But, when he says in general terms, that all things may be distinguished into two sorts, some that are, and some that are not in our own power; we must not so understand him, as if all things whatsoever were meant by it, but only such as are within us, or anyway concern us.
For at that rate, there would be no proportion at all between the two opposite parts, which ought to be observed, and is necessary to make a just division. And this proportion, I say, would be quite lost, if all things whatsoever, both those that are contained in the world, and those that are above, and out of the world, were set in opposition to the few in comparison, that are within our own power.
But now, in regard some people quarrel with this distinction, even when limited in the most cautious manner that can be, and will allow us to have nothing at all in our power: and among these, some assert, that all our actions, appetites, and passions, proceed from necessity, and not from choice; and others make us like stones put into motion, that act mechanically, by chance, and without any purpose or design at all; though what has been said already, upon our natural power, and the place which our choice and free will has, and the necessity that so it must be, might suffice; yet perhaps it may not be amiss, to consider the objections of those men, who would rob us of this liberty and power, and to refute them particularly.
Now, if by this mechanical and forced sort of action, without purpose, and by pure chance, they intend to say, that we propose to ourselves no end at all in what we do, it is by no means true; or if it would hold in some cases, yet it is evident, there are very many instances, in which it will not.
For all arts and sciences, nay, all natures and beings, have constantly some particular aim and end fixed to them; to which they direct their endeavors perpetually, and make every action in some degree subservient. And it may be said in general, That there is no one act, no one motion, of any living creature in the whole world, but is performed out of a prospect of some real, or at least some seeming good: even where the object is evil, this observation holds; since the avoiding of that evil is for the attaining some good, and for the advantage we may find in escaping from it.
But if this acting by chance, and without any purpose, be so understood, that what we desire, may prove impossible to be compassed, or incapable of answering our end, or hurtful when we have attained it, (as we say sometimes, that a man took a medicine without any thought, or to no purpose, which did him no good, or perhaps, did him harm:) neither does this sense destroy our free will.
For we maintain, that those desires and aversions are in our power, which concern, not only things that may be attained, and turn to our benefit when they are so; but those too, which cannot, and which are prejudicial to us when we have them. And for this reason we affirm, that our errors and our vices, are as truly the effects of this liberty and choice, as our greatest virtues themselves are.
Those who pretend, that our opinions and desires, and generally speaking, all our choices and intentions, are necessary, and not at our own disposal, as proceeding from motives without us, and not beginning of our own accord within us, argue for their opinion several ways.
Some of them make the wants of human nature the ground of this necessity. For we all know, that a man in extremity of hunger, or thirst, or cold, desire meat, and drink, and warmth, whether he will or no; and a person upon a sick bed, cannot help desiring health and ease.
Some lay all upon the nature of the thing itself, which is the object of our opinion, or desire, or aversion; and contend, that this excites our passions, and affects our minds, by its own power and evidence, whether we are consenting to it, or not.
Who is there, for instance, that has attained to the least knowledge in arithmetic, and does not readily allow, and firmly believe, that twice two make four? And which way shall we call such an opinion as this, the effect of freedom and choice, and not rather of absolute constraint, because arising from the evidence of the thing assented to, and the impossibility of its being otherwise?
So again, when a man has entertained a notion of any goodness or excellence, when he apprehends a thing to be lovely, or profitable, or the direct contrary; does he not forthwith naturally desire the one sort, and decline the other? For the best philosophers are agreed, that the object of our desire, and the final cause, are the motives, which set all the rest on work: and if this be true, how shall we challenge that as our own act and deed, which is so absolutely the effect of constraint and necessity, imposed by the nature and quality of things without us, which stir our affections accordingly, without any disposal or consent of ours?
Others rather think, that the disposition of the person designing is the cause of all this necessity; this, say they, must needs be wrought upon, according as it stands inclined; Nor is it in ones own choice, whether he will desire those things or not, which his own nature, and temper, and custom, strongly determine him to.
Thus the temperate person finds in himself a habitual desire of such actions, and such conversation, as are agreeable to the virtue of temperance; and the intemperate is no less fond of all occasions to exercise his extravagance. Thus the designs of them both are fixed, and it is not in their power to alter them.
For some we see plainly, who are angry at themselves, condemn their own desires, and wish with all their souls that they could restrain and subdue them, yet find their habits and customs so violent and prevailing, that they are hurried on, and trust forward, like so many engines, and feel and lament the force which they cannot resist, when objects which are agreeable to their inclinations, (such as by custom are become familiar and natural to them) offer themselves.
By the same reason, a skillful and judicious man will give a right judgment of things, and entertain true opinions of them; and the ignorant and unlearned, will have false and mistaken notions. For it cannot agree with the character of a wise man, to take up with an error; nor with that of an ignorant one, to find out the truth: but it stands to great reason, that the ignorant one should assent to a falsehood, and the skillful and learned should reject it.
And yet, if these things were entirely at one's own disposal, this would not be. For the ignorant man would never prefer falsehood before truth, if he could help it; and the wise man, if we should allow him to assent to truth, merely by virtue of his own free will, might also be allowed to take up false opinions, if you do but suppose his will to incline him that way too.
But this, they tell you, cannot be: for it is with the understanding, and the objects about which it is employed, as we find it with the senses of the body, and sensible objects; I mean, it is impossible to have things apprehended otherwise than they represent themselves, unless we suppose some weakness or defect in the organs which should apprehend and represent them to us. . . .
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