Stobaeus on Stoic Ethics 7

All the virtues which are forms of knowledge and crafts have common theorems and the same goal, as was said, and consequently they are inseparable; for he who has one has them all, and he who acts with one virtue acts with all. 

They differ from each other in their topics. 

For the topics of prudence are, in the first instance, considering and doing what is to be done and, in the second instance, considering what one should distribute and what one should choose and what one should endure, for the sake of doing what is to be done without error. 

The topic of temperance is, in the first instance, to make the impulses stable and to consider them and, in the second instance, to consider the topics of the other virtues for the sake of behaving without error in one’s impulses. 

And similarly courage, in the first instance considers everything which one should endure and, in the second instance, the topics of the other virtues. 

And justice, in the first instance, looks to what is due to each person and, in the second instance, the other topics too. 

For all the virtues consider the topics of all the virtues and those which are subordinate to each other. 

For Panaetius used to say that what happened in the case of the virtues was like what would happen if there were one target set up for many archers, and this target had on it lines that differed in color; and then each were to aim at hitting the target—one by striking the white line, it might be, another by striking the black, and another by striking another colored line. 

For just as these archers make their highest goal the hitting of the target, but each sets before himself a different manner of hitting it, in the same way too all the virtues make being happy their goal, and this lies in living in agreement with nature, but each virtue achieves this in a different manner.