The Death of Marcus Aurelius

The Death of Marcus Aurelius
Showing posts with label Moral Letters to Lucilius. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Moral Letters to Lucilius. Show all posts

Monday, November 16, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 88.5


I come next to the person who boasts his knowledge of the heavenly bodies, who knows 
 
“Whither the chilling star of Saturn hides, 
And through what orbit Mercury doth stray.” 
 
Of what benefit will it be to know this? That I shall be disturbed because Saturn and Mars are in opposition, or when Mercury sets at eventide in plain view of Saturn, rather than learn that those stars, wherever they are, are propitious, and that they are not subject to change? 
 
They are driven along by an unending round of destiny, on a course from which they cannot swerve. They return at stated seasons; they either set in motion, or mark the intervals of the whole world’s work. 
 
But if they are responsible for whatever happens, how will it help you to know the secrets of the immutable? Or if they merely give indications, what good is there in foreseeing what you cannot escape? Whether you know these things or not, they will take place.
 
“Behold the fleeting sun, 
The stars that follow in his train, and thou 
Shalt never find the morrow play thee false, 
Or be misled by nights without a cloud.” 
 
It has, however, been sufficiently and fully ordained that I shall be safe from anything that may mislead me.
 
“What,” you say, “does the ’morrow never play me false’? Whatever happens without my knowledge plays me false.”
 
I, for my part, do not know what is to be, but I do know what may come to be. I shall have no misgivings in this matter; I await the future in its entirety; and if there is any abatement in its severity, I make the most of it. 
 
If the morrow treats me kindly, it is a sort of deception; but it does not deceive me even at that. For just as I know that all things can happen, so I know, too, that they will not happen in every case. I am ready for favorable events in every case, but I am prepared for evil. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 88 
 
At this point in the letter, my thoughts usually turn to the place of astronomy in the liberal arts, and how it might differ from astrology, which can mean many different things to many different people. Yet regardless of what the Stoics as a whole, or Seneca in particular, might have believed about the various forms of divination, this section digs much deeper, by challenging us to always be at peace with our fate. 
 
Once again, it is philosophy that will save us. However immense or inscrutable the forces of the Universe, wisdom can grant us the power to establish our place. We may be confident that the good of our nature need not suffer any harm in the face of cosmic events, whether they are great or small. 
 
Knowing the motions of the stars and the planets cannot provide this, even as knowing the motions of the stars and the planets can certainly help us to discern the presence of reason and order in all things—a reverence for what is above us inspires a reverence for what is within us. 
 
If it were to turn out, for example, that the phases of the moon could somehow bring me good or bad fortune, how would I go about treating such a revelation? My awareness will obviously not change this state of affairs, because the patterns of nature will proceed on their own terms, nor should it make me fall into despair, because philosophy, in any event, teaches me why my happiness does not depend upon my circumstances. 
 
While walking home after an evening at the pub, an old friend of mine stopped in the road, to shake his fists at the starry sky. “Do you worst, you gaseous gods! You may crush my body, but you will never crush my spirit!” That is indeed an excellent attitude, and I still miss him. 
 
To know that something must happen does not have to be a catastrophe: if I can use it as an opportunity to act with understanding and with love, the foresight is always a welcome warning. I have lost absolutely nothing if I have first mastered myself. 
 
In practice, however, I often just suspect that something is likely to happen, and then the situation is really no different, since it still offers me a chance to prepare. Or, most commonly, I may be clueless about what is going to happen, and that is all the more reason to be on my guard. 
 
While many people go into a panic if they can’t predict their future, the Stoic is content to simply rely upon his own judgments. Perhaps the stock market will crash, or the dead will rise from their graves, to feast on human flesh? The only evil in either case will be my greed or my cowardice. The world will become manageable when the self has become manageable. 
 
Whenever I am tempted to curl up in a tiny ball, I play a little game of semantics: this occurrence is not, strictly speaking, good or bad, but merely pleasant or painful, convenient or inconvenient, expected or unexpected, and taken the in right way, it is invariably useful. 
 
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 

IMAGE: Frans Floris, Astronomy (1557) 



Friday, November 13, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 88.4


Now I will transfer my attention to the musician. You, sir, are teaching me how the treble and the bass are in accord with one another, and how, though the strings produce different notes, the result is a harmony; rather bring my soul into harmony with itself, and let not my purposes be out of tune. You are showing me what the doleful keys are; show me rather how, in the midst of adversity, I may keep from uttering a doleful note.
 
The mathematician teaches me how to lay out the dimensions of my estates; but I should rather be taught how to lay out what is enough for a man to own. He teaches me to count, and adapts my fingers to avarice; but I should prefer him to teach me that there is no point in such calculations, and that one is none the happier for tiring out the book-keepers with his possessions—or rather, how useless property is to any man who would find it the greatest misfortune if he should be required to reckon out, by his own wits, the amount of his holdings.
 
