But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against me, that it is what I most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having.
Thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at such perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time.
Let philosophy, then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us lend it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and refuted; and although those men may dislike such treatment who are bound and devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves wholly approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, can confute others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted ourselves without resentment.
Besides, if these studies are ever brought home to us, we shall not want even Greek libraries, in which there is an infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of authors among them; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the same things which have been written by others, which serves no purpose but to stuff their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many apply themselves to this study.
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.2
One of the reasons I have developed an admiration for Cicero is that his thinking is eclectic. He does not limit himself to this or that “school” of philosophy, but rather seeks out what he finds to be true in any and all of them. He does not succumb to what I call the bondage of the “-isms”, where a loyalty to narrow dogma hinders us from appreciating a wider truth, but rather is open to a broad range of possibilities, often to be taken in different senses.
At the same time, he does not succumb to the opposing extreme of relativism, because he understands why philosophy demands sound thinking, and thereby provides the only firm foundation for all our actions. Where I cannot grasp the meaning of what I am doing, I’m not really doing much of anything at all.
Much of my interest these days in in Stoicism, and yet I think it would be foolish to limit myself only to Stoicism, or to reject the wisdom of any other traditions. A greater harmony can be found far more often than I might initially believe. If it happens to be true, it shouldn’t matter where I happened to find it. So, some Stoics are shocked to learn of my love for Aquinas, and some Thomists are aghast at my admiration for Wittgenstein.
While the Tusculan Disputations have a strong Stoic influence, to be sure, one particular way in which Cicero diverges from that creed is in his appreciation of certain aspects of Academic skepticism.
There would be enough material for a whole shelf of books here, but in the simplest of terms, the Stoic stress on “grasping” a certainty in impressions (katalepsis) is contrasted by the Academic stress on accepting that our knowledge will only be more or less likely. A firm direct realism is countered by an emphasis on moderate doubt.
Can I know for sure? For the Stoic it can be done with great effort, and for the Academic it can merely be approached by degrees.
Whatever our own conclusions on the matter, I would suggest that Cicero’s sort of skepticism is quite healthy, and hardly destructive. It reflects his greater intent of taking in multiple points of view, balancing them against one another, and then holding to the most probable solution.
Accordingly, there need be no bitterness or animosity in the act of philosophical discourse. Sadly, far too many in intellectual circles find a pleasure in combat, yet that need not be our concern; our only concern should be to employ the dialectic to discover a shared awareness that can get the job done.
Don’t let the partisan pundits get you down. Those who are immovable in their opinions will always put the conclusion before the evidence, instead of the evidence before the conclusion.
Rome was always known for the high quality of its rhetoric, and it was Cicero’s hope that the great city might also become brilliant in its philosophy. Just as good orators can debate, while still remaining respectful to one another, so good philosophers can dispute, while still remaining united in a common goal of happiness.
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Neoptolemus, in Ennius, indeed, says that the study of philosophy was expedient for him; but that it required limiting to a few subjects, for that to give himself up entirely to it was what he did not approve of.
And for my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is expedient for me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially as I have no regular occupation? But I am not for limiting my philosophy to a few subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in which it is difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting yourself with many, or all its branches, nor can you well take a few subjects without selecting them out of a great number; nor can anyone, who has acquired the knowledge of a few points, avoid endeavoring with the same eagerness to understand more.
But still, in a busy life, and in one mainly occupied with military matters, such as that of Neoptolemus was at that time, even that limited degree of acquaintance with philosophy may be of great use, and may yield fruit, not perhaps so plentiful as a thorough knowledge of the whole of philosophy, but yet such as in some degree may at times deliver us from the dominion of our desires, our sorrows, and our fears; just as the effect of that discussion which we lately maintained in my Tusculan villa seemed to be that a great contempt of death was engendered, which contempt is of no small efficacy towards delivering the mind from fear; for whoever dreads what cannot be avoided can by no means live with a quiet and tranquil mind.
But he who is under no fear of death, not only because it is a thing absolutely inevitable but also because he is persuaded that death itself has nothing terrible in it, provides himself with a very great resource towards a happy life. However, I am not tolerant that many will argue strenuously against us; and, indeed, that is a thing which can never be avoided, except by abstaining from writing at all.
For if my Orations, which were addressed to the judgment and approbation of the people (for that is a popular art, and the object of oratory is popular applause), have been criticized by some people who are inclined to withhold their praise from everything but what they are persuaded they can attain to themselves, and who limit their ideas of good speaking by the hopes which they conceive of what they themselves may attain to, and who declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow of words and sentences, that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought and expression to that plenty and copiousness (from which arose the Attic kind of oratory, which they who professed it were strangers to, though they have now been some time silenced, and laughed out of the very courts of justice), what may I not expect, when at present I cannot have the least countenance from the people by whom I used to be upheld before?
