The things in our own power, are in their own nature free, not capable of being countermanded or hindered; but those that are not in our power, are feeble, servile, liable to opposition, and not ours but anothers.
Comment:
After having distinguished between those things that are, and those that are not, in our own power; he proceeds, in the next place, to describe the qualities proper to each of them.
The former sort he tells us, are free, because it is not in the power of any other thing or person, either to compel us to them, or to keep us back form them. Nor is the management, and the enjoyment of them, at anybody’s disposal but our own; for this is the true notion of freedom, to govern oneself as one pleases, and to be under the command and direction of no other whatsoever.
But the things out of our power, which are subject to be given or withheld, it is not we, but they are masters of them, in whose power it is to communicate them to us, or keep them from us; and therefore these are not free, but servile, and at the pleasure of others.
So again, those things are self-sufficient, and consequently firm and strong; but these that depend upon the assistance of another, are weak and indigent.
Again, those cannot be countermanded, as being in a man’s own power; for who can pretend to correct my opinions, and compel me to such or such particular notions? Who is able to put a restraint upon my desires or my aversions?
But now the things that are not in our power, are so contrived, as to depend upon the inclinations of other people, and we may have them, or lose them, as they please: and accordingly these are subject to many hindrances and disappointments, so as either never to be at all, or to be destroyed again when they have been; never to be put into my hands, or to be snatched away from me, after that I am possessed of them.
Once more, it is evident, that the things in our power, are our own, because they are our actions; and this consideration gives us the greatest propriety in them that can be: but those that depend upon the pleasure of anybody else, are properly anothers.
From whence we must infer, that every kind of good or evil, which respects the things in our power, is properly ours; as for instance, true or false apprehensions and opinions, regular or irregular desires, and the like: these are the things, that make a man happy or unhappy.
But for the things out of our power, they are none of ours: those that relate to the body, belong not to the man, strictly speaking, but only to our shell, and our instrument of action. But if we talk of a little reputation, an empty and popular applause, alas! This is something much more remote, and consequently of little or no concern at all to us.