A. You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you are not inconsistent yourself.
M. In what respect?
A. Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and in that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and the Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow that, what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of Zeno that virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that the Peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words.
M. What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with those who dispute by established rules. We live from hand to mouth, and say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the only people who are really at liberty.
But, since I just now spoke of consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the opinion of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true that nothing is good but what is honorable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a happy life can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly grant Brutus this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he is, is his own business; for who, indeed, is more worthy than himself of the glory of that opinion? Still, we may maintain that such a man is more happy than anyone else.
M. In what respect?
A. Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and in that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and the Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow that, what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of Zeno that virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that the Peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words.
M. What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with those who dispute by established rules. We live from hand to mouth, and say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the only people who are really at liberty.
But, since I just now spoke of consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the opinion of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true that nothing is good but what is honorable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a happy life can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly grant Brutus this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he is, is his own business; for who, indeed, is more worthy than himself of the glory of that opinion? Still, we may maintain that such a man is more happy than anyone else.
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.11
Indeed, we must be consistent in our consistency, while at the same time not succumbing to a small-minded conformity, always remaining open to the potential for new knowledge, and sensitive to the subtleties of different perspectives. I would rather be sluggish in my judgments than exclude the possibility of a common understanding.
The Auditor continues to be on his toes, not allowing Cicero to get away with any sloppy reasoning. If we expect Aristotle, Epicurus, or Brutus to present a coherent account, should we not also strive to do the same?
I admire how Cicero considered many points of view, and was willing to take the best from any tradition, always assessing the argument by the demands of daily living. Nevertheless, it may sometimes appear as if he had conflicting loyalties, embracing this school in one text, and then praising that school in another. At what point does being open-minded devolve into waffling?
I imagine some of this had to do with the discipline of rhetoric, of which Cicero was a master, where a writer would hone his skills by defending diverse positions. At the same time, however, there was Cicero’s philosophical training in the moderate skepticism of the Academics, which avoided a dogmatic certainty in favor of a practical likelihood. In other words, if the shoe happens to fit, feel free to wear it.
While the Tusculan Disputations are quite friendly to the Stoics, On the Ends of Good and Evil is a bit more critical. Yes, there is a freedom to roam here, though the man who likes the assurance of his principles may feel uneasy. Once again, I suspect that the Stoics of the time could be quite rigid in their doctrines, and Cicero’s pragmatic approach was more interested in the reality of things over a speculation about words.
I have myself contemplated ways to bring Zeno and Aristotle closer together, not because I am being wishy-washy, but because I aim for a shared truth to all sincere and authentic inquiry. However broadly or narrowly they defined their terms, the Stoics and the Peripatetics would surely have agreed that a good life must be virtuous, yet there remains some doubt if a good life will be a happy life, or to what extent fortune will play a role.
Let Brutus attend to his own opinions, and let us attend to ours. Whether happiness is pure or can be mixed might become clearer by examining its essence—only then can we discuss its accidents.
In his usual sweeping fashion, Cicero will next turn to Plato for some further guidance on the matter. . . .
Indeed, we must be consistent in our consistency, while at the same time not succumbing to a small-minded conformity, always remaining open to the potential for new knowledge, and sensitive to the subtleties of different perspectives. I would rather be sluggish in my judgments than exclude the possibility of a common understanding.
The Auditor continues to be on his toes, not allowing Cicero to get away with any sloppy reasoning. If we expect Aristotle, Epicurus, or Brutus to present a coherent account, should we not also strive to do the same?
I admire how Cicero considered many points of view, and was willing to take the best from any tradition, always assessing the argument by the demands of daily living. Nevertheless, it may sometimes appear as if he had conflicting loyalties, embracing this school in one text, and then praising that school in another. At what point does being open-minded devolve into waffling?
I imagine some of this had to do with the discipline of rhetoric, of which Cicero was a master, where a writer would hone his skills by defending diverse positions. At the same time, however, there was Cicero’s philosophical training in the moderate skepticism of the Academics, which avoided a dogmatic certainty in favor of a practical likelihood. In other words, if the shoe happens to fit, feel free to wear it.
While the Tusculan Disputations are quite friendly to the Stoics, On the Ends of Good and Evil is a bit more critical. Yes, there is a freedom to roam here, though the man who likes the assurance of his principles may feel uneasy. Once again, I suspect that the Stoics of the time could be quite rigid in their doctrines, and Cicero’s pragmatic approach was more interested in the reality of things over a speculation about words.
I have myself contemplated ways to bring Zeno and Aristotle closer together, not because I am being wishy-washy, but because I aim for a shared truth to all sincere and authentic inquiry. However broadly or narrowly they defined their terms, the Stoics and the Peripatetics would surely have agreed that a good life must be virtuous, yet there remains some doubt if a good life will be a happy life, or to what extent fortune will play a role.
Let Brutus attend to his own opinions, and let us attend to ours. Whether happiness is pure or can be mixed might become clearer by examining its essence—only then can we discuss its accidents.
In his usual sweeping fashion, Cicero will next turn to Plato for some further guidance on the matter. . . .
—Reflection written in 2/1999
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