequence of it, who were called after his own name,
Heracliteans.

VI. The following may be set down in a general manner as his main
principles: that everything is created from fire, and is dissolved into
fire; that everything happens according to destiny, and that all existing
things are harmonized, and made to agree together by opposite tendencies;
and that all things are full of souls and dæmones. He also discussed all
the passions which exist in the world, and used also to contend that the
sun was of that precise magnitude of which he appears to be. One of his
sayings too was, that no one, by whatever road he might travel, could
ever possibly find out the boundaries of the soul, so deeply hidden are
the principles which regulate it. He used also to call opinion the sacred
disease; and to say that eye-sight was often deceived. Sometimes, in his
writings, he expresses himself with great brilliancy and clearness; so
that even the most stupid man may easily understand him, and receive an
elevation of soul from him. And his conciseness, and the dignity of his
style, are incomparable.

In particulars, his doctrines are of this kind. That fire is an
element, and that it is by the changes of fire that all things exist;
being engendered sometimes by rarity, some times by density. But he
explains nothing clearly. He also says, that everything is produced by
contrariety, and that everything flows on like a river; that the universe
is finite, and that there is one world, and that that is produced from
fire, and that the whole world is in its turn again consumed by fire at
certain periods, and that all this happens according to fate. That of the
contraries, that which leads to production is called war and contest, and
that which leads to the conflagration is called harmony and peace; that
change is the road leading upward, and the road leading downward; and
that the whole world exists according to it.

For that fire, when densified becomes liquid, and becoming concrete,
becomes also water; again, that the water when concrete is turned to
earth, and that this is the road down; again, that the earth itself
becomes fused, from which water is produced, and from that everything
else is produced; and then he refers almost everything to the evaporation
which takes place from the sea; and this is the road which leads upwards.
Also, that there are evaporations, both from earth and sea, some of which
are bright and clear, and some are dark; and that the fire is increased
by the dark ones, and the moisture by the others. But what the space
which surrounds us is, he does not explain. He states, however, that
there are vessels in it, turned with their hollow part towards us; in
which all the bright evaporations are collected, and form flames, which
are the stars; and that the brightest of these flames, and the hottest,
is the light of the sun; for that all the other stars are farther off
from the earth; and that on this account, they give less light and
warmth; and that the moon is nearer the earth, but does not move through
a pure space; the sun, on the other hand, is situated in a transparent
space, and one free from all admixture, preserving a well proportioned
distance from us, on which account it gives us more light and more heat.
And that the sun and moon are eclipsed, when the before-mentioned vessels
are turned upwards. And that the different phases of the moon take place
every month, as its vessel keeps gradually turning round. Moreover, that
day and night, and months and years, and rains and winds, and things
of that kind, all exist according to, and are caused by, the different
evaporations.

For that the bright evaporation catching fire in the circle of the sun
causes day, and the predominance of the opposite one causes night; and
again, from the bright one the heat is increased so as to produce summer,
and from the dark one the cold gains strength and produces winter; and
he also explains the causes of the other phenomena in a corresponding
manner.

But with respect to the earth, he does not explain at all of what
character it is, nor does he do so in the case of the vessels; and these
were his main doctrines.

VII. Now, what his opinion about Socrates was, and what expressions he
used when he met with a treatise of his which Euripides brought him,
according to the story told by Ariston, we have detailed in our account
of Socrates. Seleucus, the grammarian, however, says that a man of the
name of Croton, in his Diver, relates that it was a person of the name
of Crates who first brought this book into Greece; and that he said that
he wanted some Delian diver who would not be drowned in it. And the book
is described under several titles; some calling it the Muses, some a
treatise on Nature; but Diodotus calls it—

    A well compacted helm to lead a man
    Straight through the path of life.

Some call it a science of morals, the arrangement of the changes[122] of
unity and of everything.

VIII. They say that when he was asked why he preserved silence, he said,
“That you may talk.”

IX. Darius was very desirous to enjoy his conversation; and wrote thus to
him:—

KING DARIUS, THE SON OF HYSTASPES, ADDRESSES HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS, THE
WISE MAN, GREETING HIM.

“You have written a book on Natural Philosophy, difficult to understand
and difficult to explain. Accordingly, if in some parts it is explained
literally, it seems to disclose a very important theory concerning the
universal world, and all that is contained in it, as they are placed in a
state of most divine motion. But commonly, the mind is kept in suspense,
so that those who have studied your work the most, are not able precisely
to disentangle the exact meaning of your expressions. Therefore, king
Darius, the son of Hystaspes wishes to enjoy the benefit of hearing you
discourse, and of receiving some Grecian instruction. Come, therefore,
quickly to my sight, and to my royal palace; for the Greeks, in
general, do not accord to wise men the distinction which they deserve,
and disregard the admirable expositions delivered by them, which are,
however, worthy of being seriously listened to and studied; but with me
you shall have every kind of distinction and honour, and you shall enjoy
every day honourable and worthy conversation, and your pupils’ life shall
become virtuous, in accordance with your precepts.”

HERACLITUS, OF EPHESUS, TO KING DARIUS, THE SON OF HYSTASPES, GREETING.

“All the men that exist in the world, are far removed from truth and
just dealings; but they are full of evil foolishness, which leads them
to insatiable covetousness and vain-glorious ambition. I, however,
forgetting all their worthlessness, and shunning satiety, and who wish
to avoid all envy on the part of my countrymen, and all appearance of
arrogance, will never come to Persia, since I am quite contented with a
little, and live as best suits my own inclination.”

X. This was the way in which the man behaved even to the king. And
Demetrius, in his treatise on People of the same Name, says that he also
despised the Athenians, among whom he had a very high reputation. And
that though he was himself despised by the Ephesians, he nevertheless
preferred his own home. Demetrius Phalereus also mentions him in his
Defence of Socrates.

XI. There were many people who undertook to interpret his book. For
Antisthenes and Heraclides, Ponticus, and Cleanthes, and Sphærus the
Stoic; and besides them Pausanias, who was surnamed Heraclitistes, and
Nicomedes, and Dionysius, all did so. And of the grammarians, Diodotus
undertook the same task; and he says that the subject of the book is not
natural philosophy, but politics; and that all that is said in it about
natural philosophy, is only by way of illustration. And Hieronymus tells
us, that a man of the name of Scythinus, an iambic poet, attempted to
render the book into verse.

XII. There are many epigrams extant which were written upon him, and this
is one of them:—

    I who lie here am Heraclitus, spare me
    Ye rude unlettered men: ’Twas not for you
    That I did labour, but for wiser people.
    One man may be to me a countless host,
    And an unnumbered multitude be no one;
    And this I still say in the shades below.

And there is another expressed thus:—

    Be not too hasty, skimming o’er the book
    Of Heraclitus; ’tis a difficult road,
    For mist is there, and darkness hard to pierce.
    But if you have a guide who knows his system,
    Then everything is clearer than the sun.

XIII. There were five people of the name of Heraclitus. The first
was this philosopher of ours. The second a lyric poet, who wrote a
panegyrical hymn on the Twelve Gods. The third was an Elegiac poet, of
Halicarnassus; on whom Callimachus wrote the following epigram:—

    I heard, O Heraclitus, of your death,
    And the news filled my eyes with mournful tears,
    When I remembered all the happy hours
    When we with talk beguiled the setting sun.
    You now are dust; but still the honeyed voice
    Of your sweet converse doth and will survive;
    Nor can fell death, which all things else destroys,
    Lay upon that his ruthless conquering grasp.

The fourth was a Lesbian, who wrote a history of Macedonia. The fifth was
a man who blended jest with earnest; and who, having been a harp-player,
abandoned that profession for a serio-comic style of writing.


LIFE OF XENOPHANES.

I. Xenophanes was the son of Dexius, or, as Apollodorus says, of
Orthomenes. He was a citizen of Colophon; and is praised by Timon.
Accordingly, he says:—

    Xenophanes, not much a slave to vanity,
    The wise reprover of the tricks of Homer.

He, having been banished from his own country, lived at Zancle, in Sicily,
and at Catana.

II. And, according to the statements made by some people, he was a pupil
of no one; but, as others say, he was a pupil of Boton the Athenian; or,
as another account again affirms, of Archelaus. He was, if we may believe
Sotion, a contemporary of Anaximander.

III. He wrote poems in hexameter and in elegiac verse; and also he wrote
iambics against Hesiod and Homer, attacking the things said in their
poems about the Gods. He also used to recite his own poems. It is said
likewise, that he argued against the opinions of Thales and Pythagoras,
and that he also attacked Epimenides. He lived to an extreme old age; as
he says somewhere himself:—

    Threescore and seven long years are fully passed,
    Since first my doctrines spread abroad through Greece:
    And ’twixt that time and my first view of light
    Six lustres more must added be to them:
    If I am right at all about my age,
    Lacking but eight years of a century.

His doctrine was, that there were four elements of existing things; and
an infinite number of worlds, which were all unchangeable. He thought
that the clouds were produced by the vapour which was borne upwards from
the sun, and which lifted them up into the circumambient space. That the
essence of God was of a spherical form, in no respect resembling man;
that the universe could see, and that the universe could hear, but could
not breathe; and that it was in all its parts intellect, and wisdom, and
eternity. He was the first person who asserted that everything which is
produced is perishable, and that the soul is a spirit. He used also to
say that the many was inferior to unity. Also, that we ought to associate
with tyrants either as little as possible, or else as pleasantly as
possible.

When Empedocles said to him that the wise man was undiscoverable, he
replied, “Very likely; for it takes a wise man to discover a wise
man.” And Sotion says, that he was the first person who asserted that
everything is incomprehensible. But he is mistaken in this.

Xenophanes wrote a poem on the Founding of Colophon; and also, on the
Colonisation of Elea, in Italy, consisting of two thousand verses. And he
flourished about the sixtieth olympiad.

IV. Demetrius Phalereus, in his treatise on Old Age, and Phenætius the
Stoic, in his essay on Cheerfulness, relate that he buried his sons
with his own hands, as Anaxagoras had also done. And he seems to have
been detested[123] by the Pythagoreans, Parmeniscus, and Orestades, as
Phavorinus relates in the first book of his Commentaries.

