M. These, then, are the opinions, as I think, that are held and defended—the first four are simple ones: “that nothing is good but what is honest,” according to the Stoics; “nothing good but pleasure,” as Epicurus maintains; “nothing good but a freedom from pain,” as Hieronymus asserts; “nothing good but an enjoyment of the principal, or all, or the greatest goods of nature,” as Carneades maintained against the Stoics—these are simple, the others are mixed propositions.
Then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being those of the mind; the next best those of the body; the third are external goods, as the Peripatetics call them, and the Old Academics differ very little from them. Dinomachus and Callipho have coupled pleasure with honesty; but Diodorusthe Peripatetic has joined indolence to honesty. These are the opinions that have some footing; for those of Aristo, Pyrrho, Herillus, and of some others, are quite out of date.
Now let us see what weight these men have in them, excepting the Stoics, whose opinion I think I have sufficiently defended; and indeed I have explained what the Peripatetics have to say; excepting that Theophrastus, and those who followed him, dread and abhor pain in too weak a manner.
The others may go on to exaggerate the gravity and dignity of virtue, as usual; and then, after they have extolled it to the skies, with the usual extravagance of good orators, it is easy to reduce the other topics to nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to contempt. They who think that praise deserves to be sought after, even at the expense of pain, are not at liberty to deny those men to be happy who have obtained it. Though they may be under some evils, yet this name of happy has a very wide application.
Then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being those of the mind; the next best those of the body; the third are external goods, as the Peripatetics call them, and the Old Academics differ very little from them. Dinomachus and Callipho have coupled pleasure with honesty; but Diodorusthe Peripatetic has joined indolence to honesty. These are the opinions that have some footing; for those of Aristo, Pyrrho, Herillus, and of some others, are quite out of date.
Now let us see what weight these men have in them, excepting the Stoics, whose opinion I think I have sufficiently defended; and indeed I have explained what the Peripatetics have to say; excepting that Theophrastus, and those who followed him, dread and abhor pain in too weak a manner.
The others may go on to exaggerate the gravity and dignity of virtue, as usual; and then, after they have extolled it to the skies, with the usual extravagance of good orators, it is easy to reduce the other topics to nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to contempt. They who think that praise deserves to be sought after, even at the expense of pain, are not at liberty to deny those men to be happy who have obtained it. Though they may be under some evils, yet this name of happy has a very wide application.
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.30
I believe it was Descartes who suggested that there is no statement so strange, that some philosopher has not said it. Now those who know me are well aware that I have little patience for Descartes, perhaps the worst expression of the Enlightenment, a fellow who took it upon himself to reinvent the wheel, but in this case, he does have a good point. I will qualify, however, that the title does not necessary grant the authority: true philosophers, those who count, will flock together like birds of a feather.
Where there are open minds and generous hearts, as opposed to haughty pontificating and petty bickering, philosophy cannot help but seek out the universal and the necessary, what we share in common over any personal preferences. If a disagreement is about a matter of emphasis, proper distinctions can clarify the terms, and if it does come down to a conflict of principles, a sincere discussion always brings us closer to a resolution.
I will propose that philosophers only fight after they have abandoned reason, for whatever is reasonable cannot admit of contradiction. The clash of schools and factions does not reflect poorly on the prospects for wisdom, only on our failure to heed its calling. For all of my attachments to Marcus Aurelius or Thomas Aquinas, my service to the truth comes first, a proposition both thinkers would have immediately understood.
Cicero offers four alternative definitions of the good, and he also reiterates three possible settings for the good. Generally speaking, we will find broadly similar divisions in our own time, from those who continue to stress the content of character, to those who are concerned with the balance of pleasure and pain, to those who are content with a skeptical pragmatism. Some of us look to our possessions, some of us attend to our bodies, and some of us nurture our souls. With all of these options, and their various modifications, how are we to find a common ground?
While the bookworm in me wishes to get wrapped up in the history, including a fancy chart with all these names, my most pressing need is to make better sense of my daily priorities. I can already appreciate how our external and bodily goods are relative to, and therefore measured by, our moral worth, and I further hope that Cicero can help me to understand more of why it is virtue that binds together anything else I might consider to be a benefit. Happiness may be broad, but it cannot be vague.
I believe it was Descartes who suggested that there is no statement so strange, that some philosopher has not said it. Now those who know me are well aware that I have little patience for Descartes, perhaps the worst expression of the Enlightenment, a fellow who took it upon himself to reinvent the wheel, but in this case, he does have a good point. I will qualify, however, that the title does not necessary grant the authority: true philosophers, those who count, will flock together like birds of a feather.
Where there are open minds and generous hearts, as opposed to haughty pontificating and petty bickering, philosophy cannot help but seek out the universal and the necessary, what we share in common over any personal preferences. If a disagreement is about a matter of emphasis, proper distinctions can clarify the terms, and if it does come down to a conflict of principles, a sincere discussion always brings us closer to a resolution.
I will propose that philosophers only fight after they have abandoned reason, for whatever is reasonable cannot admit of contradiction. The clash of schools and factions does not reflect poorly on the prospects for wisdom, only on our failure to heed its calling. For all of my attachments to Marcus Aurelius or Thomas Aquinas, my service to the truth comes first, a proposition both thinkers would have immediately understood.
Cicero offers four alternative definitions of the good, and he also reiterates three possible settings for the good. Generally speaking, we will find broadly similar divisions in our own time, from those who continue to stress the content of character, to those who are concerned with the balance of pleasure and pain, to those who are content with a skeptical pragmatism. Some of us look to our possessions, some of us attend to our bodies, and some of us nurture our souls. With all of these options, and their various modifications, how are we to find a common ground?
While the bookworm in me wishes to get wrapped up in the history, including a fancy chart with all these names, my most pressing need is to make better sense of my daily priorities. I can already appreciate how our external and bodily goods are relative to, and therefore measured by, our moral worth, and I further hope that Cicero can help me to understand more of why it is virtue that binds together anything else I might consider to be a benefit. Happiness may be broad, but it cannot be vague.
—Reflection written in 3/1999
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