Dio Chrysostom, On Servants 3

"Enough of that! But why do you object to my making use of the god?" 

"What! I object to your making use of the god if you can! That is not what I was saying, but that it is difficult, nay rather impossible, to make use of god or man or one's own self if one does not know how. To make the attempt without knowing how is an extremely harmful thing. Or do you think that the man who is untrained in the use of horses could make use of them?" 

"I do not." 

"And that, if, on the other hand, he should use force, he would get some harm from it rather than good?" 

"True." 

"Now then, will the man ignorant of the use of dogs be able to use them? Or does not the using of anything imply deriving benefit from it?" 

"I think so." 

"No one, therefore, of those injured by a thing really uses the thing by which he is injured, does he?" 

"Certainly not." 

"If, therefore, a man attempts to use dogs without knowing how, will he not receive damage from them?" 

"Very likely." 

"He, therefore, will not be using them either, since use does not properly exist where damage results. And this is true not only in the case of dogs and horses but of oxen and mules also, and — what might surprise you more — not even the using of an ass or a sheep is a matter for inexperienced persons. Or do you not know that from the keeping of sheep and the driving of asses some derive benefit and others injury?" 

"I do." 

"Is it not simply because the inexperienced necessarily receive damage and those who know benefit, whether it be a question of asses or swine or geese or any other creature?" 

"It appears so." 

"Furthermore, can it be that, as regards the use of things, the same reasoning does not hold good, but that one who has no knowledge of music could use a lyre, or would he not be ridiculous for trying, not to speak of his accomplishing nothing and ruining the lyre and breaking the strings? 

"Then again, if one who is not a flautist should wish to use the flute and appear in the theaters and play upon it, would he not be pelted as a punishment and be likely to smash his flute into the bargain? 

"And if a man undertakes to handle a rudder without knowing how to steer, will he not assuredly capsize the boat in short order and cause the death of both himself and his fellow passengers? 

"Still further, does the use of spear or shield do any good when wielded by timid and inexperienced persons, or rather, would they not by such an attempt at use lose not only their weapons but their own lives as well?"

"I grant it, Diogenes," he replied; "but you are letting the sun down with your interminable questions." 

"And is it not better," said he, "to let the sun go down if one is listening to useful words than to go on an idle journey? 

"And likewise in almost all cases where practical experience in 'using' is lacking, it is difficult to be zealous, and the damage is likely to be greater where the things concerned are greater. Do you, then, think that the 'use' of an ass is like the 'use' of a horse?" 

"Of course not." 

"Well, then, is the 'use' of a man like the 'use' of a god?" 

"But that question does not deserve an answer, Diogenes," said he. "Is there anyone, then, who can make use of himself who does not know himself?" 

"How could he?" replied the other. 

"Because the one who does not understand man is unable to 'use' man?" 

"Yes, because he cannot." 

"So he who does not understand himself would not be able to make use of himself, would he?" 

"I believe not." 

"Have you ever heard of the inscription at Delphi: 'Know thyself'?"⁠ 

"I have." 

"Is it not plain that the god gives this command to all, in the belief that they do not know themselves?' 

"It would seem so." 

"You, therefore, would be included in the 'all'?" 

"Certainly." 

"So then you also do not know yourself?" 

"I believe not." 

"And not knowing yourself, you do not know man; and not knowing man, you are unable to 'use' man; and yet, although you are unable to 'use' a man, you are attempting to 'use' a god, an attempt which we agree is altogether the greater and more difficult of the two. 

"Tell me, do you think Apollo speaks Attic or Doric? Or that men and gods have the same language? Yet the difference is so great that the Scamander river in Troy is called Xanthus⁠ by the gods, and that the bird kymindis is called chalkis,⁠ and that a certain spot outside the city which the Trojans called Batieia was called the Sema Myrines⁠ by the gods. 

"From this it naturally follows that the oracles are obscure and have already deceived many men. Now for Homer perhaps it was safe to go to Apollo at Delphi, as being bilingual and understanding the dialects—if he really did understand them all and not just a few things, like persons who know two or three Persian, Median, or Assyrian words and thus fool the ignorant."