What good is there for me in knowing how to parcel out a piece of land, if I know not how to share it with my brother? What good is there in working out to a nicety the dimensions of an acre, and in detecting the error if a piece has so much as escaped my measuring-rod, if I am embittered when an ill-tempered neighbor merely scrapes off a bit of my land? The mathematician teaches me how I may lose none of my boundaries; I, however, seek to learn how to lose them all with a light heart. 
 
“But,” comes the reply, “I am being driven from the farm which my father and grandfather owned!”
 
Well? Who owned the land before your grandfather? Can you explain what people (I will not say what person) held it originally? You did not enter upon it as a master, but merely as a tenant. And whose tenant are you? If your claim is successful, you are tenant of the heir. The lawyers say that public property cannot be acquired privately by possession; what you hold and call your own is public property—indeed, it belongs to mankind at large.
 
O what marvelous skill! You know how to measure the circle; you find the square of any shape which is set before you; you compute the distances between the stars; there is nothing which does not come within the scope of your calculations. 
 
But if you are a real master of your profession, measure me the mind of man! Tell me how great it is, or how puny! You know what a straight line is; but how does it benefit you if you do not know what is straight in this life of ours? 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 88 
 
Music and mathematics were rightly considered to be a part of the liberal arts, but look what happens when they are hijacked by the navel-gazing bohemians or the rapacious lawyers. Both creativity and calculation will lack any meaning and value if they are not bound to a higher purpose. 
 
Those who see me moved to tears when listening to Purcell, or hear my quivering voice while reciting Hopkins, will be shocked, perhaps even offended, once I suggest that the intensity of our passions is only as good as the soundness of our reason. 
 
“Aren’t you a hopeless romantic?” 
 
“I am most certainly a romantic, but I try not to be hopeless about it.” 
 
If it makes you feel any better, I am also quite regularly scolded by consummate professionals, for failing to file my paperwork in the most efficient manner. They don’t much appreciate it when I remind them that life can’t be measured by statistics. 
 
“Time is money!” 
 
“No, time is not money, and you wouldn’t care so much about either of these constructs if you chose to distinguish between quantity and quality.” 
 
Consider how the musician can arrange the notes into a harmonious whole, and yet his skills cannot rise to the level of forming a harmonious character. While am elegant composition may have pointed me in the direction of the true, the good, and the beautiful, it has never, in and of itself, made me a better man. For that, we must move on to philosophy. 
 
Consider how the mathematician can calculate the complexities of time and space, and yet his skills cannot rise to the level of assessing our virtue and vice. While an elegant equation may have pointed me in the direction of the true, the good, and the beautiful, it has never, in and of itself, made me a wiser man. For that, we must move on to philosophy. 
 
I do not say this lightly, for music has a powerful effect on me, probably because I have a sensitive disposition, and mathematics, especially geometry, has opened my eyes to a remarkable sort of clarity, even though I lack any special gift for it. Nevertheless, the intense emotions that arise from playing a mighty air, and the flash of insight that occurs when the numbers finally add up, are not enough to save our souls. 
 
Indeed, I know many creative types who insist that artistry is the only answer, and I know many analytical types who insist that computation is the only answer. These can both be a part of the answer, but they are not the fullness of the answer, for stirring impressions and clinical sums can only make sense in the context of our deeper judgments about their meaning and value. 
 
I have sadly also seen the musician who hasn’t yet learned how to be humble, and the mathematician who hasn’t yet learned how to love his neighbor; it just goes to show that great talent does not always make for great men. The song can become a vehicle for vanity, and the figures can be exploited out of greed. 
 
Seneca offers a timeless example about the troubles we get into when we survey our land—we are so very precise in defining the borders of our property, and yet we are so very careless about defining the duties of our nature. Folks have been bickering for centuries about where to build this fence or that wall, the whole while forgetting why nothing can really belong to them at all, except for their decency and integrity. 
 
Two families down our road have now been in a legal feud for decades, about who has rightful ownership over a few acres of grass and a hill with some trees. The grass doesn’t care, and the trees don’t care, and my tomcat, who regularly visits the spot to take a little rest, doesn’t care. 
 
But Nature does care if we are prudent enough to know our place, and brave enough to stand by our convictions, and temperate enough to want for very little, and just enough to give without hesitation. Seek out the genuine measure and walk the most honorable line. Take on the attitude of a caretaker, not of a proprietor. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 

IMAGE: George Roux, A School in Ancient Greece (1886) 



Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 88.3


It may be, perhaps, that they make you believe that Homer was a philosopher, although they disprove this by the very arguments through which they seek to prove it. 
 
