Justus Lipsius, On Constancy 1.12

The third affection bridled, which is commiseration or pitying, being a vice. It is distinguished from mercy. How, and how far forth we ought to use it.

Langius with this conference having scattered abroad some dark mists from my mind, I spoke to him thus: "My father, what by admonitions, and what by instructions you have done me great good; so that it seems that I am now able to moderate my affection toward the native soil, or commonwealth wherein I was born, but not toward the persons of my fellow citizens and countrymen. 

"For how should I not be touched and tormented with the calamities of my country for my countrymen's sake, who are tossed in this sea of adversities, and do perish by sundry misfortunes?" 

Langius, taking my tale by the end, "This is not," said he, "properly sorrow, but rather commiseration or pitying, which must be despised of him that is wise and constant; whom nothing so much beseems as steadiness and steadfastness of courage, which he cannot retain, if he is cast down not only with his own mishaps, but also at other men's." 

"What Stoical subtleties are these?" Said I. "Will you not have me to pity another man's case? Surely it is a virtue among good men, and such as have any religion in them?" 

"I deny that," said Langius, "and I trust no good man will be offended with me, if I purge the mind of this malady, for it is a very dangerous contagion, and I judge him not far from a pitiful state that is subject to the pitying of others. 

"As it is a token of naughty eyes to wax watery when they behold other blear eyes, so is it of the mind that mourns at every other man's mourning. It is defined to be, the fault of an object and base mind, cast down at the show of another's mishap. 

"When then? Are we so unkind and void of humanity that we would have no man to be moved at another's misery? Yes, I allow that we be moved to help them, not to bewail or wail with them. I permit mercy, but it is not pitying I call mercy, an inclination of the mind to succor the necessity or misery of another. This is that virtue, Lipsius, which you see through a cloud, and instead whereof pity intrudes herself unto you. 

"But, you will say, it is incident to man's nature to be moved with affection and pity. Be it so, yet certainly it is not decent and right. Do you think that any virtue consists in softness and abjection of the mind? In sorrowing? In sighing? In sobbing together with such as weep? It cannot be so. 

"For I will show you some greedy old wives and covetous misers from whose eyes you may sooner wring a thousand tears than one small penny out of their purses. But he that is truly merciful in deed will not bemoan or pity the condition of distressed persons but yet will do more to help and succor them than the other. 

"He will behold men's miseries with the eye of compassion, yet ruled and guided by reason. He will speak unto them with a sad countenance but not mourning or prostrate. He will comfort heartily, and help literally. He will perform more in works than in words: and he will stretch out unto the poor and needy his hand rather than his tongue. 

"All this will he do with discretion and care, that he not infect himself with other men's contagion, and that, as fencers use to say, he bears not other's blows upon his own ribs. What is here savoring of inhumanity or churlishness? 

"Even so, all the wisdom seems austere and rigorous at the first view. But if you consider thoroughly of it, you shall find the same to be meek, gentle; yes, more mild and amiable than Venus herself. Let this suffice touching the three fore-rehearsed affections; whom if I have in part expelled from you, it will greatly avail me to get the victory in the battle that shall ensue." 

IMAGE: Evelyn De Morgan, Demeter Mourning for Persephone (c. 1906)