Simplicius, Commentary on Epictetus 5

When therefore any frightful and discouraging imagination assaults you, harden yourself, and meet it boldly, with this reflection, that it is only our apprehension of things, and not the real nature of the things themselves. 

Then bring it to the test, and examine it by such rules of morality as you are masters of; but especially by this most material distinction, of things that are, or are not, in our power. And if, upon enquiry, it be found one of the latter sort, remember, that it is what you are not at all concerned in, and slight it accordingly. 

Comment: 

He had told us, that the man, who proposes to himself the attainment of virtue and happiness, must be constant and indefatigable, and not suffer the world, or any of its temptations, to seduce or draw him off from the pursuit of it. 

But since, even they, who do make these things their study and care, are yet subject to frequent fancies and apprehensions: some that put them upon desiring some of those external advantages, and others that terrify them with calamities of that kind; he informs us here, how to manage such apprehensions, so as to receive no inconvenience from them. 

And these apprehensions he calls frightful and discouraging; because they are extravagant and unreasonable and embitter one’s life with a world of terrors and troubles, by the excess and irregularity of their motions. 

In the following discourses, he advises more at large, not to be hurried away, and immediately transported with any imagination. Whether it tend to hope or fear; and here he says much the same thing in fewer words; that a man ought to harden and set himself against it, and disarm it of all its force, by this consideration, that it is but a fancy of our own, and no more. 

Now our fancies, we know, do sometimes give us the representations of things as they really are, as in things that are indeed pleasant and beneficial; and sometimes they delude us with wild inconsistencies, gaudy vanities, and empty dreams. 

But the strength of these representations depends upon the impressions, which they make in our minds. And this is exceedingly weakened, by making that single consideration habitual to us. That there is very often a wide difference, between the things themselves, and the representations of them to us: for, when once we are thus fixed, no violence they can use, will be able to jostle out our reason, or pervert our judgment; which he tells us, as soon as we have allayed the heat of the imagination, and made our minds quiet and calm, should be presently employed, in a nice examination of the idea represented to us. 

Now there are several rules to try it by: some taken from the nature of these ideas themselves, and the things they represent; as, whether they be such objects as tend to the good of the mind, or whether they concern our bodies, or our fortunes only: whether they contribute to any real advantage, or whether pleasure is the only thing they can pretend to: whether what they propose be feasible, or not; there is likewise another method, which proceeds upon the judgment of wise and unwise men, and the concern they express for them; but especially, upon the judgment and determinations of Almighty God. 

For that, which God himself, and wise and good men have approved of, everyone that consults the safety and happiness of his soul, must needs be convinced, will challenge his greatest care and concern; as on the contrary, whatever they dislike and condemn, ought by all means to be detested and avoided. And no man yet ever arrived to that degree of folly, or was so far blinded by passion and lust, as to persuade himself, that injustice, and luxury, and excess, are things well-pleasing to God. 

But though there are many rules which may be serviceable to us, in distinguishing between the several ideas and the things they represent; yet there is one peculiar to men, considered as men; and which is of general use upon all occasions. And this depends upon the distinction of things that are, and things that are not in our own power. 

For if the object that presents itself, as a thing inviting our desire, or provoking our aversion, be out of our own disposal; the ready course to be taken, is, to satisfy ourselves, and to dismiss it with this answer, that this is no part of our concern. For it is impossible for anything to be strictly good or evil to us, which is not within our own power; because the freedom of the will is the true specific difference of human nature. The very being of a creature thus qualified, necessarily infers this prerogative, that all its good, and all its evil, shall depend merely upon its own choice.