V. There was also another Xenophanes, a native of Lesbos, and an iambic
poet.

These are the Promiscuous or unattached philosophers.


LIFE OF PARMENIDES.

I. Parmenides, the son of Pyres, and a citizen of Velia, was a pupil of
Xenophanes. And Theophrastus, in his Abridgment, says that he was also a
pupil of Anaximander. However, though he was a pupil of Xenophanes, he
was not afterwards a follower of his; but he attached himself to Aminias,
and Diochaetes the Pythagorean, as Sotion relates, which last was a poor
but honourable and virtuous man. And he it was whose follower he became,
and after he was dead he erected a shrine, or ἡρῷον, in his honour. And
so Parmenides, who was of a noble family and possessed of considerable
wealth, was induced, not by Xenophanes but by Aminias, to embrace the
tranquil life of a philosopher.

II. He was the first person who asserted that the earth was of a
spherical form; and that it was situated in the centre of the universe.
He also taught that there were two elements, fire and earth; and that one
of them occupies the place of the maker, the other that of the matter.
He also used to teach that man was originally made out of clay; and that
they were composed of two parts, the hot and the cold; of which, in fact,
everything consists. Another of his doctrines was, that the mind and the
soul were the same thing, as we are informed by Theophrastus, in his
Natural Philosophy, when he enumerates the theories of nearly all the
different philosophers.

He also used to say that philosophy was of a twofold character; one kind
resting on certain truth, the other on opinion. On which account he says
some where:

    And ’twill be needful for you well to know,
    The fearless heart of all-convincing truth:
    Also the opinions, though less sure, of men,
    Which rest upon no certain evidence.

III. Parmenides too philosophizes in his poems; as Hesiod and Xenophanes,
and Empedocles used to. And he used to say that argument was the test
of truth; and that the sensations were not trustworthy witnesses.
Accordingly, he says:—

    Let not the common usages of men
    Persuade your better taught experience,
    To trust to men’s unsafe deceitful sight,
    Or treacherous ears, or random speaking tongue:
    Reason alone will prove the truth of facts.

On which account Timon says of him:—

    The vigorous mind of wise Parmenides,
    Who classes all the errors of the thoughts
    Under vain phantasies.

Plato inscribed one of his dialogues with his name—Parmenides, or an
essay on Ideas. He flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad. He appears
to have been the first person who discovered that Hesperus and Lucifer
were the same star, as Phavorinus records, in the fifth book of his
Commentaries. Some, however, attribute this discovery to Pythagoras. And
Callimachus asserts that the poem in which this doctrine is promulgated
is not his work.

IV. He is said also to have given laws to his fellow-citizens, as
Speusippus records, in his account of the Philosophers. He was also the
first employer of the question called the Achilles,[124] as Phavorinus
assures us in his Universal History.

V. There was also another Parmenides, an orator, who wrote a treatise on
the art of Oratory.


LIFE OF MELISSUS.

I. Melissus was a Samian, and the son of Ithagenes. He was a pupil
of Parmenides; but he also had conversed with Heraclitus, when he
recommended him to the Ephesians, who were unacquainted with him, as
Hippocrates recommended Democritus to the people of Abdera.

II. He was a man greatly occupied in political affairs, and held in
great esteem among his fellow citizens; on which account he was elected
admiral. And he was admired still more on account of his private virtues.

III. His doctrine was, that the Universe was infinite, unsusceptible of
change, immoveable, and one, being always like to itself, and complete;
and that there was no such thing as real motion, but that there only
appeared to be such. As respecting the Gods, too, he denied that there
was any occasion to give a definition of them, for that there was no
certain knowledge of them.

IV. Apollodorus states that he flourished about the eighty-fourth
olympiad.


LIFE OF ZENO, THE ELEATIC.

I. Zeno was a native of Velia. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, says that
he was by nature the son of Teleutagoras, but by adoption the son of
Parmenides.

II. Timon speaks thus of him and Melissus:—

    Great is the strength, invincible the might
    Of Zeno, skilled to argue on both sides
    Of any question, th’ universal critic;
    And of Melissus too. They rose superior
    To prejudice in general; only yielding
    To very few.

And Zeno had been a pupil of Parmenides, and had been on other accounts
greatly attached to him.

III. He was a tall man, as Plato tells us in his Parmenides, and the
same writer, in his Phædrus, calls him also the Eleatic Palamedes.

IV. Aristotle, in his Sophist, says that he was the inventor of
dialectics, as Empedocles was of rhetoric. And he was a man of the
greatest nobleness of spirit, both in philosophy and in politics. There
are also many books extant, which are attributed to him, full of great
learning and wisdom.

V. He, wishing to put an end to the power of Nearches, the tyrant (some,
however, call the tyrant Diomedon), was arrested, as we are informed by
Heraclides, in his abridgment of Satyrus. And when he was examined, as
to his accomplices, and as to the arms which he was taking to Lipara, he
named all the friends of the tyrant as his accomplices, wishing to make
him feel himself alone. And then, after he had mentioned some names,
he said that he wished to whisper something privately to the tyrant;
and when he came near him he bit him, and would not leave his hold till
he was stabbed. And the same thing happened to Aristogiton, the tyrant
slayer. But Demetrius, in his treatise on People of the same Name, says
that it was his nose that he bit off.

Moreover, Antisthenes, in his Successions, says that after he had given
him information against his friends, he was asked by the tyrant if
there was any one else. And he replied, “Yes, you, the destruction of
the city.” And that he also said to the bystanders, “I marvel at your
cowardice, if you submit to be slaves to the tyrant out of fear of such
pains as I am now enduring.” And at last he bit off his tongue and spit
it at him; and the citizens immediately rushed forward, and slew the
tyrant with stones. And this is the account that is given by almost every
one.

But Hermippus says, that he was put into a mortar, and pounded to death.
And we ourselves have written the following epigram on him:—

    Your noble wish, O Zeno, was to slay
    A cruel tyrant, freeing Elea
    From the harsh bonds of shameful slavery,
    But you were disappointed; for the tyrant
    Pounded you in a mortar. I say wrong,
    He only crushed your body, and not you.

VI. And Zeno was an excellent man in other respects, and he was also
a despiser of great men in an equal degree with Heraclitus; for he,
too, preferred the town which was formerly called Hyele, and afterwards
Elea, being a colony of the Phocæans, and his own native place, a poor
city possessed of no other importance than the knowledge of how to raise
virtuous citizens, to the pride of the Athenians; so that he did not
often visit them, but spent his life at home.

VII. He, too, was the first man who asked the question called
Achilles,[125] though Phavorinus attributes its first use to Parmenides,
and several others.

VIII. His chief doctrines were, that there were several worlds, and that
there was no vacuum; that the nature of all things consisted of hot and
cold, and dry and moist, these elements interchanging their substances
with one another; that man was made out of the earth, and that his soul
was a mixture of the before-named elements in such a way that no one of
them predominated.

IX. They say that when he was reproached, he was indignant; and that
when some one blamed him, he replied, “If when I am reproached, I am not
angered, then I shall not be pleased when I am praised.”

X. We have already said in our account of the Cittiæan, that there were
eight Zenos; but this one flourished about the seventy-ninth olympiad.


LIFE OF LEUCIPPUS.

I. Leucippus was a native of Velia, but, as some say, of Abdera; and, as
others report, of Melos.

II. He was a pupil of Zeno. And his principal doctrines were, that all
things were infinite, and were interchanged with one another; and that
the universe was a vacuum, and full of bodies; also that the worlds were
produced by bodies falling into the vacuum, and becoming entangled with
one another; and that the nature of the stars originated in motion,
according to their increase; also, that the sun is borne round in a
greater circle around the moon; that the earth is carried on revolving
round the centre; and that its figure resembles a drum; he was the first
philosopher who spoke of atoms as principles.

III. These are his doctrines in general; in particular detail, they are
as follow: he says that the universe is infinite, as I have already
mentioned; that of it, one part is a plenum, and the other a vacuum. He
also says that the elements, and the worlds which are derived from them,
are infinite, and are dissolved again into them; and that the worlds are
produced in this manner: That many bodies, of various kinds and shapes,
are borne by amputation from the infinite, into a vast vacuum; and then,
they being collected together, produce one vortex; according to which
they, dashing against one another, and whirling about in every direction,
are separated in such a way that like attaches itself to like.

But as they are all of equal weight, when by reason of their number they
are no longer able to whirl about, the thin ones depart into the outer
vacuum, as if they bounded through, and the others remain behind, and
becoming entangled with one another, run together, and produce a sort of
spherical shaped figure.

This subsists as a kind of membrane; containing within itself bodies of
every kind; and as these are whirled about so as to revolve according to
the resistance of the centre, the circumambient membrane becomes thin,
since bodies are without ceasing, uniting according to the impulse given
by the vortex; and in this way the earth is produced, since these bodies
which have once been brought to the centre remain there.

On the other side, there is produced another enveloping membrane, which
increases incessantly by the accretion of exterior bodies; and which, as
it is itself animated by a circular movement, drags with it, and adds to
itself, everything it meets with; some of these bodies thus enveloped
re-unite again and form compounds, which are at first moist and clayey,
but soon becoming dry, and being drawn on in the universal movement of
the circular vortex, they catch fire, and constitute the substance of the
stars. The orbit of the sun is the most distant one; that of the moon is
the nearest to the earth; and between the two are the orbits of the other
stars.

All the stars are set on fire by the rapidity of their own motion; and
the sun is set on fire by the stars; the moon has only a slight quantity
of fire; the sun and the moon are eclipsed in …[126] in consequence of
the inclination of the earth towards the south. In the north it always
snows, and those districts are cold, and are often frozen.

The sun is eclipsed but seldom; but the moon frequently, because her
orbits are unequal.

Leucippus admits also, that the production of worlds, their increase,
their diminution, and their destruction, depend on a certain necessity,
the character of which he does not precisely explain.


LIFE OF DEMOCRITUS.

I. Democritus was the son of Hegesistratus, but as some say, of
Athenocrites, and, according to other accounts, of Damasippus. He was
a native of Abdera, or, as it is stated by some authors, a citizen of
Miletus.