For sometimes they make of him a Stoic, who approves nothing but virtue, avoids pleasures, and refuses to relinquish honor even at the price of immortality; sometimes they make him an Epicurean, praising the condition of a state in repose, which passes its days in feasting and song; sometimes a Peripatetic, classifying goodness in three ways; sometimes an Academic, holding that all things are uncertain. 
 
It is clear, however, that no one of these doctrines is to be fathered upon Homer, just because they are all there; for they areirreconcilable with one another. We may admit to these men, indeed, that Homer was a philosopher; yet surely he became a wise man before he had any knowledge of poetry. So let us learn the particular things that made Homer wise. 
 
It is no more to the point, of course, for me to investigate whether Homer or Hesiod was the older poet, than to know why Hecuba, although younger than Helen, showed her years so lamentably. What, in your opinion, I say, would be the point in trying to determine the respective ages of Achilles and Patroclus?
 
Do you raise the question, “Through what regions did Ulysses stray?” instead of trying to prevent ourselves from going astray at all times? We have no leisure to hear lectures on the question whether he was sea-tossed between Italy and Sicily, or outside our known world (indeed, so long a wandering could not possibly have taken place within its narrow bounds); we ourselves encounter storms of the spirit, which toss us daily, and our depravity drives us into all the ills which troubled Ulysses. 
 
For us there is never lacking the beauty to tempt our eyes, or the enemy to assail us; on this side are savage monsters that delight in human blood, on that side the treacherous allurements of the ear, and yonder is shipwreck and all the varied category of misfortunes. Show me rather, by the example of Ulysses, how I am to love my country, my wife, my father, and how, even after suffering shipwreck, I am to sail toward these ends, honorable as they are.
 
Why try to discover whether Penelope was a pattern of purity, or whether she had the laugh on her contemporaries? Or whether she suspected that the man in her presence was Ulysses, before she knew it was he? Teach me rather what purity is, and how great a good we have in it, and whether it is situated in the body or in the soul. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 88 
 
Picking away at the particulars will not provide the universal. Rearranging the deck chairs will not prevent the ship from going down. Why should I fret over how old Homer might have been, when the real question should be whether I am prepared to face my own mortality? 
 
We may have difficulty grasping how the ancients obsessed over Homer, with the closest parallel perhaps being how professors in tweed jackets must relate everything back to Shakespeare, or professors with goatees must relate everything back to Dostoevsky. I recall a period in my childhood when the only way to make an impressive point was to wrap it up in quotes from John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. 
 
Now while there is certainly much that is true, good, and beautiful in Homer, Shakespeare, and Dostoevsky, no amount of merely dissecting their texts will make me a better man. It will be no different than collecting clever Bible verses for every possible occasion, while never bothering to express the slightest bit of charity. By all means, attend to the letter, but do not neglect the spirit. 
 
I also have little doubt that Homer’s poetry was the work of a wise man, and yet it was not his skill at poetry that made him a wise man. In our modern world, we somehow assume that our celebrities are qualified to teach us how to live well, as if the ability to sing a catchy song or to gaze seductively into the camera is somehow a mark of the most powerful insights. This is, as they say, ass backwards. 
 
Although we would expect them to know better, our scholars do much the same, when they lionize their intellectual heroes, based on how well their refined images can be adapted to support the most fashionable causes. 
 
Just in the last month, for example, I was told that Augustine would have enthusiastically supported the War on Terror, and that Lincoln was actually a closet socialist. Think what you will about the burning questions of the day, but please do not cherry-pick from questionable authorities in order to justify your personal preferences. 
 
And if it is indeed true, why should it matter who happened to say it, or what particular words were used in order to say it? Instead of seeking to discern the causes, we get tangled up in the details in the effects, to the point where the expert is defined by how very much he can manage to say about so very little. 
 
At our last faculty meeting, we spent a whole hour discussing if it was appropriate for our students to use the singular “they”. I broke my usual silence to make the radical suggestion that they should be allowed to write in the style they think is best, as long as they are consistent, and as long as they do so with a respect for other points of view. 
 
This was met with a deafening silence, and the decision was then made to form an ad hoc committee to produce a report on the matter. I appreciate more and more why the development of a skill is meaningless without any reference to first principles: it is all wind-up without the pitch. 
 
So it is, when literature is pursued without a moral compass, when the natural sciences are lacking in a conscience, and when the liberal arts are divorced from a vital philosophy. 
 
Where in the Mediterranean did Odysseus really travel? I find that to be a fascinating question, and I will eagerly pore over volumes of maps in order to arrive at an answer. Still, I think it far more important to decide about our direction in life. 
 
