Epictetus on Friendship 3

 . . . Well then, did you never see little dogs caressing and playing with one another, so that you might say there is nothing more friendly? But, that you may know what friendship is, throw a bit of flesh among them, and you will learn.

Throw between yourself and your son a little estate, and you will know how soon he will wish to bury you and how soon you wish your son to die. Then you will change your tone and say, “What a son I have brought up! He has long been wishing to bury me.”

Throw a smart girl between you; and do you, the old man, love her, and the young one will love her too, If a little fame intervene, or dangers, it will be just the same. . . .

—Epictetus, Discourses 2.22, tr Long

We must be careful, at this point in the text, not to become distressed or discouraged. Epictetus will now offer a number of examples of the fickle and unreliable varieties of love and friendship, and he will show how base and cruel we can all truly be. Think of these, perhaps, as viewing the symptoms before we can consider a cure. Understanding all the abuses of our nature can help us to understand how to live with it rightly.

I also need to remind myself that, for all of his skill at presenting an argument directly and clearly, Epictetus hardly has the best bedside manner of all the Stoic philosophers.

The analogy of animals can be of assistance, for few things seem as affectionate as the playfulness and tenderness of animals. But place some different desire in the way of the affection, and we will be overcome by their viciousness.

Yet there are immediate limits to such an analogy. The animal is ruled by feeling and instinct alone, and will act based upon such appearances alone. Now man also possesses such feelings and instincts, but surely his judgment of the good can direct his awareness of the good? Hence the good will only be what is pleasing to the animal, but it can be what is virtuous for a man.

It certainly should be what is virtuous for a man, but observe how often this is not the case. It is right and good for an animal to be just an animal, but not for a man to be just an animal. We nevertheless act just like animals all the time, because we surrender our reason by choosing to be ruled only by our passions.

The desire for money, or pleasure, or fame all too readily breaks the bonds of friendship that reason asks of us. If I choose to judge beyond the external appearances, I will understand that there should be unity and fellowship between men. We were all made for the same purpose, to act with wisdom and with virtue, and there needs to be absolutely no conflict or competition for all of us to share in those same goods.

But as soon as I say I want wealth, or sex, or reputation more than I want character, I have chosen to flip the order of human priorities. I will now sell out the good of my friend, a good clear to sound thinking, for the good of my passions, a false appearance of the human good. 

Written on 2/2002

Image: Hermann Kern, "Good Friends" (1904)