II. He was a pupil of some of the Magi and Chaldæans, whom Xerxes had
left with his father as teachers, when he had been hospitably received
by him, as Herodotus informs us;[127] and from these men he, while still
a boy, learned the principles of astronomy and theology. Afterwards, his
father entrusted him to Leucippus, and to Anaxagoras, as some authors
assert, who was forty years older than he. And Phavorinus, in his
Universal History, says that Democritus said of Anaxagoras, that his
opinions about the sun and moon were not his own, but were old theories,
and that he had stolen them. And that he used also to pull to pieces his
assertions about the composition of the world, and about mind, as he was
hostile to him, because he had declined to admit him as a pupil. How then
can he have been a pupil of his, as some assert? And Demetrius in his
treatise on People of the same Name, and Antisthenes in his Successions,
both affirm that he travelled to Egypt to see the priests there, and
to learn mathematics of them; and that he proceeded further to the
Chaldæans, and penetrated into Persia, and went as far as the Persian
Gulf. Some also say that he made acquaintance with the Gymnosophists in
India, and that he went to Æthiopia.

III. He was one of three brothers who divided their patrimony among them;
and the most common story is, that he took the smaller portion, as it was
in money, because he required money for the purpose of travelling; though
his brothers suspected him of entertaining some treacherous design. And
Demetrius says, that his share amounted to more than a hundred talents,
and that he spent the whole of it.

IV. He also says, that he was so industrious a man, that he cut off for
himself a small portion of the garden which surrounded his house, in
which there was a small cottage, and shut himself up in it. And on one
occasion, when his father brought him an ox to sacrifice, and fastened it
there, he for a long time did not discover it, until his father having
roused him, on the pretext of the sacrifice, told him what he had done
with the ox.

V. He further asserts, that it is well known that he went to Athens, and
as he despised glory, he did not desire to be known; and that he became
acquainted with Socrates, without Socrates knowing who he was. “For I
came,” says he, “to Athens, and no one knew me.” “If,” says Thrasylus,
“the Rivals is really the work of Plato, then Democritus must be the
anonymous interlocutor, who is introduced in that dialogue, besides
Œnopides and Anaxagoras, the one I mean who, in the conversation with
Socrates, is arguing about philosophy, and whom the philosopher tells,
that a philosopher resembles a conqueror in the Pentathlum.” And he was
veritably a master of five branches of philosophy. For he was thoroughly
acquainted with physics, and ethics, and mathematics, and the whole
encyclic system, and indeed he was thoroughly experienced and skilful in
every kind of art. He it was who was the author of the saying, “Speech
is the shadow of action.” But Demetrius Phalereus, in his Defence of
Socrates, affirms that he never came to Athens at all. And that is a
still stranger circumstance than any, if he despised so important a
city, not wishing to derive glory from the place in which he was, but
preferring rather himself to invest the place with glory.

VI. And it is evident from his writings, what sort of man he was.
“He seems,” says Thrasylus, “to have been also an admirer of the
Pythagoreans.” And he mentions Pythagoras himself, speaking of him with
admiration, in the treatise which is inscribed with his name. And he
appears to have derived all his doctrines from him to such a degree, that
one would have thought that he had been his pupil, if the difference
of time did not prevent it. At all events, Glaucus, of Rhegium, who
was a contemporary of his, affirms that he was a pupil of some of the
Pythagorean school.

And Apollodorus, of Cyzicus, says that he was intimate with Philolaus;
“He used to practise himself,” says Antisthenes, “in testing perceptions
in various manners; sometimes retiring into solitary places, and spending
his time even among tombs.”

VII. And he further adds, that when he returned from his travels, he
lived in a most humble manner; like a man who had spent all his property,
and that on account of his poverty, he was supported by his brother
Damasus. But when he had foretold some future event, which happened
as he had predicted, and had in consequence become famous, he was for
all the rest of his life thought worthy of almost divine honours by
the generality of people. And as there was a law, that a man who had
squandered the whole of his patrimony, should not be allowed funeral
rites in his country, Antisthenes says, that he, being aware of this
law, and not wishing to be exposed to the calumnies of those who envied
him, and would be glad to accuse him, recited to the people his work
called the Great World, which is far superior to all his other writings,
and that as a reward for it he was presented with five hundred talents;
and not only that, but he also had some brazen statues erected in his
honour. And when he died, he was buried at the public expense; after
having attained the age of more than a hundred years. But Demetrius says,
that it was his relations who read the Great World, and that they were
presented with a hundred talents only; and Hippobotus coincides in this
statement.

VIII. And Aristoxenus, in his Historic Commentaries, says that Plato
wished to burn all the writings of Democritus that he was able to
collect; but that Amyclas and Cleinias, the Pythagoreans, prevented him,
as it would do no good; for that copies of his books were already in many
hands. And it is plain that that was the case; for Plato, who mentions
nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; not
even in those passages where he has occasion to contradict his theories,
evidently, because he said that if he did, he would be showing his
disagreement with the best of all philosophers; a man whom even Timon
praises in the following terms:—

    Like that Democritus, wisest of men,
    Sage ruler of his speech; profound converser,
    Whose works I love to read among the first.

IX. But he was, according to the statement made by himself in the Little
World, a youth when Anaxagoras was an old man, being forty years younger
than he was. And he says, that he composed the Little World seven hundred
and thirty years after the capture of Troy. And he must have been born,
according to the account given by Apollodorus in his Chronicles, in the
eightieth olympiad; but, as Thrasylus says, in his work entitled the
Events, which took place before the reading of the books of Democritus,
in the third year of the seventy-seventh olympiad, being, as it is there
stated, one year older than Socrates. He must therefore have been a
contemporary of Archelaus, the pupil of Anaxagoras, and of Œnopides,
for he makes mention of this letter. He also speaks of the theories of
Parmenides and Zeno, on the subject of the One, as they were the men of
the highest reputation in histories, and he also speaks of Protagoras of
Abdera, who confessedly lived at the same time as Socrates.

X. Athenodorus tells us, in the eighth book of his Conversations, that
once, when Hippocrates came to see him, he ordered some milk to be
brought; and that, when he saw the milk, he said that it was the milk
of a black goat, with her first kid; on which Hippocrates marvelled at
his accurate knowledge. Also, as a young girl came with Hippocrates, on
the first day, he saluted her thus, “Good morning, my maid;” but on the
next day, “Good morning, woman;” for, indeed, she had ceased to be a maid
during the night.

XI. And Hermippus relates, that Democritus died in the following manner:
he was exceedingly old, and appeared at the point of death; and his
sister was lamenting that he would die during the festival of the
Thesmophoria,[128] and so prevent her from discharging her duties to the
Goddess; and so he bade her be of good cheer, and desired her to bring
him hot loaves every day. And, by applying these to his nostrils, he kept
himself alive even over the festival. But when the days of the festival
were passed (and it lasted three days), then he expired, without any
pain, as Hipparchus assures us, having lived a hundred and nine years.
And we have written an epigram upon him in our collection of poems in
every metre, which runs thus:—

    What man was e’er so wise, who ever did
    So great a deed as this Democritus?
    Who kept off death, though present for three days,
    And entertained him with hot steam of bread.

Such was the life of this man.

XII. Now his principal doctrines were these. That atoms and the vacuum
were the beginning of the universe; and that everything else existed
only in opinion. That the worlds were infinite, created, and perishable.
But that nothing was created out of nothing, and that nothing was
destroyed so as to become nothing. That the atoms were infinite both
in magnitude and number, and were borne about through the universe in
endless revolutions. And that thus they produced all the combinations
that exist; fire, water, air, and earth; for that all these things are
only combinations of certain atoms; which combinations are incapable of
being affected by external circumstances, and are unchangeable by reason
of their solidity. Also, that the sun and the moon are formed by such
revolutions and round bodies; and in like manner the soul is produced;
and that the soul and the mind are identical: that we see by the falling
of visions across our sight; and that everything that happens, happens of
necessity. Motion, being the cause of the production of everything, which
he calls necessity. The chief good he asserts to be cheerfulness; which,
however, he does not consider the same as pleasure; as some people, who
have misunderstood him, have fancied that he meant; but he understands by
cheerfulness, a condition according to which the soul lives calmly and
steadily, being disturbed by no fear, or superstition, or other passion.
He calls this state εὐθυμία, and εὐεστὼ, and several other names.
Everything which is made he looks upon as depending for its existence on
opinion; but atoms and the vacuum he believes exist by nature. These were
his principal opinions.

XIII. Of his books, Thrasylus has given a regular catalogue, in the same
way that he has arranged the works of Plato, dividing them into four
classes.

Now these are his ethical works. The Pythagoras; a treatise on the
Disposition of the Wise Man; an essay on those in the Shades Below; the
Tritogeneia (this is so called because from Minerva three things are
derived which hold together all human affairs); a treatise on Manly
Courage or Valour; the Horn of Amalthea; an essay on Cheerfulness; a
volume of Ethical Commentaries. A treatise entitled, For Cheerfulness,
(εὐεστὼ) is not found.

These are his writings on natural philosophy. The Great World (which
Theophrastus asserts to be the work of Leucippus); the Little World; the
Cosmography; a treatise on the Planets; the first book on Nature; two
books on the Nature of Man, or on Flesh; an essay on the Mind; one on the
Senses (some people join these two together in one volume, which they
entitle, on the Soul); a treatise on Juices; one on Colours; one on the
Different Figures; one on the Changes of Figures; the Cratynteria (that
is to say, an essay, approving of what has been said in preceding ones);
a treatise on Phænomenon, or on Providence; three books on Pestilences,
or Pestilential Evils; a book of Difficulties. These are his books on
natural philosophy.

His miscellaneous works are these. Heavenly Causes; Aërial Causes; Causes
affecting Plane Surfaces; Causes referring to Fire, and to what is in
Fire; Causes affecting Voices; Causes affecting Seeds, and Plants, and
Fruits; three books of Causes affecting Animals; Miscellaneous Causes; a
treatise on the Magnet. These are his miscellaneous works.

His mathematical writings are the following. A treatise on the Difference
of Opinion, or on the Contact of the Circle and the Sphere; one on
Geometry; one on Numbers; one on Incommensurable Lines, and Solids,
in two books; a volume called Explanations; the Great Year, or the
Astronomical Calendar; a discussion on the Clepsydra; the Map of the
Heavens; Geography; Polography; Actinography, or a discussion on Rays of
Light. These are his mathematical works.