What was Penelope really thinking during her husband’s long absence? I find that to be a fascinating question, and I will carefully examine the subtleties of her every statement. Still, I think it far more important to ask what it means to be loyal, and what it means to be prudent. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 

IMAGE: Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres, The Apotheosis of Homer (1827) 



Sunday, November 8, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 88.2


Certain persons have made up their minds that the point at issue with regard to the liberal studies is whether they make men good; but they do not even profess or aim at a knowledge of this particular subject. 
 
The scholar busies himself with investigations into language, and if it be his desire to go farther afield, he works on history, or, if he would extend his range to the farthest limits, on poetry.
 
But which of these paves the way to virtue? Pronouncing syllables, investigating words, memorizing plays, or making rules for the scansion of poetry—what is there in all this that rids one of fear, roots out desire, or bridles the passions?
 
The question is: do such men teach virtue, or not? If they do not teach it, then neither do they transmit it. If they do teach it, they are philosophers. 
 
Would you like to know how it happens that they have not taken the chair for the purpose of teaching virtue? See how unlike their subjects are; and yet their subjects would resemble each other if they taught the same thing. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 88 

In the quest for a quick fix and an easy profit, people will try to sell you most anything—and that includes an education. Usually, they will promise you a brilliant career, though you will also find the sophists who claim that their teachings will endow you with the greatest virtues, so you may then belong to the select elders of their tribe, whatever the color of its flag. 
 
The secular humanists assure you that science will rescue the planet, or the pious zealots guarantee you that doctrines will lead to a special place in heaven. The are sadly mistaken, for higher learning will never make us good, even as it might lay the grounds for ultimately choosing to be good. Since no one else can provide it for you, you will have to do it for yourself. 
 
In my remote neck of the woods, I am a fan of studying the “Great Books”, because I find that grappling with a diversity of perspectives is a fine preparation for finally forming one’s own convictions. You cannot come to know yourself without first knowing where you came from. 
 
I am under no illusion, however, that any sort of curriculum has ever saved a man’s soul, or that scholarly exercises will magically impart an excellence of character. 
 
Though it may take on a variety of forms, the liberal arts I admire are not aimed at memorizing a particular content, but at developing certain habits of reason, which strengthen our ability to be free in our judgments; this, and not any political posturing, is what makes them properly “liberal”. 
 
Nevertheless, when I teach the trivium and quadrivium, in the tradition of the Greeks and Romans, I do not pretend that breaking down an argument is a mark of righteousness. 
 
Literature or mathematics can help us in discovering the solution, but they do not provide the solution. If I limit myself to merely picking away at words, or fiddling with an equation, I am not yet engaging in the highest work of being human. I am not yet living in prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. 

To borrow from the terms of other schools, liberal studies are a material cause, an occasion out of which the virtues may arise, but they are not the efficient cause, the conscious commitment to the true, the good, and the beautiful. To do this is to embrace philosophy, understood in both it broadest and its deepest sense; beyond the technical means are the moral ends. 
 
Let the academics continue with their disputations on disparate topics. Once we can rise up to the first principles of our nature, such divisions will quietly pass away. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 



Friday, November 6, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 88.1


Letter 88: On liberal and vocational studies   
 
You have been wishing to know my views with regard to liberal studies. My answer is this: I respect no study, and deem no study good, which results in money-making. 
 
Such studies are profit-bringing occupations, useful only in so far as they give the mind a preparation and do not engage it permanently. One should linger upon them only so long as the mind can occupy itself with nothing greater; they are our apprenticeship, not our real work.
 
Hence you see why “liberal studies” are so called; it is because they are studies worthy of a free-born gentleman. 
 
But there is only one really liberal study—that which gives a man his liberty. It is the study of wisdom, and that is lofty, brave, and great-souled. All other studies are puny and puerile. 
 
You surely do not believe that there is good in any of the subjects whose teachers are, as you see, men of the most ignoble and base stamp? We ought not to be learning such things; we should have done with learning them. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 88 
 
On the rare occasions when folks read one of my informal reflections, they are often disappointed that I haven’t thoroughly “explained” the text to them. 
 
This would not surprise them, however, if they observed the way I teach; I have no intention of just giving you an answer, because I’m not even sure I have one for myself, and I would much rather we spend some time working through it together. How can anyone arrive at a conclusion if he hasn’t done the reasoning for himself, step by trying step? 
 
Of all Seneca’s letters, this is surely the one I have written about the most. I have a scholarly interest in the topic, of course, but my greater concern has always been how the practice of the liberal arts is an expression of a radically different model of the human person, so firmly opposed to our usual way of treating people as mere producers and consumers. 
 
Once we recognize something more about our true nature, we must then reconsider our assumptions about what it means to learn. 
 
If you believe that man is only made to increase the goods of his body, then you might be right to pursue an education that will help you become richer and more gratified. If, on the other hand, you believe that man is first made to increase the goods of his soul, then you will seek out an education to help you become wiser and more loving. 
 
