The Stoics would set ahead of this still another genus, even more primary; concerning which I shall immediately speak, after proving that the genus which has been discussed above, has rightly been placed first, being, as it is, capable of including everything.
I therefore distribute "that which exists" into these two species—things with, and things without, substance. There is no third class.
And how do I distribute "substance"? By saying that it is either animate or inanimate
And how do I distribute the "animate"? By saying: "Certain things have mind, while others have only life."
Or the idea may be expressed as follows: "Certain things have the power of movement, of progress, of change of position, while others are rooted in the ground; they are fed and they grow only through their roots."
Again, into what species do I divide "animals"? They are either perishable or imperishable.
Certain of the Stoics regard the primary genus as the "something." I shall add the reasons they give for their belief; they say:
"In the order of Nature some things exist, and other things do not exist. And even the things that do not exist are really part of the order of Nature. What these are will readily occur to the mind, for example centaurs, giants, and all other figments of unsound reasoning, which have begun to have a definite shape, although they have no bodily consistency."
I therefore distribute "that which exists" into these two species—things with, and things without, substance. There is no third class.
And how do I distribute "substance"? By saying that it is either animate or inanimate
And how do I distribute the "animate"? By saying: "Certain things have mind, while others have only life."
Or the idea may be expressed as follows: "Certain things have the power of movement, of progress, of change of position, while others are rooted in the ground; they are fed and they grow only through their roots."
Again, into what species do I divide "animals"? They are either perishable or imperishable.
Certain of the Stoics regard the primary genus as the "something." I shall add the reasons they give for their belief; they say:
"In the order of Nature some things exist, and other things do not exist. And even the things that do not exist are really part of the order of Nature. What these are will readily occur to the mind, for example centaurs, giants, and all other figments of unsound reasoning, which have begun to have a definite shape, although they have no bodily consistency."
—from Seneca, Moral Letters 58
One can also work from the “top down”, just as one can work from the “bottom up”. In either direction, the same order of contracting and expanding classifications is evident, reflecting how all varieties of being are related to one another.
One can also work from the “top down”, just as one can work from the “bottom up”. In either direction, the same order of contracting and expanding classifications is evident, reflecting how all varieties of being are related to one another.
Within all existing things, I can distinguish between those that have concrete substance, and those that do not. Within substances, some possess life, and some do not. Within living things, some have self-motion, and some do not. Within animals, some have reason, and some do not.
In all cases, a certain distinguishing “difference” is added to the higher genus in order to arrive at the lower species, and a more thorough awareness of the more detailed divisions rightly serves to highlight the fullness of the whole.
I often draw a parallel here between these broader or narrower categories of definition with Aristotle’s discussion of the “order of being” and the “order of knowing” from his Physics. In Nature, the causes, of course, always precede the effects, and yet in the way we learn we first perceive the effects, and only then work backwards in our reasoning to the causes.
By analogy, the totality of being is in itself primary, though we tend to first apprehend the many specific types of being we see around ourselves. It takes time for us to discover how the multitude is merely an expression of a unity. As we experience, we tend to eventually arrive at principles that were already primary in the design of Nature.
Hence, I like to say that any science is like a mystery story: the crime happened at the beginning, while the detective takes until the very end to figure it out. What a wonderful pattern!
If it still seems too abstract, it might help to think of nesting dolls, where the smaller is contained inside the larger. Yet it is God who looks at the entirety from the outside, while we have to wiggle our way out from the inside.
Now when Seneca mentions how some of the Stoics argued for a genus that goes beyond even “existence” itself, this could easily send us down the rabbit hole. Seneca himself seems to have little use for such an idea, and yet, for our purposes, it suggests how we must consider the place of possible realities within our overall model. This again becomes relevant when Seneca proposes that we look to the absolute of the ideal before we look to the merely sensible.
In any case, my Peripatetic background tells me that something potential can only be of something actual, such that a unicorn or a leprechaun are impressions within an existing mind, derived from an imagined combination of existing things. Before we all became far too easily offended, one of my professors would joke about the “reality” of sober Irishmen or honest lawyers in this manner.
Yes, this sort of pondering can make for a massive headache, while it is also important to stretch the mind to make it more malleable and adaptable. There is ultimately a very practical point here, that we are best served by stressing the realm of the intelligible over the sensible in our daily lives—the higher subsumes and directs the lower.
I often draw a parallel here between these broader or narrower categories of definition with Aristotle’s discussion of the “order of being” and the “order of knowing” from his Physics. In Nature, the causes, of course, always precede the effects, and yet in the way we learn we first perceive the effects, and only then work backwards in our reasoning to the causes.
By analogy, the totality of being is in itself primary, though we tend to first apprehend the many specific types of being we see around ourselves. It takes time for us to discover how the multitude is merely an expression of a unity. As we experience, we tend to eventually arrive at principles that were already primary in the design of Nature.
Hence, I like to say that any science is like a mystery story: the crime happened at the beginning, while the detective takes until the very end to figure it out. What a wonderful pattern!
If it still seems too abstract, it might help to think of nesting dolls, where the smaller is contained inside the larger. Yet it is God who looks at the entirety from the outside, while we have to wiggle our way out from the inside.
Now when Seneca mentions how some of the Stoics argued for a genus that goes beyond even “existence” itself, this could easily send us down the rabbit hole. Seneca himself seems to have little use for such an idea, and yet, for our purposes, it suggests how we must consider the place of possible realities within our overall model. This again becomes relevant when Seneca proposes that we look to the absolute of the ideal before we look to the merely sensible.
In any case, my Peripatetic background tells me that something potential can only be of something actual, such that a unicorn or a leprechaun are impressions within an existing mind, derived from an imagined combination of existing things. Before we all became far too easily offended, one of my professors would joke about the “reality” of sober Irishmen or honest lawyers in this manner.
Yes, this sort of pondering can make for a massive headache, while it is also important to stretch the mind to make it more malleable and adaptable. There is ultimately a very practical point here, that we are best served by stressing the realm of the intelligible over the sensible in our daily lives—the higher subsumes and directs the lower.
—Reflection written in 5/2013
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