M. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they are “partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary; partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily obtained.”
As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that anyone may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted out.
On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the Epicureans; and those pleasures which they do not despise in a body, they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of them; for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within anyone’s reach; and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person: and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but can never be of any use.
And the assertions which Epicurus makes with respect to the whole of pleasure are such as show his opinion to be that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it is pain.
So that a wise man will always adopt such a system of counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain, provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body rejoices while it perceives a present pleasure; but that the mind not only perceives the present as well as the body, but foresees it while it is coming, and even when it is past will not let it quite slip away.
So that a wise man enjoys a continual series of pleasures, uniting the expectation of future pleasure to the recollection of what he has already tasted. The like notions are applied by them to high living; and the magnificence and expensiveness of entertainments are deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small expense.
As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that anyone may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted out.
On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the Epicureans; and those pleasures which they do not despise in a body, they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of them; for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within anyone’s reach; and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person: and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but can never be of any use.
And the assertions which Epicurus makes with respect to the whole of pleasure are such as show his opinion to be that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it is pain.
So that a wise man will always adopt such a system of counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain, provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body rejoices while it perceives a present pleasure; but that the mind not only perceives the present as well as the body, but foresees it while it is coming, and even when it is past will not let it quite slip away.
So that a wise man enjoys a continual series of pleasures, uniting the expectation of future pleasure to the recollection of what he has already tasted. The like notions are applied by them to high living; and the magnificence and expensiveness of entertainments are deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small expense.
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.33
With Cicero, I cannot bring myself to agree with the Epicurean model of the human person, just as I also cannot subscribe to their larger view of Nature, but I do have a great admiration for any school that preaches such a serene form of self-mastery. I am, unfortunately, more familiar with the crude licentiousness that goes together with our contemporary brand of hedonism, and it just goes to show that even a philosophy grounded in the appetites does not need to be cursed by selfishness and vulgarity.
Off course I am a creature of the senses, yet in itself an emotion contains no merit, and a passion is only as good as the understanding that informs it. That the Epicurean stresses the importance of prudence in guiding desire should indicate how he seeks out a broader awareness, though he still insists on defining everything by means of pleasure and pain. I would respectfully ask him to consider how the value of the feeling is relative to the value of the act, and why the capacity for happiness hinges upon the power of judgment.
The temperance of an Epicurus can be said to approximate the virtues, while it may not be doing so for all the right reasons. In practice, however, observe his remarkable restraint in recognizing why most of our so-called pleasures are neither necessary nor beneficial. It can be helpful for me to examine this threefold division of my desires, so I might admit how many of the things I claim as requirements for my happiness are really just hindrances to my inner peace.
Very little is needed to survive, and life makes only the slightest demands in order for us to thrive. What is it that keeps me from accepting this? I am working under the illusion that more is always better, mistaking quantity for quality and intensity for depth. If it is essential, nature has already provided for it. If it is optional, I can just as easily do without it. If it extraneous, I should rid myself of it completely. My demand for more luxury is a symptom of my weakness, not of my strength.
In something akin to what later thinkers called an “enlightened self-interest”, the Epicureans calculated how the endurance of a certain pain could provide us with more lasting pleasure, just as the avoidance of a lesser pleasure could liberate us from a greater pain. In college, we would jokingly ask whether the drinking was worth the hangover, when we really should have wondered whether anything could justify the crippling lifetime of shame and regret that followed from the habits of gluttony and lust. This is why the sage is perfectly content with a glass of water and a pleasant view.
I believe there is more to a good life than a balance sheet of pleasure and pain, but there is some wisdom in choosing our enjoyments with the bigger picture clearly in mind. If it is genuinely worthwhile, I will not only relish it for one moment, but I will also anticipate its coming and remember it fondly once it has passed. The lush fails to wait for a fine wine to age, as the lecher passes over a lifetime with a loyal woman in favor of an hour with a floozie.
It's tragic when we say that we just want to have some fun, and then our fervor brings us nothing but misery.
With Cicero, I cannot bring myself to agree with the Epicurean model of the human person, just as I also cannot subscribe to their larger view of Nature, but I do have a great admiration for any school that preaches such a serene form of self-mastery. I am, unfortunately, more familiar with the crude licentiousness that goes together with our contemporary brand of hedonism, and it just goes to show that even a philosophy grounded in the appetites does not need to be cursed by selfishness and vulgarity.
Off course I am a creature of the senses, yet in itself an emotion contains no merit, and a passion is only as good as the understanding that informs it. That the Epicurean stresses the importance of prudence in guiding desire should indicate how he seeks out a broader awareness, though he still insists on defining everything by means of pleasure and pain. I would respectfully ask him to consider how the value of the feeling is relative to the value of the act, and why the capacity for happiness hinges upon the power of judgment.
The temperance of an Epicurus can be said to approximate the virtues, while it may not be doing so for all the right reasons. In practice, however, observe his remarkable restraint in recognizing why most of our so-called pleasures are neither necessary nor beneficial. It can be helpful for me to examine this threefold division of my desires, so I might admit how many of the things I claim as requirements for my happiness are really just hindrances to my inner peace.
Very little is needed to survive, and life makes only the slightest demands in order for us to thrive. What is it that keeps me from accepting this? I am working under the illusion that more is always better, mistaking quantity for quality and intensity for depth. If it is essential, nature has already provided for it. If it is optional, I can just as easily do without it. If it extraneous, I should rid myself of it completely. My demand for more luxury is a symptom of my weakness, not of my strength.
In something akin to what later thinkers called an “enlightened self-interest”, the Epicureans calculated how the endurance of a certain pain could provide us with more lasting pleasure, just as the avoidance of a lesser pleasure could liberate us from a greater pain. In college, we would jokingly ask whether the drinking was worth the hangover, when we really should have wondered whether anything could justify the crippling lifetime of shame and regret that followed from the habits of gluttony and lust. This is why the sage is perfectly content with a glass of water and a pleasant view.
I believe there is more to a good life than a balance sheet of pleasure and pain, but there is some wisdom in choosing our enjoyments with the bigger picture clearly in mind. If it is genuinely worthwhile, I will not only relish it for one moment, but I will also anticipate its coming and remember it fondly once it has passed. The lush fails to wait for a fine wine to age, as the lecher passes over a lifetime with a loyal woman in favor of an hour with a floozie.
It's tragic when we say that we just want to have some fun, and then our fervor brings us nothing but misery.
—Reflection written in 3/1999
IMAGE: Agostino Scilla, Epicurus (c. 1670)
"Whatever you do, do wisely and think of the consequences."
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