My attachment to Stoicism is largely due to its insistence on virtue as our highest good, and my attachment to the liberal arts is largely due to their suitability as aids for becoming more virtuous. 
 
I am regularly told how I am not being “realistic”, since our students need good jobs in order to be successful. Now while I would never deny the utility of putting food on the table and a roof over our heads, I’m afraid I have very different standard of what constitutes success: I consider a life to be “real” when we fulfill the end for which we are created, not when we settle for sitting in a cubicle while filling out spreadsheets, just so that one man out of many thousands can then buy himself a vacation home. 
 
As creatures of mind and will, we are perfected by wisdom and virtue. No amount of money will do us a bit of good without an excellence of character, and the most immediate proof for this is the way most of my generation crawls along in a state of abject misery. We’ve already tried economic efficiency—now maybe it’s time to search for a moral compass. 
 
So, no, I will not try to qualify what Seneca has said. If we really wish to be free, we should begin by improving our powers of judgment. A true liberty is not about manipulating the circumstances, but about ruling ourselves, such that we are prepared to accept any variation of fortune as an opportunity to act from sound principles. 
 
When the university administrator praises such noble values, be sure to check if his words are then matched by his deeds. All too often, you will find that he is actually just running a business, and he has little interest in offering a service. In discovering how he lacks integrity, you are a step closer to choosing a very different path. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 

IMAGE: Niccolo Giolfino, The Liberal Arts (c. 1520) 



Tuesday, November 3, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 87.14


Let us suppose that we have been summoned to an assembly; an act dealing with the abolition of riches has been brought before the meeting. Shall we be supporting it, or opposing it, if we use these syllogisms? 
 
Will these syllogisms help us to bring it about that the Roman people shall demand poverty and praise it—poverty, the foundation and cause of their empire—and, on the other hand, shall shrink in fear from their present wealth, reflecting that they have found it among the victims of their conquests, that wealth is the source from which office-seeking and bribery and disorder have burst into a city once characterized by the utmost scrupulousness and sobriety, and that because of wealth an exhibition all too lavish is made of the spoils of conquered nations; reflecting, finally, that whatever one people has snatched away from all the rest may still more easily be snatched by all away from one? 
 
Nay, it were better to support this law by our conduct and to subdue our desires by direct assault rather than to circumvent them by logic. If we can, let us speak more boldly; if not, let us speak more frankly. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 87 
 
My stodgy friends are forever chasing after the almighty dollar, while my edgy friends are plotting to blow up the banks, but they are all working from the false assumption that our lives must be defined by the struggle between the haves and the have-nots. It never occurs to any of them how the only battle of consequence is the one between our virtues and our vices. 
 
Seneca does not hate riches, but he is concerned that a reliance on prosperity will be a deathblow to integrity. In the end, money is nothing more than a means of exchange, and we should really be asking ourselves whether there is greater worth in character or in commodities. The price we are willing to pay will depend upon our deeper principles, such that decent folks will place more value in compassion than they will in gold. 
 
If we cared first for the state of our souls, we would be content with very little property, knowing full well how a simplicity on the outside can reflect a purity on the inside. Do I need marble fixtures in order to increase my understanding? Must a swimming pool be a prerequisite for offering love? I’m afraid my longing for luxury is usually a sign that I am neglecting my humanity. 
 
Wherever charity is present, there will always be more than enough to go around. Even as the politicians promise to redistribute the wealth, and the economists contrive to create more of it, and the scholars scribble away at their treatises, those of common sense and goodwill are busy looking out for their neighbors, humbly aware of why there can never be a good for the one at the expense of another. 
 
Despite all the grandstanding, the world will not be saved by legislation, or fiscal policies, or chains of syllogisms. The progress begins when one man acts to restrain his avarice, and he thereby encourages the next man to pass it on. There is no other way to improve the human condition than the practice of human excellence, because virtues are ordinary habits, not pretentious abstractions. 
 
If I really want to be happy, I need to start taking less for myself and giving more of myself. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 



Wednesday, October 28, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 87.13


Be of good cheer; there is only one knot left for you to untangle, though it is a knot for a Hercules: “Good does not result from evil. But riches result from numerous cases of poverty; therefore, riches are not a good.” 
 
This syllogism is not recognized by our school, but the Peripatetics both concoct it and give its solution. Posidonius, however, remarks that this fallacy, which has been bandied about among all the schools of dialectic, is refuted by Antipater as follows:
 
“The word ‘poverty’ is used to denote, not the possession of something, but the non-possession or, as the ancients have put it, deprivation, (for the Greeks use the phrase ‘by deprivation,’ meaning ‘negatively’). ‘Poverty’ states, not what a man has, but what he has not. 
 
“Consequently, there can be no fulness resulting from a multitude of voids; many positive things, and not many deficiencies, make up riches.
 
