“And,
further, I cannot approve of an argument by which some men think that they can
cut this knot; for they say that a result does not come to pass for the reason
that Providence has foreseen it, but the opposite rather, namely, that because
it is about to come to pass, therefore it cannot be hidden from God's Providence.
“In
that way it seems to me that the argument must resolve itself into an argument
on the other side. For in that case it is not necessary that that should happen
which is foreseen, but that that which is about to happen should be foreseen;
as though, indeed, our doubt was whether God's foreknowledge is the certain cause
of future events, or the certainty of future events is the cause of Providence.
“But
let our aim be to prove that, whatever be the shape which this series of causes
takes, the fulfilment of God's foreknowledge is necessary, even if this knowledge
may not seem to induce the necessity for the occurrence of future events. For
instance, if a man sits down, it must be that the opinion, which conjectures
that he is sitting, is true; but conversely, if the opinion concerning the man
is true because he is sitting, he must be sitting down. There is therefore necessity
in both cases: the man must be sitting, and the opinion must be true. But he
does not sit because the opinion is true, but rather the opinion is true
because his sitting down has preceded it.
“Thus,
though the cause of the truth of the opinion proceeds from the other fact, yet
there is a common necessity on both parts. In like manner we must reason of
Providence and future events. For even though they are foreseen because they
are about to happen, yet they do not happen because they are foreseen. None the
less it is necessary that either what is about to happen should be foreseen of
God, or that what has been foreseen should happen; and this alone is enough to
destroy all free will.”
—from
Book 5, Prose 3
I can’t
help but admire how thorough Boethius’ entire objection is, such a far cry from
the thoughtless determinism I see around me far too often. He doesn’t merely
take things for granted, or avoid his own responsibility by passing it on to
greater powers; he genuinely wishes to understand if human freedom can possibly
exist in the presence of any kind of omniscience.
Now the
problem may arise from assuming that we somehow have to act because God knows
what we will do, when the reverse could also be true, that God knows what we
will do because we decide to act. This could seemingly retain our free choice
within God’s perfect awareness, by pointing out that the certitude of the latter
proceeds from the liberty of the former.
But
notice how we are still speaking in terms of what is certain, what has
to be, and the fact that Providence is absolutely necessary, having within it
no possibility of error or contingency, is really what is getting in the way.
In other
words, it hardly matters if we bicker about whether the egg came before the
chicken or the chicken came before the egg. The unavoidable fact seems to be that
if God knows it, He knows it without a doubt.
I can
talk all I want about how my own judgments were the cause behind it turning out
the way it did, and that still doesn’t get around the final inevitability of it
all. There is no other way it could ever turn out. It is written in stone, in
whatever way I speak of it, and so it will come to pass, however much I may
object or try to take it back.
Though
the scale and degree are obviously rather different, it would be a bit like someone
telling me he has written a brilliant computer program, one capable of
calculating all the relevant variables, and thereby able to predict all of my
actions.
I protest,
of course, and insist that I’m the one in charge, that I am following my own
way, however clever his technology and programming might be. Of all the nerve!
Yet when
it’s properly put to the test, it turns out that the program manages to
forecast every move I make, long before I come to a particular decision. It’s
uncanny, seemingly to be known better than I know myself.
This imaginary
computer is not God, of course, and its scope could never be omniscient, but it
offers a similar challenge. Where is the freedom, if it has already been prophesied?
This is the troubling problem of foreknowledge.
Written in 1/2016
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