There is often a sad divide between vaguely evoking philosophy and then putting in the actual effort of being philosophical, or a bitter irony when someone makes use of fuzzy philosophical concepts in order to reject the very significance of philosophy.
At first, I may assume this is a distinctly modern problem, and then Cicero shows me once again how there is nothing new under the sun. It seems to be a common weakness of human nature to only take something as far as it is immediately comfortable, and to cast it aside as soon as it requires the exercise of tender loving care.
As with all things in life, philosophy will offer its rewards in proportion to our commitments. Where it is treated as an amusing pastime, it may provide us with pleasant diversions from our usual troubles. Where it is treated as defining the core of who we are, it becomes a lasting solution for our most severe tribulations.
I know little about Neoptolemus, but from how Cicero describes him, I think I know many who are much like him. A little bit of learning is fine, as long as it doesn’t get in the way of the day-to-day business. Perhaps a smattering of this or that topic is expedient, though engaging with the full breadth and depth of philosophy might hinder the acts of winning wars, acquiring wealth, or building up fame.
There is, however, a completely different way of looking at it, such that the guidance of philosophy could radically modify how we even got about dealing with conflict, money, and status, and where we may well be tempted to forgo these entanglements as much as we can. If wisdom rules, then virtue becomes the highest good, and if virtue is the goal, then the rest will appear quite trivial.
In the first book of these Tusculan Disputations, Cicero and the Auditor did not arrive at an exhaustive account of what it means to die, and yet they nevertheless came to the insight that, whatever our ultimate fate may be, death does not have to be an evil, and can further be accepted as a good. In doing so, life itself is given a whole new level of meaning, in which dying well becomes a necessary part of living well.
Likewise, in this second book, an equally challenging question about the nature of suffering opens the door to an equally enlightening revelation about how pain need not be an obstacle to happiness, but can rather be transformed into an opportunity for happiness. As all good philosophers, Stoic or otherwise, come to understand, the appearance of opposition regularly gives way to an appreciation of harmony—an open-minded attitude makes this attainable.
By extension, if some people, especially the most influential and grandiose, ridicule the place of philosophy, I must be careful not to take offense or to consider them as my enemies; they are only doing what I have done time and time again, confusing a difficulty with an impossibility, or taking the unfamiliar as unreasonable.
Cicero knew this well from his own lifelong practice of rhetoric, facing the contempt of those who saw fine words in defense of principles as nothing more than a trickery to excuse iniquity. I may not be able to do properly it right now, though that should not deter me from striving to learn it for the future.
Eloquence of speech or precision in thinking are hardly wasted; the waste is in refusing to attempt either, presuming that I cannot do what I find so strenuous to do. It is not necessary to be a Cicero to be articulate, or a Socrates to be reflective; the best of us should be an inspiration, and not a discouragement, to the rest of us.
“No, but such a one is blessed, for he has a great company to walk with him.”
I too join the ranks of the multitude and have a large company to walk with.
To sum up: remember that the door is open.
Do not be a greater coward than the children, but do as they do.
Children, when things do not please them, say, “I will not play anymore”; so, when things seem to you to reach that point, just say, “I will not play anymore,” and so depart, instead of staying to make moan.
—from Epictetus, Discourses 1.24
Yes, people do still wear crowns, though they have taken on different appearances over the years.
In Scent of a Woman, the headmaster has his Jaguar XJ-S. Take note of how the folks up in first class look back in disgust at the peasants in coach. I know an abbot at a two-bit monastery who wears a giant gaudy ring, and he glows when people kiss it.
I try not to get angry anymore, or even to laugh, because they deserve compassion instead of contempt. Forgive them, for they know not what they do. These are precisely the sort of people Sophocles or Dante were warning us about.
Whether or not we travel in the best of circles depends entirely on how we measure the merits of our company. When I get caught up in the thoughtlessness of conformity, I will feel very lonely, and then I remember how I am never truly alone. Nature always provides me with so many opportunities to act in friendship, however grubby or unrefined.
Or do I want the glitz and the glamor? Then it isn’t really friendship, is it?
If my conscience feels nauseous at the thought of cooperating with scoundrels, I can still opt out. This can only be achieved, however, if I have my values in order, for otherwise I will continue to crave the trivialities deep down on the inside.
Astute children have the good sense to pick up their toys and go home when the games turn nasty, and I can do just the same in the grown-up playground.
But let me not confuse such a principle with the malice of dismissing or shunning my fellows; at no point is it necessary to deny the person, only to refuse the vice. If I am completely honest with myself, I know full well when love or hate are intended.
I may not agree with the concupiscence and the relativism of a Timothy Leary, yet that old hippie phrase can also be adapted to what Epictetus has to say: “Turn on, tune in, drop out.”
Awake from the slumber. Recognize your nature within the whole of Nature. Stop following the script some buffoon has written for you, and then begin to do your own vital work.