His works on music are the following. A treatise on Rhythm and Harmony;
one on Poetry; one on the beauty of Epic Poems; one on Euphonious and
Discordant Letters; one on Homer, or on Propriety of Diction[129] and
Dialects; one on Song, one on Words; the Onomasticon. These are his
musical works.

The following are his works on art. Prognostics; a treatise on the Way
of Living, called also Diætetics, or the Opinions of a Physician; Causes
relating to Unfavourable and Favourable Opportunities; a treatise on
Agriculture, called also the Georgic; one on Painting; Tactics, and
Fighting in heavy Armour. These are his works on such subjects.

Some authors also give a list of some separate treatises which they
collect from his Commentaries. A treatise on the Sacred Letters seen at
Babylon; another on the Sacred Letters seen at Meroe; the Voyage round
the Ocean; a treatise on History; a Chaldaic Discourse; a Phrygian
Discourse; a treatise on Fever; an essay on those who are attacked with
Cough after illness; the Principles of Laws; Things made by Hand, or
Problems.

As to the other books which some writers ascribed to him, some are merely
extracts from his other writings, and some are confessedly the work of
others. And this is a sufficient account of his writings.

XIV. There were six people of the name of Democritus. The first was this
man of whom we are speaking; the second was a musician of Chios, who
lived about the same time; the third was a sculptor who is mentioned by
Antigonus; the fourth is a man who wrote a treatise on the Temple at
Ephesus, and on the city of Samothrace; the fifth was an epigrammatic
poet, of great perspicuity and elegance; the sixth was a citizen of
Pergamus, who wrote a treatise on Oratory.


LIFE OF PROTAGORAS.

I. Protagoras was the son of Artemon, or, as Apollodorus says (which
account is corroborated by Deinon, in his History of Persia), of Mæander.
He was a native of Abdera, as Heraclides Ponticus tell us, in his
treatise on Laws; and the same authority informs us that he made laws
for the Thurians. But, according to the statement of Eupolis, in his
Flatterers, he was a native of Teos; for he says:—

    Within you’ll find Protagoras, of Teos.

He, and Prodicus of Ceos, used to levy contributions for giving their
lectures; and Plato, in his Protagoras, says that Prodicus had a very
powerful voice.

II. Protagoras was a pupil of Democritus. And he was surnamed Wisdom, as
Phavorinus informs us in his Universal History.

III. He was the first person who asserted that in every question there
were two sides to the argument exactly opposite to one another. And he
used to employ them in his arguments, being the first person who did so.
But he began something in this manner: “Man is the measure of all things:
of those things which exist as he is; and of those things which do not
exist as he is not.” And he used to say that nothing else was soul except
the senses, as Plato says, in the Theætetus; and that everything was
true. And another of his treatises he begins in this way: “Concerning the
Gods, I am not able to know to a certainty whether they exist or whether
they do not. For there are many things which prevent one from knowing,
especially the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of the life of
man.” And on account of this beginning of his treatise, he was banished
by the Athenians. And they burnt his books in the market-place, calling
them in by the public crier, and compelling all who possessed them to
surrender them.

He was the first person who demanded payment of his pupils; fixing
his charge at a hundred minæ. He was also the first person who gave a
precise definition of the parts of time; and who explained the value of
opportunity, and who instituted contests of argument, and who armed the
disputants with the weapon of sophism. He it was too who first left facts
out of consideration, and fastened his arguments on words; and who was
the parent of the present superficial and futile kinds of discussion. On
which account Timon says of him:—

    Protagoras, that slippery arguer,
    In disputatious contests fully skilled.

He too, it was, who first invented that sort of argument which is called
the Socratic, and who first employed the reasonings of Antisthenes, which
attempt to establish the point that they cannot be contradicted; as Plato
tells us in his Euthydemus. He was also the first person who practised
regular discussions on set subjects, as Artemidorus, the dialectician,
tells us in his treatise against Chrysippus. He was also the original
inventor of the porter’s pad for men to carry their burdens on, as we
are assured by Aristotle, in his book on Education; for he himself was a
porter, as Epicurus says somewhere or other. And it was in this way that
he became highly thought of by Democritus, who saw him as he was tying up
some sticks.

He was also the first person who divided discourse into four parts;
entreaty, interrogation, answer, and injunction: though some writers
make the parts seven; narration, interrogation, answer, injunction,
promise, entreaty, and invocation; and these he called the foundations of
discourse: but Alcidamas says that there are four divisions of discourse;
affirmation, denial, interrogation, and invocation.

V. The first of his works that he ever read in public was the treatise
on the Gods, the beginning of which we have quoted above, and he read
this at Athens in the house of Euripides, or, as some say, in that
of Megaclides; others say that he read it in the Lyceum; his pupil,
Archagoras, the son of Theodotus, giving him the aid of his voice. His
accuser was Pythodorus, the son of Polyzelus, one of the four hundred;
but Aristotle calls him Evathlus.

VI. The writings of his which are still extant are these: a treatise on
the Art of Contention; one on Wrestling; one on Mathematics; one on a
Republic; one on Ambition; one on Virtues; one on the Original Condition
of Man; one on those in the Shades Below; one on the Things which are not
done properly by Men; one volume of Precepts; one essay entitled Justice
in Pleading for Hire; two books of Contradictions.

These are his books.

Plato also addressed a dialogue to him.

VII. Philochorus relates that, as he was sailing to Sicily his ship was
wrecked, and that this circumstance is alluded to by Euripides in his
Ixion; and some say that he died on his journey, being about ninety years
old. But Apollodorus states his age at seventy years, and says that he
was a sophist forty years, and that he flourished about the eighty-fourth
Olympiad. There is an epigram upon him written by myself, in the
following terms:—

    I hear accounts of you, Protagoras,
    That, travelling far from Athens, on the road,
    You, an old man, and quite infirm, did die.
    For Cecrops’ city drove you forth to exile;
    But you, though ’scaping dread Minerva’s might,
    Could not escape the outspread arms of Pluto.

VIII. It is said that once, when he demanded of Evathlus his pupil
payment for his lessons, Evathlus said to him, “But I have never been
victorious in an argument;” and he rejoined, “But if I gain my cause,
then I should naturally receive the fruits of my victory, and so would
you obtain the fruits of yours.”

IX. There was also another Protagoras, an astronomer, on whom Euphorion
wrote an elegy; and a third also, who was a philosopher of the Stoic
sect.


LIFE OF DIOGENES, OF APOLLONIA.

I. Diogenes was a native of Apollonia, and the son of Apollothemis,
a natural philosopher of high reputation; and he was, as Antisthenes
reports, a pupil of Anaximenes. He was also a contemporary of Anaxagoras,
and Demetrius Phalereus says, in his Defence of Socrates, that he was
very unpopular at Athens, and even in some danger of his life.

II. The following were his principal doctrines; that the air was an
element; that the worlds were infinite, and that the vacuum also was
infinite; that the air, as it was condensed, and as it was rarified,
was the productive cause of the worlds; that nothing can be produced
out of nothing;[130] and that nothing can be destroyed so as to become
nothing; that the earth is round, firmly planted in the middle of the
universe, having acquired its situation from the circumvolutions of the
hot principle around it, and its consistency from the cold.

The first words of his treatise are:—

“It appears to me that he who begins any treatise ought to lay down
principles about which there can be no dispute, and that his exposition
of them ought to be simple and dignified.”


LIFE OF ANAXARCHUS.

I. Anaxarchus was a native of Abdera. He was a pupil of Diogenes, of
Smyrna; but, as some say, of Metrodorus, of Chios; who said that he was
not even sure that he knew nothing; and Metrodorus was a pupil of Nessus,
of Chios; though others assert that he was a disciple of Democritus.

II. Anaxarchus too enjoyed the intimacy of Alexander, and flourished
about the hundred and tenth olympiad. He had for an enemy Nicocreon, the
tyrant of Cyprus. And on one occasion, when Alexander, at a banquet,
asked him what he thought of the entertainment, he is said to have
replied, “O king, everything is provided very sumptuously; and the only
thing wanting is to have the head of some satrap served up;” hinting
at Nicocreon. And Nicocreon did not forget his grudge against him for
this; but after the death of the king, when Anaxarchus, who was making a
voyage, was driven against his will into Cyprus, he took him and put him
in a mortar, and commanded him to be pounded to death with iron pestles.
And then they say that he, disregarding this punishment, uttered that
celebrated saying, “Beat the bag of Anaxarchus, but you will not beat
Anaxarchus himself.” And then, when Nicocreon commanded that his tongue
should be cut out, it is said that he bit it off, and spit it at him. And
we have written an epigram upon him in the following terms:—

    Beat more and more; you’re beating but a bag;
    Beat, Anaxarchus is in heav’n with Jove.
    Hereafter Proserpine will rack your bones,
    And say, Thus perish, you accursed beater.

III. Anaxarchus, on account of the evenness of his temper and the
tranquillity of his life, was called the Happy. And he was a man to
whom it was very easy to reprove men and bring them to temperance.
Accordingly, he produced an alteration in Alexander who thought himself
a God, for when he saw the blood flowing from some wound that he had
received, he pointed to him with his finger, and said, “This is blood,
and not:—

    “Such stream as issues from a wounded God;
    Pure emanation, uncorrupted flood,
    Unlike our gross, diseas’d, terrestrial blood.”[131]

But Plutarch says that it was Alexander himself who quoted these lines to
his friends.

They also tell a story that Anaxarchus once drank to him, and then showed
the goblet, and said:—

    Shall any mortal hand dare wound a God?


LIFE OF PYRRHO.

I. Pyrrho was a citizen of Elis, and the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles
informs us, and, as Apollodorus in his Chronicles asserts, he was
originally a painter.

II. And he was a pupil of Bryson, the son of Stilpon, as we are told
by Alexander in his Chronicles. After that he attached himself to
Anaxarchus, and attended him everywhere; so that he even went as far as
the Gymnosophists, in India, and the Magi.