“You have,” says he, “a wrong notion of the meaning of what poverty is. For poverty does not mean the possession of little, but the non-possession of much; it is used, therefore, not of what a man has, but of what he lacks.”
 
I could express my meaning more easily if there were a Latin word which could translate the Greek word which means “not-possessing.” Antipater assigns this quality to poverty, but for my part I cannot see what else poverty is than the possession of little. 
 
If ever we have plenty of leisure, we shall investigate the question: what is the essence of riches, and what the essence of poverty; but when the time comes, we shall also consider whether it is not better to try to mitigate poverty, and to relieve wealth of its arrogance, than to quibble about the words as if the question of the things were already decided. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 87 
 
Honestly, this section of the letter makes my head hurt. I’m afraid I’m not terribly clever when it comes to logical trickery, but I am relieved to see that Seneca also wants no part in such distractions. The fancy words become meaningless when they are separated from the actual things. 
 
The syllogism doesn’t sound terribly Stoic to me, so it comes as little surprise that it is a creation of the Peripatetics. Were the critics perhaps trying to attack a straw man? 
 
Whatever the original context, the problem is that poverty and wealth are still being presented as if they were in themselves good or evil, when the whole Stoic argument depends upon shifting our values to the content of character. The debate grows tiresome when this basic distinction is avoided, as the two sides merely talk past one another. 
 
If I only wanted to arrive at a preferred conclusion that riches are not goods, this might be a valid approach, though it would most certainly not be a sound one. First, we are still working from the false premise that poverty is an evil. Second, as Antipater explained, poverty is, strictly speaking, an absence, and it would be contradictory to suggest that something can arise out of nothing. 
 
To resolve the ambiguity about this demonstration, it would be necessary to define exactly what we mean by poverty and wealth, particularly with regard to the question of whether being poor means having very little or having nothing at all. With Seneca, I am inclined to doubt that we can ever speak of anything as a total privation, since an absence is always relative to some other presence, but are we running the risk of missing the forest for the trees? 
 
Make no mistake, while I am deeply interested in the metaphysical aspects of deprivation, is it not for our purposes sufficient to consider how poverty and wealth, as immediate experiences, influence our judgments about benefit and harm? If we are hampered by need, should we not strive to overcome it? If we are spoiled by affluence, should we not choose to reject it? 
 
Just as people disagree on a glass being half full or half empty, even as it remains entirely the same glass of water, I wonder if an ontology of negation can wait for the moment, until we first have established how to cope with a concrete hardship in our daily living. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 

IMAGE: Bartoleme Esteban Murillo, The Young Beggar (c. 1650) 



Monday, October 26, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 87.12


Posidonius thinks that the syllogism should be framed as follows: “Things which bestow upon the soul no greatness or confidence or freedom from care are not goods. But riches and health and similar conditions do none of these things; therefore, riches and health are not goods.” 
 
This syllogism he then goes on to extend still further in the following way: “Things which bestow upon the soul no greatness or confidence or freedom from care, but on the other hand create in it arrogance, vanity, and insolence, are evils. But things which are the gift of Fortune drive us into these evil ways. Therefore, these things are not goods.”
 
“But,” says the objector, “by such reasoning, things which are the gift of Fortune will not even be advantages.” 
 
No, advantages and goods stand each in a different situation. An advantage is that which contains more of usefulness than of annoyance. But a good ought to be unmixed and with no element in it of harmfulness. 
 
A thing is not good if it contains more benefit than injury, but only if it contains nothing but benefit. Besides, advantages may be predicated of animals, of men who are less than perfect, and of fools. 
 
Hence the advantageous may have an element of disadvantage mingled with it, but the word “advantageous” is used of the compound because it is judged by its predominant element. The good, however, can be predicated of the wise man alone; it is bound to be without alloy. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 87 
 
Nevertheless, however accommodating we wish to be, it is never wise to use our words carelessly. As much as it may offend the Peripatetics, Posidonius offers us a more precise set of distinctions: 
 
For something to be a good, it must be of benefit in itself, without any qualifications. 
 
For something to be an evil, it must be of harm in itself, without any qualifications. 
 
For something to be an advantage, it must offer a greater opportunity for benefit than for harm. 
 
For something to be a disadvantage, it must offer a greater opportunity for harm than for benefit. 
 
By such standards, which avoid any uncertainty or ambiguity, virtue is our sole human good, vice is our sole human evil, and all other circumstances will become either advantages or disadvantages to us, depending on whether they are employed in the service of virtue or of vice. 
 
Sometimes the semantics isn’t “just” semantics. We run the grave risk of a creeping definition, where a relative advantage is easily confused with an absolute good, and so we slowly begin to view conditional qualities as if they possessed an unconditional worth. Before too long, things like money or health are treated with a total reverence they hardly deserve. 
 
