Of man and beast.

"It is no common thing to do this only, to fulfill the promise of a man's nature. For what is a man? The answer is: 'A rational and mortal being.' Then, by the rational faculty, from whom are we separated? From wild beasts. And from what others? From sheep and like animals.

"Take care then to do nothing like a wild beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man; you have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep; but if you do, in this case the man is lost.

"What then do we do as sheep? When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we act rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we declined? To sheep. What have we lost? The rational faculty. When we act contentiously and harmfully and passionately, and violently, to what have we declined? To wild beasts.

"Consequently some of us are great wild beasts, and others little beasts, of a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, 'Let me be eaten by a lion.' But in all these ways the promise of a man acting as a man is destroyed."

--Epictetus, Discourses 2.9 (tr Long)

I need simply reflect back upon myself to see what is at the essence of my being; it is in that very act of thinking that I discern myself in relation to Nature. I am indeed also a being of flesh and bone, a being with senses and with feelings, but these are properties I also share with animals, whether they be tame or wild.

I would be amazed at how others confuse their natures with those of animals, but then I catch myself doing just the same. If I define myself by my feelings, by my status, by my possessions, or by my power, I am surrendering my inner power of judgment to the outer conditions of my passions.

If you have hurt my feelings, and I either crawl away to sulk and lick my wounds, or fight to hurt in return, I am acting not as a man, but as an animal.

If I have won some struggle for a piece of territory or a place in the pecking order, and I strut along filled with pride, I am acting not as a man, but as an animal.

If I have acquired for myself the pleasures of the flesh, and I then reach out for even greater pleasures far and wide, leaving one for the next, I am acting not as a man, but as an animal.

If I have affection for another person, but only feel such affection as long as that person is useful to me, I am acting not as a man, but as an animal. 

But am I not a being of passion? Yes, but there is no room for a false dichotomy here. It is not necessary to insist that reason and emotion cannot exist together. I am not only a mind, or only composed of feelings. Both are necessary aspects of my existence, but both only work together rightly when the higher directs and rules over the lower, when that power which can govern itself orders that power which cannot govern itself.

 As Epictetus makes clear, this confusion about our very nature as persons has been with us all along. It isn't just a symptom of modernity or post-modernity. My students will almost invariably first define themselves by their feelings, and begin with the assumption that animals don't have feelings like they do. Only reflection, the use of reason, can help them resolve this confusion.

Written on 6/19/2006

Image: Wenceslas Hollar, (1607-1677), Creation of Man and Beast