III. Owing to which circumstance, he seems to have taken a noble line in
philosophy, introducing the doctrine of incomprehensibility, and of the
necessity of suspending one’s judgment, as we learn from Ascanius, of
Abdera. For he used to say that nothing was honourable, or disgraceful,
or just, or unjust. And on the same principle he asserted that there
was no such thing as downright truth; but that men did everything in
consequence of custom and law. For that nothing was any more this than
that. And his life corresponded to his principles; for he never shunned
anything, and never guarded against anything; encountering everything,
even waggons for instance, and precipices, and dogs, and everything of
that sort; committing nothing whatever to his senses. So that he used
to be saved, as Antigonus the Carystian tells us, by his friends who
accompanied him. And Ænesidemus says that he studied philosophy on the
principle of suspending his judgment on all points, without however, on
any occasion acting in an imprudent manner, or doing anything without due
consideration. And he lived to nearly ninety years of age.

IV. And Antigonus, of Carystus, in his account of Pyrrho, mentions the
following circumstances respecting him; that he was originally a person
of no reputation, but a poor man, and a painter; and that a picture of
some camp-bearers, of very moderate execution, was preserved in the
Gymnasium at Elis, which was his work; and that he used to walk out into
the fields and seek solitary places, very rarely appearing to his family
at home; and that he did this in consequence of having heard some Indian
reproaching Anaxarchus for never teaching any one else any good, but for
devoting all his time to paying court to princes in palaces. He relates
of him too, that he always maintained the same demeanour, so that if any
one left him in the middle of his delivery of a discourse, he remained
and continued what he was saying; although, when a young man, he was of a
very excitable temperament. Often too, says Antigonus, he would go away
for a time, without telling any one beforehand, and taking any chance
persons whom he chose for his companions. And once, when Anaxarchus had
fallen into a pond, he passed by without assisting him; and when some
one blamed him for this, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and
absence of all emotion.

On one occasion he was detected talking to himself, and when he was
asked the reason, he said that he was studying how to be good. In his
investigations he was never despised by any one, because he always spoke
explicitly and straight to the question that had been put to him. On
which account Nausiphanes was charmed by him even when he was quite
young. And he used to say that he should like to be endowed with the
disposition of Pyrrho, without losing his own power of eloquence. And
he said too, that Epicurus, who admired the conversation and manners of
Pyrrho, was frequently asking him about him.

V. He was so greatly honoured by his country, that he was appointed
a priest; and on his account all the philosophers were exempted from
taxation. He had a great many imitators of his impassiveness; in
reference to which Timon speaks thus of him in his Python, and in his
Silli:—

    Now, you old man, you Pyrrho, how could you
    Find an escape from all the slavish doctrines
    And vain imaginations of the Sophists?
    How did you free yourself from all the bonds
    Of sly chicane, and artful deep persuasion?
    How came you to neglect what sort of breeze
    Blows round your Greece, and what’s the origin
    And end of everything?

And again, in his Images, he says:—

    These things, my heart, O Pyrrho, longs to hear,
    How you enjoy such ease of life and quiet,
    The only man as happy as a God.

And the Athenians presented him with the freedom of their city, as
Diocles tells us, because he had slain Cotys, the Thracian.

VI. He also lived in a most blameless manner with his sister, who was a
midwife, as Eratosthenes relates, in his treatise on Riches and Poverty;
so that he himself used to carry poultry, and pigs too if he could get
any, into the market-place and sell them. And he used to clean all the
furniture of the house without expressing any annoyance. And it is said
that he carried his indifference so far that he even washed a pig. And
once, when he was very angry about something connected with his sister
(and her name was Philista), and some one took him up, he said, “The
display of my indifference does not depend on a woman.” On another
occasion, when he was driven back by a dog which was attacking him, he
said to some one who blamed him for being discomposed, “That it was a
difficult thing entirely to put off humanity; but that a man ought to
strive with all his power to counteract circumstances with his actions if
possible, and at all events with his reason.” They also tell a story that
once, when some medicines of a consuming tendency, and some cutting and
cautery was applied to him for some wound, that he never even contracted
his brow. And Timon intimates his disposition plainly enough in the
letters which he wrote to Python. Moreover, Philo, the Athenian, who was
a friend of his, said that he was especially fond of Democritus; and next
to him of Homer; whom he admired greatly, and was continually saying:—

    But as the race of falling leaves decay,
    Such is the fate of man.[132]

He used also, as it is said, to compare men to wasps, and flies, and
birds, and to quote the following lines:—

    Die then, my friend, what boots it to deplore?
    The great, the good Patroclus is no more.
    He, far thy better, was foredoom’d to die;
    And thou, doest thou bewail mortality?[133]

And so he would quote anything that bore on the uncertainty and emptiness
and fickleness of the affairs of man. Posidonius tells the following
anecdote about him: that when some people who were sailing with him
were looking gloomy because of a storm, he kept a calm countenance,
and comforted their minds, exhibiting himself on deck eating a pig, and
saying that it became a wise man to preserve an untroubled spirit in that
manner. Numenius is the only writer who asserts that he used to deliver
positive dogmas.

VII. He had many eminent disciples, and among them Eurylochus, of whom
the following defective characteristic is related; for, they say, that he
was once worked up to such a pitch of rage that he took up a spit with
the meat on it, and chased the cook as far as the market-place. And once
in Elis he was so harassed by some people who put questions to him in the
middle of his discourses, that he threw down his cloak and swam across
the Alpheus. He was the greatest possible enemy to the Sophists, as Timon
tells us. But Philo, on the contrary, was very fond of arguing; on which
account Timon speaks of him thus:—

    Avoiding men to study all devoted,
    He ponders with himself, and never heeds
    The glory or disputes which harass Philo.

Besides these disciples, Pyrrho also had Hecateus of Abdera, and Timon
the Phliasian, who wrote the Silli, and whom we shall speak of hereafter;
and also Nausiphanes, of Teos, who, as some say, was the master of
Epicurus.

VIII. All these men were called Pyrrhoneans from their master; and also
doubters, and sceptics, and ephectics, or suspenders of their judgment,
and investigators, from their principles. And their philosophy was called
investigatory, from their investigating or seeking the truth on all
sides; and sceptical from their being always doubting (σκέπτομαι), and
never finding; and ephectic, from the disposition which they encouraged
after investigation, I mean the suspending of their judgment (ἐποχὴ);
and doubting, because they asserted that the dogmatic philosophers only
doubted, and that they did the same. [And they were called Pyrrhoneans
from Pyrrho himself.]

But Theodosius, in his Chapters on Scepticism, contends, that we ought
not to call the Pyrrhonean school sceptical; for since, says he, the
motion and agitation of the mind in each individual is incomprehensible
to others, we are unable to know what was the disposition of Pyrrho; and
if we do not know it we ought not to be called Pyrrhoneans. He also
adds that Pyrrho was not the original inventor of Scepticism, and that
he had no particular dogma of any kind; and that, consequently, it can
only be called Pyrrhonism from some similarity. Some say that Homer was
the original founder of this school; since he at different times gives
different accounts of the same circumstance, as much as any one else ever
did; and since he never dogmatizes definitively respecting affirmation;
they also say that the maxims of the seven wise men were sceptical;
such as that, “Seek nothing in excess,” and that, “Suretyship is near
calamity;” which shows that calamity follows a man who has given positive
and certain surety; they also argue that Archilochus and Euripides were
Sceptics; and Archilochus speaks thus:—

    And now, O Glaucus, son of Leptines,
    Such is the mind of mortal man, which changes
    With every day that Jupiter doth send.

And Euripides says:—

    Why then do men assert that wretched mortals
    Are with true wisdom gifted; for on you
    We all depend; and we do everything
    Which pleases you.

Moreover, Xenophanes, and Zeno the Eleatic, and Democritus were also
Sceptics; of whom Xenophanes speaks thus:—

    And no man knows distinctly anything,
    And no man ever will.

And Zeno endeavours to put an end to the doctrine of motion by saying:
“The object moved does not move either in the place in which it is, or
in that in which it is not.” Democritus, too, discards the qualities,
where he says: what is cold is cold in opinion, and what is hot is hot
in opinion; but atoms and the vacuum exist in reality. And again he
says: “But we know nothing really; for truth lies in the bottom.” Plato,
too, following them, attributes the knowledge of the truth to the Gods
and to the sons of the Gods, and leaves men only the investigation of
probability. And Euripides says:—

    Who now can tell whether to live may not
    Be properly to die. And whether that
    Which men do call to die, may not in truth
    Be but the entrance into real life?

And Empedocles speaks thus:—

    These things are not perceptible to sight,
    Nor to the ears, nor comprehensible
    To human intellect.

And in a preceding passage he says:—

    Believing nothing, but such circumstances
    As have befallen each.

Heraclitus, too, says, “Let us not form conjectures at random, about
things of the greatest importance.” And Hippocrates delivers his opinion
in a very doubtful manner, such as becomes a man; and before them all
Homer has said:—

    Long in the field of words we may contend,
    Reproach is infinite and knows no end.

And immediately after:—

    Armed, or with truth or falsehood, right or wrong.
    (So voluble a weapon is the tongue),
    Wounded we wound, and neither side can fail,
    For every man has equal strength to rail:[134]

Intimating the equal vigour and antithetical force of words. And the
Sceptics persevered in overthrowing all the dogmas of every sect, while
they themselves asserted nothing dogmatically; and contented themselves
with expressing the opinions of others, without affirming anything
themselves, not even that they did affirm nothing; so that even discarded
all positive denial; for to say, “We affirm nothing,” was to affirm
something. “But we,” said they, “enunciate the doctrines of others, to
prove our own perfect indifference; it is just as if we were to express
the same thing by a simple sign.” So these words, “We affirm nothing,”
indicate the absence of all affirmation, just as other propositions,
such as, “Not more one thing than another,” or, “Every reason has a
corresponding reason opposed to it,” and all such maxims indicate a
similar idea. But the phrase, “Not more one thing,” &c., has sometimes
an affirmative sense, indicating the equality of certain things, as for
instance, in this sentence, “A pirate is not worse than a liar.” But
by the sceptics this is said not positively, but negatively, as for
instance, where the speaker contests a point and says, “It was not
Scylla, any more than it was Chimæra.” And the word “more,” itself, is
sometimes used to indicate a comparison, as when we say, “That honey is
more sweet than grapes.” And at other times it is used positively, and at
the same time negatively, as when we say, “Virtue profits us more than
hurts us;” for in this phrase we intimate that virtue does profit, and
does not hurt us. But the Sceptics abolish the whole expression, “Not
more than it;” saying, that “Prudence has not existence, any more than it
has no existence.” Accordingly, then, expression, as Timon says in his
Python, indicates nothing more than an absence of all affirmation, or of
all assent of the judgment.

