Remember then, that if you mistake those things for free, which nature has made servile; and fancy that your own, which is indeed another’s; you shall be sure to meet with many hindrances and disappointments, much trouble, and great distractions, and be continually finding fault both with God and man.
But if you take things right, as they really are, looking upon no more to be your own than indeed is so; and all that to be another’s, which really belongs to him; nobody shall ever be able to put any constraint upon you, nobody shall check or disappoint you; you shall accuse nobody, shall complain of nothing, shall never do anything unwillingly, shall receive harm from nobody, shall have no enemy; for no man will be able to do you any prejudice.
Comment:
He had told us before, what was, and what was not in our own power, and described the qualities peculiar to both sorts, and what relation they bear to us: that the things in our power are properly ours; that those out of our power, are another’s.
And now he advises, that men would manage themselves, suitably to the nature of these things, and not be guilty of perverse and ridiculous absurdities, with regard to them. For this is the true foundation of all the happiness, or the wretchedness, of our lives. The succeeding well in our attempts, attaining to the good we aim at, and restraining all the mischief that could befall us, makes us happy. The being disappointed in our hopes, missing our ends and advantages, or the falling into mischiefs and inconveniences, are the things that make us miserable.
But now, if your happiness consists in regular desires, and just aversions, and these desires and aversions are in our own power; we must seek our happiness here, that we may be sure to find it; and to find that happiness, which is properly ours, and peculiar to us. And we shall be sure to find it; for how is it possible we should not, when the regulation of our desires and aversions, depends entirely upon ourselves?
On the other hand, if we place our affections and desires upon things not in our power, and expect to find our happiness in such; this double misfortune must needs follow upon it: one way the disappointment is unavoidable, that, though we should prove successful, and obtain what we are so fond of, yet still these things are not what we take them for, nor can we meet with that, which is proper our happiness in them.
But besides, it is agreeable to all the reason in the world, to believe, that generally we must needs be disappointed of the things themselves. For how should it be otherwise, when a man sets his heart upon that which is another’s, as if it were his own; and when he must depend upon other persons and accidents, whether he shall ever obtain it or no?
Now the natural consequences of such disappointments are, the being interrupted, and having all our measures broken, and a world of grief and remorse, when we find our pains have been employed to no purpose, and that we are engaged in wrongs courses.
For, as pleasure and joy are the effects of good success, the accomplishing what we wish, and being delivered from what we dread; so, when we are overtaken by the mischiefs we feared, and defeated in our endeavors after that we desired, we presently fall into trouble and discontent, and complain of everyone that we think contributed to our misfortune, and spare neither men, nor sometimes providence, and God himself.
Besides, there is another mischief comes of this. For by being so tenderly affected for things that are not in our power, we lose sometimes those that are; and he that deprives us of what he could take away, robs us of what he has no power to take from us; namely regular and moderate desire and aversions.
But if we be disposed and affected as we ought, and make a true distinction between what is ours, and what is not; if we settle our affections, and bestow our care, not upon things which belong to another, but upon our own, our proper happiness, and what falls within the compass of our own power; that is, upon the entertaining such desires and aversions, as are agreeable to reason and nature; then we may rest secure, that we shall never be annoyed by any constraint or compulsion, any disappointment or hindrance; but shall have the sole government, and entire disposal, of such desires and aversion.
And if so, then we shall have no occasion of grief or remorse: for that can happen but in two cases, either the missing of what we wished, or the falling into what we feared, and would fain have avoided. Now we can never be frustrated in our desires, nor ever be damaged by any inconvenience we fear, provided we will but make those things our care, which are in our own power.
Consequently, we can never live in awe and dread of any man; for the reason, why we fear anybody, is because he may do us some prejudice, or some way obstruct our advantage. But no man alive has it in his power to offer violence to our desires and aversions; and these are the things, in which the man who lives according to the dictates of right reason, places his happiness.
At this rate, we can have no enemy neither, for he is accounted our enemy, that does us mischief; but nobody can do this to a man who is out of the power of all mankind to hurt him: By the same reason, such a person will accuse no man, complain of nothing, nor ever do anything against his will. So that the life of this man is untainted with perturbation and sensual pleasure, must needs be above all grief, and all fear, absolutely free, and exquisitely happy.
And here we may observe farther, how excellently well he proves the life of a wise and good man, to be not only the best and most for ones advantage, but the pleasantest and most for one’s satisfaction too. For, as Plato tells us, every creature does, by natural instinct, endeavor after pleasure, and run away from pain. Now some pleasures attend those things, that are truly good and advantageous to us; and others, those that are prejudicial and hurtful. And this makes it necessary to take good heed what choice we make, that so we may embrace and pursue, and accustom ourselves to, the enjoyment of such pleasures only, as may be beneficial to us.
Temperance, for example, is really more delightful to a virtuous man, than extravagance and licentiousness are to the dissolute. This needs no other proof than that many debauchees leave their loose way of living, and turn sober, when they consider, and come to a better sense of things. But there are no instances to be produced, of any temperate persons, who proceed upon wise and reasonable considerations, that ever abandoned themselves to debauchery and excess.
Now if this way of living had not more than ordinary pleasure in it, men would never choose it with so much eagerness and satisfaction, And, that such a virtuous life as this, must needs be more easy and pleasant, Epictetus demonstrates, from its being free and uncontrolled, above checks and contradictions, above hindrances and disappointments, but depending and doing all upon the dictates of one’s own mind: and thus those happy men live, who place all their good and evil in their own actions, and the use of that liberty and power, which nature has given them.
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