Seneca on Philosophy and Friendship 1

You desire to know whether Epicurus is right when, in one of his letters, he rebukes those who hold that the wise man is self-sufficient and for that reason does not stand in need of friendships. This is the objection raised by Epicurus against Stilpo and those who believed that the Supreme Good is a soul which is insensible to feeling.

We are bound to meet with a double meaning if we try to express the Greek term "lack of feeling" summarily, in a single word, rendering it by the Latin word “impanentia”. For it may be understood in the meaning the opposite to that which we wish it to have. 

What we mean to express is, a soul which rejects any sensation of evil; but people will interpret the idea as that of a soul which can endure no evil.  Consider, therefore, whether it is not better to say "a soul that cannot be harmed”, or "a soul entirety beyond the realm of suffering”. There is this difference between ourselves and the other school: our ideal wise man feels his troubles, but overcomes them; their wise man does not even feel them. . . .

—Seneca the Younger, Moral Letters to Lucilius 9, tr Gummere

The concept of self-sufficiency in Stoicism can be a difficult one to embrace, because at face value it might seem to say that a man needs nothing beyond himself to live well. He would therefore seem not to need family, friends, or any love for another person.

This is tempting for those of us who are bitten by the Black Dog, or who have been hurt one time too many. But it confuses self-sufficiency with isolation. They are hardly the same thing.

Though we need not dwell upon the details here, Epicurus was the founder of a rival school to Stoicism. In the simplest sense, while the Stoics said that the highest measure of a man was the pursuit of virtue, Epicurus argued that the highest measure of a man was the pursuit of pleasure. Now Epicurus was hardly a hedonist, because he understood that we could never live in perfect pleasure. He therefore suggested that the proper balance was seeking moderate pleasure, and minimum pain.

Epicurus was also critical of Stilpo, a philosopher of the Megarian school. We sadly have none of Stilpo’s writings, but he seemed to encourage being “insensitive” to the world in order to practice true virtue. This seemed ridiculous to Epicurus, and perhaps rightly so. Lucilius is confused about the difference between the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Megarians, and perhaps rightly so.

Here is one reason why I have always admired Seneca. His ability to distinguish and clarify cuts like a knife. I think only St. Thomas Aquinas can outdo him in this regard.

What do we truly mean by being “insensitive” or “lacking feeling”? Different words, and in different languages, can sometimes tie us in knots. I once recall a heated debate that revolved around the difference between the terms “know” and “believe” in English and in German. The words weren’t the problem, but our own ability and willingness to find a common meaning was indeed a problem.

Seneca explains that Stilpo and the Stoics are really using the term “insensitive” very differently. Stilpo means that that we should not be moved or affected by feelings at all, while the Stoic means that we should not allow our feelings to rule us. In other words, the Megarian removes passion from the equation, while the Stoic puts it in its rightful place. Stilpo’s view is actually what most people assume defines Stoicism, though, as Seneca clarifies, that is hardly the case. People will misunderstand the meaning of terms.

These are really two different solutions to the problem of pain and suffering. Either you excise feeling and thereby excise pain, or you manage and order your feelings, and then you transform pain.

They are also two very different approaches to the question of friendship. I am self-sufficient, therefore I do not need friends, or I am self-sufficient, therefore I must learn to love my friends rightly.

Epicurus might be right to criticize Stilpo for denying his feelings, though this same criticism would hardly apply to Stoicism. Nevertheless, both the Megarian and the Stoic would have to disagree with the Epicurean claim that feeling is the primary thing that defines us. I feel a triangular chart of the relationship between the three views coming on, but you can picture that in your own imagination!

Written 1/2005

Image: Johann Heinrich Lips (1758-1817), An Allegory of Friendship