Also the expression, “Every reason has a corresponding reason,” &c., does
in the same manner indicate the suspension of the judgment; for if, while
the facts are different, the expressions are equipollent, it follows that
a man must be quite ignorant of the real truth.

Besides this, to this assertion there is a contrary assertion opposed,
which, after having destroyed all others, turns itself against itself,
and destroys itself, resembling, as it were, those cathartic medicines
which, after they have cleansed the stomach, then discharge themselves,
and are got rid of. And so the dogmatic philosophers say, that all these
reasonings are so far from overturning the authority of reason that they
confirm it. To this the Sceptics reply, that they only employ reason as
an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of
reason, without employing reason; just as if we assert that there is
no such thing as space, we must employ the word “space,” but that not
dogmatically, but demonstratively; and if we assert that nothing exists
according to necessity, it is unavoidable that we must use the word
“necessity.” The same principle of interpretation did they adopt; for
they affirmed that facts are not by nature such as they appear to be, but
that they only seem such; and they said, that what they doubt is not what
they think, for their thoughts are evident to themselves, but the reality
of the things which are only made known to them by their sensations.

The Pyrrhonean system, then, is a simple explanation of appearances, or
of notions of every kind, by means of which, comparing one thing with
another one arrives at the conclusion, that there is nothing in all
these notions, but contradiction and confusion; as Ænesidemus says in
his Introduction to Pyrrhonism. As to the contradictions which are found
in those speculations, when they have pointed out in what way each fact
is convincing, they then, by the same means, take away all belief from
it; for they say that we regard as certain, those things which always
produce similar impressions on the senses, those which are the offspring
of habit, or which are established by the laws, and those too which give
pleasure or excite wonder. And they prove that the reasons opposite to
those on which our assent is founded are entitled to equal belief.

IX. The difficulties which they suggest, relating to the agreement
subsisting between what appears to the senses, and what is comprehended
by the intellect, divide themselves into ten modes of argument, according
to which the subject and object of our knowledge is incessantly changing.
And these ten modes Pyrrho lays down in the following manner.

The first relates to the difference which one remarks between the
sentiments of animals in respect of pleasure, and pain, and what is
injurious, and what is advantageous; and from this we conclude, that
the same objects do not always produce the same impressions; and that
the fact of this difference ought to be a reason with us for suspending
our judgment. For there are some animals which are produced without
any sexual connexion, as those which live in the fire, and the Arabian
Phœnix, and worms. Others again are engendered by copulation, as men
and others of that kind; and some are composed in one way, and others
in another; on which account they also differ in their senses, as for
instance, hawks are very keen-sighted; dogs have a most acute scent. It
is plain, therefore, that the things seen produce different impressions
on those animals which differ in their power of sight. So, too, young
branches are eagerly eaten by the goat, but are bitter to mankind; and
hemlock is nutritious for the quail, but deadly to man; and pigs eat
their own dung, but a horse does not.

The second mode refers to the nature and idiosyncracies of men. According
to Demophon, the steward of Alexander used to feel warm in the shade,
and to shiver in the sun. And Andron, the Argive, as Aristotle tells us,
travelled through the dry parts of Libya, without once drinking. Again,
one man is fond of medicine, another of farming, another of commerce;
and the same pursuits are good for one man, and injurious to another; on
which account, we ought to suspend our opinions.

The third mode, is that which has for its object the difference of the
organs of sense. Accordingly, an apple presents itself to the sight as
yellow, to the taste as sweet, to the smell as fragrant; and the same
form is seen, in very different lights, according to the differences of
mirrors. It follows, therefore, that what is seen is just as likely to be
something else as the reality.

The fourth refers to the dispositions of the subject, and the changes in
general to which it is liable. Such as health, sickness, sleep, waking,
joy, grief, youth, old age, courage, fear, want, abundance, hatred,
friendship, warmth, cold, easiness of breathing, oppression of the
respiratory organs, and so on. The objects, therefore, appear different
to us according to the disposition of the moment; for, even madmen are
not in a state contrary to nature. For, why are we to say that of them
more than of ourselves? For we too look at the sun as if it stood still.
Theon, of Tithora, the Stoic, used to walk about in his sleep; and a
slave of Pericles’ used, when in the same state, to walk on the top of
the house.

The fifth mode is conversant with laws, and established customs, and
belief in mythical traditions, and the conventions of art, and dogmatical
opinions. This mode embraces all that relates to vice, and to honesty; to
the true, and to the false; to the good, and to the bad; to the Gods, and
to the production, and destruction of all visible objects. Accordingly,
the same action is just in the case of some people, and unjust in that
of others. And good in the case of some, and bad in that of others. On
this principle we see that the Persians do not think it unnatural for a
man to marry his daughter; but among the Greeks it is unlawful. Again,
the Massagetæ, as Eudoxus tells us in the first book of his Travels over
the World, have their women in common; but the Greeks do not. And the
Cilicians delight in piracy, but the Greeks avoid it. So again, different
nations worship different Gods; and some believe in the providence of
God, and others do not. The Egyptians embalm their dead, and then bury
them; the Romans burn them; the Pæonians throw them into the lakes. All
these considerations show that we ought to suspend our judgment.

The sixth mode has reference to the promiscuousness and confusion of
objects; according to which nothing is seen by us simply and by itself;
but in combination either with air, or with light, or with moisture, or
with solidity, or heat, or cold, or motion, or evaporation or some other
power. Accordingly, purple exhibits a different hue in the sun, and in
the moon, and in a lamp. And our own complexions appear different when
seen at noonday and at sunset. And a stone which one cannot lift in the
air, is easily displaced in the water, either because it is heavy itself
and is made light by the water, or because it is light in itself and is
made heavy by the air. So that we cannot positively know the peculiar
qualities of anything, just as we cannot discover oil in ointment.

The seventh mode has reference to distances, and position, and space, and
to the objects which are in space. In this mode one establishes the fact
that objects which we believe to be large, sometimes appear small; that
those which we believe to be square, sometimes appear round; that those
which we fancy even, appear full of projections; those which we think
straight, seem bent; and those which we believe to be colourless, appear
of quite a different complexion. Accordingly, the sun, on account of its
distance from us, appears small. The mountains too, at a distance,[135]
appear airy masses and smooth, but when beheld close, they are rough.
Again, the sun has one appearance at his rise, and quite a different one
at midday. And the same body looks very different in a wood from what
it does on plain ground. So too, the appearance of an object changes
according to its position as regards us; for instance, the neck of a dove
varies as it turns. Since then, it is impossible to view these things
irrespectively of place and position, it is clear that their real nature
is not known.

The eighth mode has respect to the magnitudes or quantities of things; or
to the heat or coldness, or to the speed or slowness, or to the paleness
or variety of colour of the subject. For instance, a moderate quantity of
wine when taken invigorates, but an excessive quantity weakens. And the
same is the case with food, and other similar things.

The ninth depends upon the frequency, or rarity, or strangeness of the
thing under consideration. For instance, earthquakes excite no wonder
among those nations with whom they are of frequent occurrence; nor does
the sun, because he is seen every day.

The ninth mode is called by Phavorinus, the eighth, and by Sextus and
Ænesidemus, the tenth; and Sextus calls the tenth the eighth, which
Phavorinus reckons the tenth as the ninth in order.

The tenth mode refers to the comparison between one thing and another;
as, for instance, between what is light and what is heavy; between
what is strong and what is weak; between what is greater and what is
less; what is above and what is below. For instance, that which is on
the right, is not on the right intrinsically and by nature, but it is
looked upon as such in consequence of its relation to something else;
and if that other thing be transposed, then it will no longer be on the
right. In the same way, a man is spoken of as a father, or brother, or
relation to some one else; and day is called so in relation to the sun:
and everything has its distinctive name in relation to human thought:
therefore, those things which are known in relation to others, are
unknown of themselves.

And these are the ten modes.

X. But Agrippa adds five other modes to them. One derived from the
disagreement of opinions; another from the necessity of proceeding _ad
infinitum_ from one reasoning to another; a third from relation; a fourth
from hypothesis; and the last from the reciprocal nature of proofs.

That which refers to the disagreement of opinions, shows that all the
questions which philosophers propose to themselves, or which people in
general discuss, are full of uncertainty and contradiction.

That which is derived from the necessity of proceeding incessantly from
one reasoning to another, demonstrates that it is impossible for a man
ever, in his researches, to arrive at undeniable truth; since one truth
is only to be established by another truth; and so on, _ad infinitum_.

The mode which is derived from relation rests on the doctrine that no
object is ever perceived independently and entirely by itself, but always
in its relation to something else; so that it is impossible to know its
nature correctly.

That which depends on hypothesis is directed against those arguers who
pretend that it is necessary to accept the principles of things taken
absolutely, and that one must place one’s faith in them without any
examination, which is an absurdity, for one may just as well lay down the
opposite principles.

The fifth mode, that one namely which arises from the reciprocal nature
of proofs, is capable of application whenever the proof of the truth
which we are looking for supposes, as a necessary preliminary, our belief
in that truth; for instance, if, after we have proved the porosity of
bodies by their evaporations, we return and prove the evaporations by the
porosity.

XI. These Sceptics then deny the existence of any demonstration, of
any test of truth, of any signs, or causes, or motion, or learning,
and of anything as intrinsically or naturally good or bad. For every
demonstration, say they, depends either on things which demonstrate
themselves, or on principles which are indemonstrable. If on things
which demonstrate themselves, then these things themselves require
demonstration; and so on _ad infinitum_. If on principles which are
indemonstrable, then, the very moment that either the sum total of these
principles, or even one single one of them, is incorrectly urged, the
whole demonstration falls instantly to pieces. But if any one supposes,
they add, that there are principles which require no demonstration, that
man deceives himself strangely, not seeing that it is necessary for him
in the first place to establish this point, that they contain their proof
in themselves. For a man cannot prove that there are four elements,
because there are four elements.