The first syllogism explains this clearly enough. Money and health do not, of their own accord, make us better, which is why we should not rightly refer to them as goods. 
 
The second syllogism may appear to be pushing the envelope, even for a Stoic, but if examined closely, it simply draws some further conclusions from the previous claim. While money and health do not, of their own accord, make us worse, they still have an uncanny way of encouraging us to make poor choices for ourselves. 
 
I suppose it only remains to be seen if these circumstances ought to be treated as advantages or as disadvantages, yet because their utility is entirely contingent, I will once again have to say, “It depends.” How are they influencing my judgments? 
 
Is Posidonius being a bit too pessimistic here? Do wealth and comfort usually turn out to be disadvantages, where the potential harm outweighs the potential benefits? This is a particular, and not a universal question, but in speaking from my own experience, that sounds about right. Though a man of far greater character may find it to be otherwise, such men are rather hard to come by. Posidonius is calling the odds as he sees them.
 
The critic is placing far too much value in the “gifts” of Fortune, to the point where he conflates the perfect with the imperfect. The good life will be pure and simple, regardless of the trimmings. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 

IMAGE: Pieter de Hooch, A Woman with a Pair of Scales (c. 1664) 



Thursday, October 22, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 87.11


I think that the reasoning of Posidonius is better: he holds that riches are a cause of evil, not because, of themselves, they do any evil, but because they goad men on so that they are ready to do evil. 
 
For the efficient cause, which necessarily produces harm at once, is one thing, and the antecedent cause is another. It is this antecedent cause which inheres in riches; they puff up the spirit and beget pride, they bring on unpopularity and unsettle the mind to such an extent that the mere reputation of having wealth, though it is bound to harm us, nevertheless affords delight.
 
All goods, however, ought properly to be free from blame; they are pure, they do not corrupt the spirit, and they do not tempt us. They do, indeed, uplift and broaden the spirit, but without puffing it up. 
 
Those things which are goods produce confidence, but riches produce shamelessness. The things which are goods give us greatness of soul, but riches give us arrogance. And arrogance is nothing else than a false show of greatness. 
 
“According to that argument,” the objector says, “riches are not only not a good, but are a positive evil.” 
 
Now they would be an evil if they did harm of themselves, and if, as I remarked, it were the efficient cause which inheres in them; in fact, however, it is the antecedent cause which inheres in riches, and indeed it is that cause which, so far from merely arousing the spirit, actually drags it along by force. 
 
Yes, riches shower upon us a semblance of the good, which is like the reality and wins credence in the eyes of many men. The antecedent cause inheres in virtue also; it is this which brings on envy—for many men become unpopular because of their wisdom, and many men because of their justice. 
 
But this cause, though it inheres in virtue, is not the result of virtue itself, nor is it a mere semblance of the reality; nay, on the contrary, far more like the reality is that vision which is flashed by virtue upon the spirits of men, summoning them to love it and marvel thereat. 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 87 
 
I find myself in the odd situation of being inspired by a philosopher whose books I have never read, which is perhaps something like falling in love with a girl you have never met. 
 
Posidonius, I am told, wrote on a wide range of subjects, much like Aristotle, and while he was a firm supporter of the Stoic tradition, he did not hesitate to employ the teachings from a variety of other schools. This immediately endears him to me, for we should always embrace the truth, wherever we happen to find it. 
 
Yet none of his works have survived, and we are left with only references and fragments. Though I am fascinated when Seneca or Cicero discuss his thinking, usually with great respect, I grow frustrated when I cannot go straight to the source, and I imagine what it would be like if someone actually discovered his writings, perhaps safely tucked away under some rubble in Asia Minor. I feel much the same way about Panaetius. 
 
I am pleased to see how Posidonius tried to resolve the problem of the good by distinguishing the different aspects of causality. Even as the source of any action is from the agent itself, there are also the conditions that came before it, which set the grounds, so to speak, for that change to take place. Our own choices are the efficient causes of what we do, and yet various circumstances will influence these decisions, by making one path or the other seem more appealing. 
 
I will speculate that Posidonius intended the antecedent cause to be a type of material cause, though I may well be mistaken. In any case, it serves a similar purpose, by providing the occasion. 
 
Now contrary to what the determinists might claim, the environment does not make the man, but it will certainly give him an emphatic nudge. If you put a bottle of Bushmills in front of me, I will be sorely tempted to drink it all in one sitting. If you show me a picture of the lost love of my life, I will instinctively feel intense pain, and I will be sorely tempted to put a sad record on the turntable and begin brooding. 
 
Yet these are merely temptations, and they do not compel me to do anything whatsoever. Neither the bottle nor the photograph is good or evil for me—it is my judgments about the bottle and the photograph that are good or evil for me. 
 
