Justus Lipsius, On Constancy 1.19

The fourth and true kind of destiny expounded. The name briefly spoken of, it is lightly defined, and proved to differ from providence. 

"This much may suffice touching the opinions and dissensions of the ancients. For why should I overcuriously search the secrets of hell, as the proverb says? I shall have enough to do with true destiny, which now I propound and illustrate, calling it an eternal decree of God's providence, which cannot be taken away no more than providence itself. 

"And let not any man cavil with me about the name, because I say there is not in Latin another proper word to express that thing but fatum. What? Have old writers abused it? Let us use it: and so enlarging this word out of the prison of the Stoics, let us bring it to a better light. 

"It is called in Latin fatum from fando, of speaking, neither is it anything else properly but the saying and commandment of God: and this is it which now I seek for; I define it either with that famous Picus, a rank and order of causes depending upon God's counsel, or with my own words more obscurely and subtly, an immovable decree of providence inherent in things movable, which firmly effects everything in its order, place, and time. 

"I call it 'a decree of providence' because I agree not wholly with the divines of our days (let them give me leave in the free study of the truth) who in name and nature confound it with providence. I know it be a hard matter, and full of temerity to conceive or restrain unto certain words that supernatural and supercelestial essence—I mean God—or ought that belongs to him; yet unto any man's capacity I defend and maintain that providence is one thing properly, and fate or destiny another. 

"For I consider providence no otherwise then that it be a power and faculty in God of seeing, knowing and governing all things. A power, I say, universal, undivided, guarded, and as Lucretius speaks, united together. But destiny seems to descend into the things themselves and to be seen in the particulars of them, being as it were a disposing and bestowing abroad of that universal providence, by particulars. 

"Therefore, providence is in God, and attributed to him alone; destiny in the things, and to them is ascribed. You think I trifle, and, as it is said, bore holes in millet seed; no, Lipsius, I take this out of the talk of the common people, among whom nothing is more usual than to say, 'this was my good or evil destiny'; and likewise, 'this was the fatal decree of this kingdom, or that town.'

"But no man speaks so of providence, no man applies it to the things themselves, without impiety and derision. Therefore, I said well, that the one of them was in God, the other truly from God, and perceived in the selfsame things. 

"I say, moreover, that though providence be not really divided from destiny, yet it is more excellent and more ancient; even as we are taught in the schools of the wise to say that the sun is more worth than the light; eternity than time; understanding than reason. But to draw into a short summary these curious not common matters: you see that I have just cause both to use this distinction and also to retain the name of destiny against the new consistory of divines. 

"For why? Those ancient, celebrated fathers prohibit me not but that I may use in its right and true sense the word destiny. But now that I may return to make plain my former definition, I said it was an inherent decree, to show that destiny should be marked in the things to which it comes, and not from whence it proceeds. 

"I added, 'in movable things', signifying that although destiny itself be immovable, yet it takes not away motion, nor any natural faculty from things, but works easily and without force even as the marks and signs imprinted by God in each thing do require. 

"In causes—secondary, I mean—that be necessary, it works necessarily; in natural causes, naturally; in voluntary causes, voluntarily; in contingent, contingently. Wherefore in respect of the things it does neither force, nor constrain; but as everything is made to do, or suffer, so it directs and turns all things. But if you recall it to its first original, I mean God and his providence, I affirm constantly and boldly that all things are done necessarily, which are done by destiny.

"Lastly, I joined 'of the order, place, and time', establishing that which I said before, that providence was of things in universality, destiny by distribution in particularities. By 'order', I understand the course and united together of causes which destiny limits. By 'place and time' I mean that wonderful and incomprehensible power whereby all events or actions are tied to their certain places and moments of time. 

"It was destiny that Tarquin should be banished from his kingdom. Be it so; but first let the adultery be committed. You see the order of the causes. It was destiny that Caesar be killed. So; but in the Senate by the image of Pompey. You see the place. That Domitian should be murdered by his own people. Let him be murdered; but yet at the very hour, even the fifth, which in vain he sought to prevent. Thus you see the time." 

IMAGE: Master of Marradi, The Expulsion of King Tarquin (c. 1480)