Besides, if particular proofs are denied in a complex demonstration, it
must follow that the whole demonstration is also incorrect. Again, if we
are to know that an argument is really a demonstrative proof, we must
have a test of truth; and in order to establish a test, we require a
demonstrative proof; and these two things must be devoid of every kind of
certainty, since they bear reciprocally the one on the other.

How then is any one to arrive at certainty about obscure matters, if one
is ignorant even how one ought to attempt to prove them? For what one is
desirous to understand is not what the appearance of things is, but what
their nature and essence is.

They show, too, that the dogmatic philosophers act with great simplicity;
for that the conclusions which they draw from their hypothetical
principles, are not scientific truths but mere suppositions; and
that, in the same manner, one might establish the most improbable
propositions. They also say that those who pretend that one ought not to
judge of things by the circumstances which surround them, or by their
accessories, but that one ought to take their nature itself as one’s
guide, do not perceive that, while they pretend to give the precise
measure and definition of everything, if the objects present such and
such an appearance, that depends solely on their position and relative
arrangement. They conclude from thence, that it is necessary to say that
everything is true, or that everything is false. For if certain things
only are true, how is one to recognize them. Evidently it will not be
the senses which judge in that case of the objects of sensation, for
all appearances are equal to the senses; nor will it be the intellect,
for the same reason. But besides these two faculties, there does not
appear to be any other test or criterion at all. So, say they, if we
desire to arrive at any certainty with respect to any object which comes
under either sense or intellect, we must first establish those opinions
which are laid down previously as bearing on those objects. For some
people have denied this doctrine, and others have overturned that; it
is therefore indispensable that they should be judged of either by the
senses or by the intellect. And the authority of each of these faculties
is contested; it is therefore impossible to form a positive judgment of
the operations of the senses and of the intellect; and if the contest
between the different opinions, compels us to a neutrality, then the
measure which appeared proper to apply to the appreciation of all those
objects is at the same time put an end to, and one must fix a similar
valuation on everything.

Perhaps our opponent will say, “Are then appearances trustworthy or
deceitful?”[136] We answer that, if they are trustworthy, the other side
has nothing to object to those to whom the contrary appearance presents
itself. For, as he who says that such and such a thing appears to him is
trustworthy, so also is he who says that the contrary appears to him. And
if appearances are deceitful, then they do not deserve any confidence
when they assert what appears to them to be true. We are not bound then
to believe that a thing is true, merely because it obtains assent. For
all men do not yield to the same reasons; and even the same individual
does not always see things in the same light. Persuasion often depends on
external circumstances, on the authority of the speaker, on his ability,
on the elegance of his language, on habit, or even on pleasure.

They also, by this train of reasoning, suppress the criterion of truth.
Either the criterion has been decided on, or it has not. And if it has
not, it does not deserve any confidence, and it cannot be of any use at
all in aiding us to discern truth from falsehood. If, on the other hand,
it has been decided on, it then enters into the class of particular
things which require a criterion, and in that case to judge and to be
judged amount to the same thing; the criterion which judges is itself
judged of by something else, that again by a third criterion, and so on
_ad infinitum_. Add to this, say they, the fact that people are not even
agreed as to the nature of the criterion of truth; some say that man is
the criterion, others that it is the senses which are so: one set places
reason in the van, another class rely upon cataleptic perception.

As to man himself, he disagrees both with himself and with others, as
the diversity of laws and customs proves. The senses are deceivers, and
reason disagrees with itself. Cataleptic perception is judged of by the
intellect, and the intellect changes in various manners; accordingly, we
can never find any positive criterion, and in consequence, truth itself
wholly eludes our search.

They also affirm that there are no such things as signs; for if there
are signs, they argue they must be such as are apprehended either by the
senses or by the intellect. Now, there are none which are apprehended by
the senses, for everything which is apprehended by the senses is general,
while a sign is something particular. Moreover, any object which is
apprehended by the senses has an existence of its own, while signs are
only relative. Again, signs are not apprehended by the intellect, for
in that case they would be either the visible manifestation of a visible
thing, or the invisible manifestation of an invisible thing, or the
invisible sign of a visible thing; or the visible sign of an invisible
thing. But none of all these cases are possible; there are therefore no
such things as signs at all.

There is therefore no such thing as a visible sign of a visible thing;
for that which is visible has no need of a sign. Nor, again, is there any
invisible sign of an invisible thing; for when anything is manifested by
means of another thing, it must become visible. On the same principle
there is no invisible sign of a visible object; for that which aids in
the perception of something else must be visible. Lastly, there is no
visible manifestation of an invisible thing; for as a sign is something
wholly relative, it must be perceived in that of which it is the sign;
and that is not the case. It follows, therefore, that none of those
things which are not visible in themselves admit of being perceived; for
one considers signs as things which aid in the perception of that which
is not evident by itself.

They also wholly discard, and, as far as depends on them, overturn the
idea of any cause, by means of this same train of reasoning. Cause is
something relative. It is relative to that of which it is the cause. But
that which is relative is only conceived, and has no real existence.
The idea of a cause then is a pure conception; for, inasmuch as it is a
cause, it must be a cause of something; otherwise it would be no cause
at all. In the same way as a father cannot be a father, unless there
exists some being in respect of whom one gives him the title of father;
so too a cause stands on the same ground. For, supposing that nothing
exists relatively to which a cause can be spoken of; then, as there is no
production, or destruction, or anything of that sort, there can likewise
be no cause. However, let us admit that there are such things as causes.
In that case then, either a body must be the cause of a body, or that
which is incorporeal must be the cause of that which is incorporeal. Now,
neither of these cases is possible, therefore, there is no such thing
as cause. In fact, one body cannot be the cause of another body, since
both bodies must have the same nature; and if it be said that one is the
cause, inasmuch as it is a body, then the other must be a cause for the
same reason. And in that case one would have two reciprocal causes; two
agents without any passive subject.

Again, one incorporeal thing cannot be the cause of another incorporeal
thing for the same reason. Also, an incorporeal thing cannot be the
cause of a body, because nothing that is incorporeal can produce a body.
Nor, on the other hand, can a body be the cause of anything incorporeal,
because in every production there must be some passive subject matter;
but, as what is incorporeal is by its own nature protected from being
a passive subject, it cannot be the object of any productive power.
There is, therefore, no such thing as any cause at all. From all which
it follows, that the first principles of all things have no reality;
for such a principle, if it did exist, must be both the agent and the
efficient cause.

Again, there is no such thing as motion. For whatever is moved, is moved
either in the place in which it is, or in that in which it is not. It
certainly is not moved in the place in which it is, and it is impossible
that it should be moved in the place in which it is not; therefore, there
is no such thing as motion at all.

They also denied the existence of all learning. If, said they, anything
is taught, then either that which does exist is taught in its existence
or that which does not exist is taught in its non-existence; but that
which does exist is not taught in its existence (for the nature of all
existent things is visible to all men, and is known by all men); nor is
that which does not exist taught in its non-existence, for nothing can
happen to that which does not exist, so that to be taught cannot happen
to it.

Nor again, say they, is there any such thing as production. For that
which is, is not produced, for it exists already; nor that which is not,
for that does not exist at all. And that which has no being nor existence
at all, cannot be produced.

Another of their doctrines is, that there is no such thing as any natural
good, or natural evil. For if there be any natural good, or natural evil,
then it must be good to everyone, or evil to everyone; just as snow is
cold to everyone. But there is no such thing as one general good or evil
which is common to all beings; therefore, there is no such thing as any
natural good, or natural evil. For either one must pronounce everything
good which is thought so by anyone whatever, or one must say that it does
not follow that everything which is thought good is good. Now, we cannot
say that everything which is thought good is good, since the same thing
is thought good by one person (as, for instance, pleasure is thought good
by Epicurus) and evil by another (as it is thought evil by Antisthenes);
and on this principle the same thing will be both good and evil. If,
again, we assert that it does not follow that everything which is thought
good is good, then we must distinguish between the different opinions;
which it is not possible to do by reason of the equality of the reasons
adduced in support of them. It follows that we cannot recognize anything
as good by nature.

And we may also take a view of the whole of their system by the
writings which some of them have left behind them. Pyrrho himself has
left nothing; but his friends Timon, and Ænesidemus, and Numenius, and
Nausiphanes, and others of that class have left books. And the dogmatical
philosophers arguing against them, say that they also adopt spurious and
pronounce positive dogmas. For where they think that they are refuting
others they are convicted, for in the very act of refutation, they assert
positively and dogmatize. For when they say that they define nothing,
and that every argument has an opposite argument; they do here give a
positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. But they reply to these
objectors; as to the things which happen to us as men, we admit the truth
of what you say; for we certainly do know that it is day, and that we are
alive; and we admit that we know many other of the phænomena of life.
But with respect to those things as to which the dogmatic philosophers
make positive assertions, saying that they are comprehended, we suspend
our judgment on the ground of their being uncertain; and we know nothing
but the passions; for we confess that we see, and we are aware that we
comprehend that such a thing is the fact; but we do not know how we see,
or how we comprehend. Also, we state in the way of narrative, that this
appears white, without asserting positively that it really is so. And
with respect to the assertion, “We define nothing,” and other sentences
of that sort, we do not pronounce them as dogmas. For to say that is a
different kind of statement from saying that the world is spherical;
for the one fact is not evident, while the other statements are mere
admissions.

While, therefore, we say that we define nothing, we do not even say that
as a definition.

Again, the dogmatic philosophers say that the Sceptics overthrow all
life, when they deny everything of which life consists. But the Sceptics
say that they are mistaken; for they do not deny that they see, but that
they do not know how it is that they see. For, say they, we assert what
is actually the fact, but we do not describe its character. Again, we
feel that fire burns, but we suspend our judgment as to whether it has
a burning nature. Also, we see whether a person moves, and that a man
dies; but how these things happen we know not. Therefore, say they, we
only resist the uncertain deductions which are put by the side of evident
facts. For when we say that an image has projections, we only state
plainly what is evident; but when we say that it has not projections, we
no longer say what appears evident, but something else. On which account
Timon, in his Python, says that Pyrrho does not destroy the authority of
custom. And in his Images he speaks thus:—

    But what is evidently seen prevails,
    Wherever it may be.