The injury proceeds from the error in my estimation, and yet it is also my responsibility to avoid those situations that are likely to weaken my resolve. Do I have the excellence within me to be surrounded by luxury? If I believe it to be so, then I can take up the challenge, but if there is any doubt about my capacity, then it is best to leave it be. 
 
Since the benefit or the harm of riches is relative to our character, we cannot speak of money as good or evil in any absolute sense. External things will often present an appearance of worth, at which point I must remind myself why their value hinges upon my internal disposition toward virtue or vice. Seek out that which makes the task easier, and avoid that which makes the burden heavier. 
 
Observe how this applies to every circumstance, such that even something as noble as the wisdom or justice in one can also be twisted into an excuse for envy by another. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I again refer you to the argument on virtue in the Meno: do not confuse the conditional with the unconditional. 
 
Posidonius was willing to grant how the concepts of good and evil can be applied equivocally, as antecedent causes, as long as we understand why they unequivocally rest in the quality of our thinking, as efficient causes. This willingness to seek an agreement between different point of view, by qualifying the various senses of a term, reminds me of another one of my philosophical heroes, Thomas Aquinas. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014 



Tuesday, October 20, 2026

Seneca, Moral Letters 87.10


“That which, while we are desiring to attain it, involves us in many evils, is not a good. But while we are desiring to attain riches, we become involved in many evils; therefore, riches are not a good,” 
 
“Your first premise,” they say, “contains two meanings; one is: we become involved in many evils while we are desiring to attain riches. But we also become involved in many evils while we are desiring to attain virtue. One man, while travelling in order to prosecute his studies, suffers shipwreck, and another is taken captive.
 
“The second meaning is as follows: that through which we become involved in evils is not a good. And it will not logically follow from our proposition that we become involved in evils through riches or through pleasure; otherwise, if it is through riches that we become involved in many evils, riches are not only not a good, but they are positively an evil. You, however, maintain merely that they are not a good.
 
“Moreover,” the objector says, “you grant that riches are of some use. You reckon them among the advantages; and yet on this basis they cannot even be an advantage, for it is through the pursuit of riches that we suffer much disadvantage.”
 
Certain men answer this objection as follows: “You are mistaken if you ascribe disadvantages to riches. Riches injure no one; it is a man’s own folly, or his neighbor’s wickedness, that harms him in each case, just as a sword by itself does not slay; it is merely the weapon used by the slayer. Riches themselves do not harm you, just because it is on account of riches that you suffer harm." 

—from Seneca, Moral Letters 87 
 
My head has now been stuffed with this philosophy nonsense for so long, that I find certain passages to be downright humorous, as if they were egghead versions of the classic “Who’s on First?” skit by Abbott and Costello. 
 
For me, this letter is full of such hilarious exchanges, where the Peripatetic remains tied to the notion that “things” must either be good or bad, and he cannot conceive of the Stoic insight that the value is not in the circumstance, but only in the use of the circumstance. 
 
The Stoic: “If money were really a good in itself, it would never be an occasion for evil. And yet you only have to spend some time in a room full of bankers to see how easily it is abused.” 
 
The Peripatetic: “So now you’re going to tell me that walking is evil, because I might trip and fall while I’m on my way to school? Should I never get on a boat, because there’s a chance it will sink?” 
 
The Stoic: “The walking and the sailing are to be treated as indifferent, with the benefit or the harm being relative to the virtue or the vice within us.” 
 
The Peripatetic: “But you’re the one who said that riches aren’t a good, and if they aren’t a good, then they have to be an evil. So, which one is it?” 
 
The Stoic: “It’s neither, until we choose to make something of it.” 
 
The Peripatetic: “Ah, that makes it appear very bad. Are you claiming that money is always bad?” 
 
The Stoic: “I didn’t say that.” 
 
The Peripatetic: “Then money must be a good, which is what I I’ve been saying from the beginning.” 
 
The Stoic: “No, it depends. It doesn’t have to be good, and it doesn’t have to be evil.” 
 
The Peripatetic: “Well, it sounds like you are pointing out all of the downsides, as if there aren’t any upsides.” 
 
The Stoic: “I am conscious of both, just as I know how a sword can become a tool to defend, or a tool to oppress.” 
 
The Peripatetic: “Oh, so now you want to ban all the swords too? What kind of weirdo are you?” 
 
And so on . . . 
 
In the simplest of terms, the critic won’t distinguish between the merits of what we do and the conditions under which we do it, between the dignity on the inside and the trappings on the outside. 
 
He is not yet willing to think beyond the standards of acquisition, possession, and consumption, like a yuppie who defines himself by his stock portfolio, his wine cellar, and his squash club membership. 

—Reflection written in 2/2014