M. This is the very same which is said by Epicurus and Hieronymus. Now, if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no power of itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate honorable and laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty circumstance set off with an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain that a wise man is always happy, what, think you, may be done by the Socratic and Platonic philosophers?
Some of these allow such superiority to the goods of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns the body and all external circumstances. But others do not admit these to be goods; they make everything depend on the mind: whose disputes Carneades used, as a sort of honorary arbitrator, to determine.
For, as what seemed goods to the Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by the Stoics, and as the Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good health, and other things of that sort than the Stoics, when these things were considered according to their reality, and not by mere names, his opinion was that there was no ground for disagreeing.
Therefore, let the philosophers of other schools see how they can establish this point also. It is very agreeable to me that they make some professions worthy of being uttered by the mouth of a philosopher with regard to a wise man’s having always the means of living happily.
Some of these allow such superiority to the goods of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns the body and all external circumstances. But others do not admit these to be goods; they make everything depend on the mind: whose disputes Carneades used, as a sort of honorary arbitrator, to determine.
For, as what seemed goods to the Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by the Stoics, and as the Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good health, and other things of that sort than the Stoics, when these things were considered according to their reality, and not by mere names, his opinion was that there was no ground for disagreeing.
Therefore, let the philosophers of other schools see how they can establish this point also. It is very agreeable to me that they make some professions worthy of being uttered by the mouth of a philosopher with regard to a wise man’s having always the means of living happily.
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.41
Even when there is a divergence among philosophers on how to define what is good, they will generally agree that our understanding determines what is good. Even when the likes of Hume or Nietzsche insist that the mind must be a slave to the passions, they have awkwardly employed reason to establish such a measure. Whichever way you go, there is no escaping that the life of wisdom, in one way or another, is the happy life.
The Stoics held the far more rigid, and to us far more shocking, view that only virtue could be considered our true good, while the Peripatetics spoke of a hierarchy of goods, with the lower being relative to the higher, such that money and fame are in service to the formation of character.
Now as important as the nuances of theory must be, how greatly will these two approaches differ in practice? I am happy to debate about the merits of fortune, and in what manner the circumstances might contribute to our happiness, but as long as a fellow knows to put his integrity first, he will also know to put his conveniences second, and so his conscience remains the source of his blessings, whatever the subtleties of the school.
As much as he may be in error, the sensualist or the relativist has also used his reason to arrive at his desired end, and therefore he does not need to reinvent his whole nature to get back on track, only to correct his lapses of judgment. I have learned the hard way that it is best to first focus on what is held in common, instead of promptly bickering about the details.
When I am teaching, on most any topic, I never miss the opportunity to ask my students about their perception of the good. From those who are patient enough to engage, I am usually offered a laundry list of benefits, though my constant pestering then encourages them to consider a deeper pattern. Are there times, for example, when fortune or fame could end up becoming harmful?
And this is why I believe Plato’s Meno to be such a wonderful text. What makes any circumstance good or bad? You guessed it—the presence or absence of knowledge! And if you don’t happen to be keen on the argument offered by Socrates, note how you have now countered with a different argument, itself an exercise in understanding as a standard for right and wrong.
This is one of the reasons I am so inspired by Cicero: where else will you find the quest for a harmony between the Stoics, Peripatetics, Academics, and, yes, even the Epicureans? Philosophy, like any aspect of life, should be about what we can discover to share together.
Even when there is a divergence among philosophers on how to define what is good, they will generally agree that our understanding determines what is good. Even when the likes of Hume or Nietzsche insist that the mind must be a slave to the passions, they have awkwardly employed reason to establish such a measure. Whichever way you go, there is no escaping that the life of wisdom, in one way or another, is the happy life.
The Stoics held the far more rigid, and to us far more shocking, view that only virtue could be considered our true good, while the Peripatetics spoke of a hierarchy of goods, with the lower being relative to the higher, such that money and fame are in service to the formation of character.
Now as important as the nuances of theory must be, how greatly will these two approaches differ in practice? I am happy to debate about the merits of fortune, and in what manner the circumstances might contribute to our happiness, but as long as a fellow knows to put his integrity first, he will also know to put his conveniences second, and so his conscience remains the source of his blessings, whatever the subtleties of the school.
As much as he may be in error, the sensualist or the relativist has also used his reason to arrive at his desired end, and therefore he does not need to reinvent his whole nature to get back on track, only to correct his lapses of judgment. I have learned the hard way that it is best to first focus on what is held in common, instead of promptly bickering about the details.
When I am teaching, on most any topic, I never miss the opportunity to ask my students about their perception of the good. From those who are patient enough to engage, I am usually offered a laundry list of benefits, though my constant pestering then encourages them to consider a deeper pattern. Are there times, for example, when fortune or fame could end up becoming harmful?
And this is why I believe Plato’s Meno to be such a wonderful text. What makes any circumstance good or bad? You guessed it—the presence or absence of knowledge! And if you don’t happen to be keen on the argument offered by Socrates, note how you have now countered with a different argument, itself an exercise in understanding as a standard for right and wrong.
This is one of the reasons I am so inspired by Cicero: where else will you find the quest for a harmony between the Stoics, Peripatetics, Academics, and, yes, even the Epicureans? Philosophy, like any aspect of life, should be about what we can discover to share together.
—Reflection written in 3/1999
IMAGE: Pietro della Vecchia, Three Philosophers (c. 1650)
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