And in his treatise on the Senses, he says, “The reason why a thing
is sweet I do not declare, but I confess that the fact of sweetness
is evident.” So too, Ænesidemus, in the first book of his Pyrrhonean
Discourses, says that Pyrrho defines nothing dogmatically, on account
of the possibility of contradiction, but that he is guided by what is
evident. And he says the same thing in his book against Wisdom, and in
his treatise on Investigation.

In like manner, Zeuxis, a friend of Ænesidemus, in his treatise on
Twofold Arguments, and Antiochus, of Laodicea, and Apellas, in his
Agrippa, all declare nothing beyond what is evident. The criterion
therefore, among the Sceptics, is that which is evident; as Ænesidemus
also says; and Epicurus says the same thing.

But Democritus says, that there is no test whatever of appearances,
and also that they are not criteria of truth. Moreover, the dogmatic
philosophers attack the criterion derived from appearances, and say that
the same objects present at times different appearances; so that a town
presents at one time a square, and at another a round appearance; and
that consequently, if the Sceptic does not discriminate between different
appearances, he does nothing at all. If, on the contrary, he determines
in favour of either, then, say they, he no longer attaches equal value
to all appearances. The Sceptics reply to this, that in the presence of
different appearances, they content themselves with saying that there
are many appearances, and that it is precisely because things present
themselves under different characters, that they affirm the existence of
appearances.

Lastly, the Sceptics say, that the chief good is the suspension of the
judgment which tranquillity of mind follows, like its shadow, as Timon
and Ænesidemus say; for that we need not choose these things, or avoid
those, which all depend on ourselves: but as to those things which do not
depend upon us, but upon necessity, such as hunger, thirst, and pain,
those we cannot avoid; for it is not possible to put an end to them by
reason.

But when the dogmatic philosophers object that the Sceptic, on his
principles, will not refuse to kill his own father, if he is ordered
to do so; so that they answer, that they can live very well without
disquieting themselves about the speculations of the dogmatic
philosophers; but, suspending their judgment in all matters which do not
refer to living and the preservation of life. Accordingly, say they, we
avoid some things, and we seek others, following custom in that; and we
obey the laws.

Some authors have asserted, that the chief good of the Stoics is
impassibility; others say that it is mildness and tranquillity.


LIFE OF TIMON.

I. Apollonides, of Nicæa, a philosopher of our school, in the first
book of his Commentaries on the Silli, which he dedicated to Tiberius
Cæsar, says that Timon was the son of Timarchus, and a Phliasian by
birth. And then, when he was young, he studied dancing, and afterwards
he renounced that study, and went to Megara to Stilpo. And having spent
some time there, he returned home again and married. Then he came
with his wife to Elis, to see Pyrrho, and there he remained while his
children were born; the elder of whom, he called Xanthus, and taught him
medicine, and left him his successor in his sect of philosophy. And he
was a man of considerable eminence, as Sotion tells us in his eleventh
book. Afterwards, being in difficulty as to his means, he departed to
the Hellespont and the Propontis; and living at Chalcedon as a Sophist,
he earned a very high reputation and great popularity; from thence he
departed, after having made a considerable fortune, and went to Athens,
and remained there till his death, going across once for a short time
to Thebes. He was also acquainted with king Antigonus, and with Ptolemy
Philadelphus, as he himself testifies in his Iambics.

II. He was, says Antigonus, fond of drinking, and he at times occupied
himself with works quite inconsistent with philosophy; for he wrote lyric
and epic poems, and tragedies and satiric dramas, and thirty comedies,
and sixty tragedies and Silli, and amatory poems.

There are works of his also enumerated in a regular catalogue, extending
to twenty thousand verses, which are mentioned by Antigonus, of Carystos,
who also wrote his life. Of the Silli, there are three volumes; in which
he attacks every one as if he were a Sceptic, and especially he lampoons
the dogmatic philosophers under the form of parodies. The first volume
of these Silli contains a long uninterrupted narration; but the second
and third are in the form of dialogues. He is represented in them, as
interrogating Xenophanes, the Colophonian, about every thing, and he
utters a long continued discourse; in his second book he speaks of the
more ancient philosophers; and in his third of the more modern ones;
on which account some people have given the last book the name of the
epilogue.

But the first book contains the same subjects, with this difference, that
in that it is all confined to one single person and its first line begins
thus:—

    Come hither, all you over-busy Sophists

III. He died when he was nearly ninety years old, as Antigonus tells us;
and Sotion, in his eleventh book, makes the same statement. I have heard
it said that he had only one eye, and, indeed, he used to call himself
Cyclops.

IV. There was also another Timon, the misanthrope.

V. Now this philosopher was very fond of a garden, and also of solitude,
as we are told by Antigonus. Accordingly it is reported, that Hieronymus,
the Peripatetic, said of him, as among the Scythians, both they who
fly, and they who pursue shoot with the bow, so in the case of the
philosophers, those who pursue and those who fly both hunt for pupils, as
Timon for instance.

VI. He was a man of very acute perceptions, and very quick at seeing
the ridiculous side of any question: he was also very fond of learning,
and a very clever man at devising plots for poets, and at composing
dramas. And he used to associate with himself, in the composition of his
tragedies, two other poets, named Alexander and Homer; and whenever he
was disturbed by his maid-servants or by the dogs, he paid no attention
to them, studying above all things to live in tranquillity. They tell a
story, that Aratus asked him how he could procure an entire and correct
copy of Homer’s poetry, and he answered, “If he could fall in with an old
manuscript which had never been corrected.” And all his works used to
lie about at random, and at times half eaten by mice; so that once when
he was reading them to Zopyrus, the orator, and unrolling a volume, he
read whatever passages came first, and when he got to the middle of the
book he found a great gap, which he had not previously perceived, so very
indifferent was he about such matters.

His constitution was so vigorous, that he could easily go without his
dinner. And they say, that once when he saw Arcesilaus passing through
the forum of the Cercopes, he said, “What are you doing here, where we
freemen are?” And he used constantly to quote to those who invoked the
testimony of their intellects to judge of the senses:—

    Attagas and Numenius are met.[137]

And this jesting manner was habitual with him. Accordingly he once said
to a man, who was surprised at everything, “Why do you not wonder that
we three men have only four eyes between us?” for he himself had only
one eye, no more had Dioscorides, his pupil; but the man to whom he was
speaking had his sight unimpaired. On another occasion, he was asked by
Arcesilaus, why he had come from Thebes, and he said, “To laugh at you
all when I see you face to face.” But though he attacked Arcesilaus in
his Silli, he has praised him in the book entitled the Funeral Banquet of
Arcesilaus.

VII. He had no successor, as Menodotus tells us; but his school ceased,
till Ptolemy the Cyrenean re-established it. According to the account
given to us by Hippobotus and Sotion, he had as pupils, Dioscorides
of Cyprus, and Nicolochus of Rhodes, and Euphranor of Seleucia, and
Praylus of the Troas, who was a man of such constancy of mind that, as
Phylarchus relates in his History, he allowed himself to be punished
as a traitor wholly undeservedly, not uttering one word of complaint
against his fellow citizens; and Euphranor had for his pupil, Eubulus, of
Alexandria, who was the master of Ptolemy, who was the master of Sarpedon
and Heraclides. And Heraclides was the master of Ænesidemus, of Cnossus,
who wrote eight books of Pyrrhonean discourses; he was also the master
of Zeuxippus Polites, who was the master of Zeuxis Goniopus, who was the
master of Antiochus, of Laodicea, in Lycia. Antiochus again, was the
master of Menodotus, of Nicomedia, a skilful physician, and of Theodas,
of Laodicea; and Menodotus was the master of Herodotus, of Tarsus, the
son of Arieus; Herodotus was the master of Sextus Empiricus, who left ten
books of Sceptic Maxims, and other excellent works; and Sextus was the
master of Saturninus Cythenas, who was also an empiric.

[121] According to Strabo, the descendants of Androclus, the founder of
Ephesus (of which family Heraclitus came), bore the title of king, and
had certain prerogatives and privileges attached to the title.

[122] There is probably some corruption in the text here.

[123] There is great obscurity and uncertainty of the text here. The
reading translated is that of Huebner, πεφωρᾶσθαι. Some read πεπρᾶσθαι,
_he_ seems to have abandoned the Pythagoreans. Others propose πεπρᾶχθαι.
The French translator renders,—He had for enemies the Pythagoreans.

[124] See the account of Zeno the Cittiæan.

[125] See the life of Parmenides.

[126] There is evidently a considerable gap in the text here.

[127] As there is no such passage in Herodotus, Valckenær conjectures
that we ought here to read Metrodorus.

[128] The Thesmophoria was a festival in honour of Ceres, celebrated
in various parts of Greece; and only by married women; though girls
might perform some of the ceremonies. Herodotus says, that it was
introduced into Greece from Egypt, by the daughters of Danaus. The Attic
Thesmophoria lasted probably three days, and began on the eleventh day of
the month Pyanession; the first day was called ἄνοδος, or κάθοδος, from
the women going in procession to Eleusis; the second νηστεία, or fasting;
the third was called καλλιγένεια, as on that day Ceres was invoked under
that name, and it was the day of merriment of the festival.

[129] Namely, reasoning well, expressing one’s self well, and acting well.

[130] This is thus embodied by Lucretius:—

    Nam nihil e nihilo, in nihilum nîl posse reverti.

[131] Hom. Il. v. 340. Pope’s version, 422.

[132] Il. vi. 146.

[133] Il. xxi. 106. Pope’s version, 115.

[134] Homer, Il. xx. 248. Pope’s version, 294.

[135] There is too remarkable a similarity in this to Campbell’s lines:—

    ’Tis distance lends enchantment to the view,
    And robes the mountains in their azure hue:

to allow one to pass it over without pointing it out.

[136] “Diogenes here appears (though, he gives no intimation of his doing
so,) to be transcribing the reasonings of some one of the Sceptics.”
_French Transl._

[137] That is to say, the harmony between intellect and the senses will
not last long. Attagas and Numenius were two notorious brigands.