The Death of Marcus Aurelius

The Death of Marcus Aurelius

Saturday, November 14, 2026

Justus Lipsius, On Constancy 1.20


It is distinguished by four notes from Stoical destiny. Here is shown more exactly how it does not enforce our will; and also that God is neither coadjutor nor author of evil.

"How say you, young man, do you perceive? Or must I light a clearer torch for you?" 

 I, striking my head, "Yes, Langius, I must have more light, or I shall never come out of this darkness. What slender kind of distinctions are these? Captious jinns of questions are here? I fear treason, believe me, and suspect those mystical and doubtful words of yours as my very enemies." 

Langius, laughing a little, "Be of good courage," said he, "here is no Hannibal. You are come into a sure castle, not fallen into any ambush; I will give you light enough. Tell me where and in what point you are so ignorant yet?"  

"In that, Langius, which concerns force and necessity. For truly I cannot see how this destiny that you describe differs from that of the Stoics, which when you in words shut out at the broad gate, as I may say, in effect you let in afterwards at a postern or backdoor." 

"No, Lipsius, God forbid, for my part I do not so much as dream of any such Stoical destiny, nor study to revive again those old wives long ago dead and buried. I propose unto you such a doctrine as may stand with modesty and godliness, distinguished from the violent fate by four marks. 

"They make God himself subject to destiny, and Jupiter in Homer though he were most willing, could not free Sarpedon from his bonds. But we do subject destiny unto God, making him a most free author and actor of things, able at his will, and pleasure far to surmount and cut in sunder those linked troupes and bands of destiny. 

"They appoint a successive order of natural causes from all eternity: we do not make the causes always natural, for God is often the cause of wonders and miracles, besides or contrary to nature, nor eternal. For these second causes had the beginning with the world. 

"Thirdly, they take away all contingency from things; we admit it, affirming that as often as the secondary causes are such, chance or happenstance  may be admitted in the events and actions. 

"Lastly, they seemed to intrude a violent force upon our will. This is far from us, who do both allow fate or destiny, and also join hands with liberty or freedom of will. We do so shun the deceitful blasts of fortune, and chance, that we dash not our ship against the rocks of necessity. 

"Is there fate? Yes. But it is the first and principal cause, which is so far from taking away the middle and secondary causes, that ordinarily and for the most part it works not but by them; and your will is among the number of those secondary causes. Think not that God forces it or entirely takes it away; herein is all the error and ignorance in this matter, no man considers how he ought to will that which destiny wills; and I say freely to will it. 

"For God that created all things uses the same without any corruption of them. As the highest sphere with its motion sways about the rest, yet so as it neither bars nor breaks them of their proper motions; so God by the power of destiny draws all things but takes not away the peculiar faculty or motion of any thing. 

"He would that trees and corn should grow, so do they, without any force of their own nature. He would that men should use deliberation and choice. So do they without force, of their free will. And yet whatsoever they were in mind to make choice of, God foresaw from all eternity; he foresaw it, I say, not forced it; he knew it, but constrained not; he foretold it, but not prescribed it. 

"Why do our curious curioes stagger or stumble at this? O simple creatures! I see nothing more clear than this, except it be so that some busy wanton mind lists to rub and exasperate itself, being infected with a contagious itching of disputation and contention. 

"How can they be, say they, if God foresaw that I should sin, and his foresight cannot be deceived, but that I do sin necessarily? Fool! Who denies it? You sin necessarily, and yet of your own free will. Indeed,  this much did God foresee, that you should sin in such sort as he foresaw, but he saw that you should sin freely, therefore you sin freely and necessarily. Is this plain enough? 

"They urge further and say, is not God in us the author of every motion? He is the author generally, I confess, yet the favorer of good only. Are you inclined to virtue? He knows it and helps you. Unto vice? He knows that also, and suffers you. 

"Neither is there any fault in him. I ride a weak and lame horse, the riding is of me, but the weakness and lameness of the horse itself. I play upon a harp ill-sounding and out of tune: in that it is out of tune is the fault of the instrument, not of me. The earth with one universal and the same juice nourishes all trees and fruits whereof some growth is profitable, and some poisonable. What then? Shall we say that this proceeds of the earth, and not rather from the nature of the trees that do convert so good nutriment into poison? 

"So in this case it comes of God that you are moved. But it is of and in yourself that you are moved to evil. Finally, to conclude of this liberty; destiny is as the first man that leads the round in this dance of the word; but so as we dance our parts too, in willing or nilling, and no further, not in doing, for there is to man only a free will to strive and struggle against God, and not power to perform the same. 

"As it is lawful for me to walk up and down in a ship and to run about the hatches or seats, but this stirring of mine cannot hinder the sailing of the ship, so in this fatal vessel wherein we all sail, let our wills wrangle and wrest as they list, they shall not turn her out of her course, nor any thing hinder the same. That highest will of all wills must hold and rule the reins, and with the turn of a hand direct this chariot whithersoever it pleases." 

IMAGE: Alfred Agache, The Fates (c. 1885) 



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