Seneca, Moral Letters 85.7

Then, again, we should see to it that two principles which ought to be tested separately should not be confused. For the conclusion is reached independently that that alone is good which is honorable, and again independently the conclusion that virtue is sufficient for the happy life. 
 
If that alone is good which is honorable, everyone agrees that virtue is sufficient for the purpose of living happily; but, on the contrary, if virtue alone makes men happy, it will not be conceded that that alone is good which is honorable.
 
Xenocrates and Speusippus hold that a man can become happy even by virtue alone, not, however, that that which is honorable is the only good. Epicurus also decides that one who possesses virtue is happy, but that virtue of itself is not sufficient for the happy life, because the pleasure that results from virtue, and not virtue itself, makes one happy. 
 
This is a futile distinction. For the same philosopher declares that virtue never exists without pleasure; and therefore, if virtue is always connected with pleasure and always inseparable therefrom, virtue is of itself sufficient. For virtue keeps pleasure in its company, and does not exist without it, even when alone.
 
But it is absurd to say that a man will be happy by virtue alone, and yet not absolutely happy. I cannot discover how that may be, since the happy life contains in itself a good that is perfect and cannot be excelled, If a man has this good, life is completely happy. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 85 
 
In different corners of our lives, we will sometimes assert conflicting values, sometimes out of hypocrisy, because we believe we can pull a fast one, and sometimes out of ignorance, because we aren’t yet making the necessary connections. How often I assured myself that a good conscience would be more than enough, and yet I then found myself obsessed with acquiring some further comfort, as if I were stepping back and forth between two different worlds. 
 
But it is always one and the same world, and we are always called to the excellence of one and the same nature, however much we may object. My attempts at trying to have it both ways are usually a sign that I remain deeply confused about who I am meant to be, unwilling to commit by trying to play it safe. If an integrity of character leaves me short, can I still fall back on chasing after the fortune and the fame? 
 
Do I understand what I mean by this “good” that I seek? We are constantly using the term, and yet we rarely bother to examine what it means. “You know—the sort of things that I want.” And what sort of things should I want? “You know—the ones that are good for me.” Ah, yes, I’m glad we had this chat. 
 
Will there be a list of many things, or will it reduce down to a single thing? For the Stoics, in their admittedly irritating manner, the human good will solely be the excellence of our nature, and such a rational nature is defined by the quality of our judgments. 
 
Hence the virtues become the deciding factor, through which any other circumstances can become beneficial for us, and the absence of which brings us nothing but harm. If it is sufficient for a creature to be what it was made to be, then our moral worth stands as absolute, and everything else is relative. 
 
There remains the temptation, however, to squeeze in some other goods, as if a righteous soul still needs a few accessories. Perhaps we also require a certain amount of money, or some approval from our fellows, or a fairly healthy body? Before we know it, we have muddied the waters, and we have added so many conditions that virtue now seems to depend upon everything except itself. 
 
And so certain Academics and Peripatetics spoke of the most favorable conditions, forgetting how any situation at all can become an occasion to do what is right, and the Epicureans claimed the primacy of pleasure, as if an effect can swap places with its cause. I wonder if they were so fixated on their preferences that they began to compromise on their principles? If we grant that virtue is indeed the greatest human good, as is evident from our very identity, then any other considerations will fade in comparison. 
 
When we face our hardships with dignity, virtue remains as complete and self-sufficient. When we find that we have been granted the deepest joy, it is only the perfection of virtue that made this possible. A man properly feels good because he knows that he does good. 

—Reflection written in 1/2014