Dio Chrysostom, On Slavery and Freedom 1.1

Men desire above all things to be free and say that freedom is the greatest of blessings, while slavery is the most shameful and wretched of states; and yet they have no knowledge of the essential nature of this freedom and this slavery of which they speak. 

And, what is more, they do practically nothing whatever to escape the shameful and grievous thing, which is slavery, and to gain what they consider to be valuable, that is, freedom; but on the contrary, they do the things which result in their continuing in slavery all their lives and never attaining to freedom. 

However, we should perhaps feel no surprise that these men are unable either to get or to avoid the thing of which they happen to be ignorant. 

For instance, if they happened to be ignorant as to what a sheep and a wolf are respectively, but nevertheless thought that the one was profitable and good to get while the other was harmful and unprofitable, it would not be at all surprising if they feared the sheep and fled from it at times as though it were a wolf, but let the wolf approach and awaited its coming, thinking to be a sheep. 

For ignorance has this effect upon men who lack knowledge, and forces them to flee from and to pursue the opposite of what they desire to flee from and to pursue, and of what would be to their advantage. 

Come then, let us consider whether the majority of men really have any clear knowledge about freedom and slavery. For it is quite possible that we are criticizing them without good reason, and that they know well what these are. 

Now if one were to ask statement what the nature of freedom is, they would say, perhaps, that it consists in being subject to no one and acting simply in accordance with one's own judgement. 

But if one were to go on and ask the man who made this answer whether he thought it a fine thing, and worthy of a free man, that when he is a member of a chorus he should not pay attention to the leader nor be subject to him, but should sing in tune or out of tune just as he took the notion, and whether he thought the opposite course, namely, to pay attention and obey the director of the chorus and to begin and to stop singing only at his command, was shameful and slavish, I do not think that he would agree. 

And again, if one were to ask whether he thought it was characteristic of a free man, when a passenger on board a ship, to pay no attention to the captain and refuse to carry out whatever orders he should give; for instance, to stand erect in the ship when ordered to sit down, simply if he took a notion to do so; and if he were on occasion ordered to bale or help hoist the sails, neither to bale nor lay hold of the ropes; this man, too, he would not call free or enviable, because he does what seems best to himself. 

And surely one would not call soldiers slaves because they are subject to their general's orders and spring to their feet the moment he gives a command, and partake of food and lay hold of their weapons and fall in and advance and retire only at their general's order. Neither will they call persons who are sick slaves because they must obey their physicians. 

And yet the orders which they obey are neither insignificant nor easy to carry out, but at times they order them to do without both food and drink; and if the physician decides at any time to bind the patient, he is straightway bound; and if he decides to use the knife or cautery, the patient will be burned and cut to the extent that the physician decides is best. 

And if the sick man refuses to obey, all the household will help the physician to cope with him, and not the free alone, but often the sick man's domestics themselves bind their master and fetch the fire that he may suffer cautery, and give any other assistance. 

You do not say, do you, that this man is not free because he endures many unpleasant things at another's command? Surely you would not have denied, for instance, that Darius, the King of the Persians, was a free man when, after suffering a fall from his horse in a hunt and dislocating his ankle, he obeyed the surgeons while they pulled and twisted his foot in order to set the joint, and that too although they were Egyptians.⁠ 

Nor, to take another instance, would you have denied that Xerxes was a free man, when on his retreat from Greece a storm arose and he while aboard the ship obeyed the captain in everything and would not permit himself against the captain's judgement even to nod or to change his position. 

Therefore they will not persist in maintaining that rendering obedience to no man or doing whatever one likes constitutes freedom. 

But perhaps they will counter by saying that these men obey for their own advantage, just as people on shipboard obey the captain and soldiers their general, and that the sick for this reason give heed to their physician, that they prescribe nothing but what is for the advantage of their patients. 

But masters, they will assert, do not order their slaves to do what will benefit them, but what they think will be of profit to themselves. 

Well then, is it to the master's advantage that his servant should die or be ill or be a knave? No one would say so, but would affirm that the contrary is to his advantage, namely that he should keep alive and well and should be an honest man. 

And these same things will be found to be for the advantage of the servant as well; so that the master, if indeed he is wise, will order his servant to do that which is equally to the servant's advantage; for that will prove to be of advantage to himself as well.