. . . It is necessary then, in order to enjoy the world, so as to maintain one’s own virtue and innocence, that a man provide himself with a competent degree of knowledge and prudence, and reduce his appetites to moderation and obedience. And when he engages in business and conversation, that he be sure to do it cautiously and seasonable, and to put on this impenetrable armor.
For this reason, Epictetus is urgent with his young beginners to suspend even those things, that are consistent with virtue, for awhile; until time and practice have confirmed their good habits, and qualified them to use the world with safety and discretion. For, as it is rashness and folly to go into the field unarmed, so it is, to engage with the world, till a man has fortified himself with temper and prudence.
But he acquaints us farther, that, for those, who as yet are but raw and inexperienced in virtue, to employ themselves in business and worldly care, is not only inconvenient and hazardous, but ridiculous and vain, and to no manner of purpose. They, that place their desires and their aversions upon such things as are out of a man’s power, must needs fail of prudence and moderation, and cannot have inclinations and aversions grounded upon, and governed by, right reason, which are the only things that make men free, and easy, and happy.
For they must of necessity live in subjection to their wild and brutish passions, which lord it over them, like so many cruel master, or enraged tyrants. They must also live perpetually in a slavish fear of all those men, in whose power it is, either to gratify their hopes, or to obstruct and defeat them; who can intercept the good they wish, or inflict the ills they fear, lest they should exert this power to their prejudice.
Besides all this, when our care and concern is laid out upon the seeming good things without us, it exposes us to disappointments in our true happiness, by taking off our care from those things that are more properly ours. For they, who divide their desires and endeavors between both, do neither make a just distinction between those things that are, and those that are not, really good; nor do they express a becoming concern, for that which is their own peculiar happiness; nor bestow the pains about it that it deserves: and till they do so, it is impossible they should attain to it.
For the most part therefore, they fall short of those external advantages they propose to themselves, because they do not apply their minds to these entirely, but now and then are diverted by desires and endeavors after their true and proper happiness; and out of a secret shame and consciousness, that this requires their care, fall into such perplexities and distractions, as restrain and stop their career, and will not suffer them to do nor to endure, everything that is necessary for obtaining the false good they chiefly pursue.
Now, though such a divided life as this, must be acknowledged to be less vicious, than that which addicts itself wholly to the world, without any check or interruption at all; yet it cannot but be exceeding troublesome and uneasy; much more so indeed, than that of the worldling. For it is one continual labor in vain, ever striving to reconcile contradictions, full of perpetual inconsistencies and remorses, dislike of ones own actions, and eternal self-condemnation. So that it must needs be infinitely painful and detestable.
But it is worth our taking notice, that Epictetus, upon these occasions, does frequently in the following discourses, admonish and awaken us with a reminder, the reason of which is, that he addresses himself to the rational soul; which, though it be naturally and essentially endued with just ideas of things, and has an inbred faculty of discerning and adhering to truth, yet finds but too often, that this eye of reason is darkened, has a dim and confused representations of things imposed upon it, by the material principle, to which it is united; and by this means is betrayed into ignorance and forgetfulness, the true cause of all its miscarriages and all its miseries. So that, considered in these circumstances, it stands in need of a continual monitor to rouse it into thought and remembrance.
But when he says, that a man who proposes to himself advantages so valuable, ought not to be content with a moderate prosecution of them; this expression is not to be understood, as we take it, when used to distinguish between moderation and excess, but is intended here of the defect, and signifies a supine neglect, and cold indifference. For where our happiness and our all is at stake, there, as Pindar expresses himself,
Distress and danger should our courage fire, move generous thought, and brave resolves inspire.
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