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Wednesday, September 11, 2024

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.27


M. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which must be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. But as I suspect that your inquiry is not so much respecting the wise man as concerning yourself (for you allow that he is free from all perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the diseases of the mind. 
 
There is certainly some remedy; nor has Nature been so unkind to the human race as to have discovered so many things salutary to the body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. She has even been kinder to the mind than to the body; inasmuch as you must seek abroad for the assistance which the body requires, while the mind has all that it requires within itself. 
 
But in proportion as the excellency of the mind is of a higher and more divine nature, the more diligence does it require; and therefore reason, when it is well applied, discovers what is best, but when it is neglected, it becomes involved in many errors. I shall apply, then, all my discourse to you; for though you pretend to be inquiring about the wise man, your inquiry may possibly be about yourself. 
 
Various, then, are the cures of those perturbations which I have expounded, for every disorder is not to be appeased the same way. One medicine must be applied to the man who mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the person who envies; for there is this difference to be maintained in all the four perturbations: we are to consider whether our discourse had better be directed to perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason, or a somewhat too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better applied to particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust, and the rest, and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove that which has occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to eradicate every kind of grief. 
 
As, should anyone grieve that he is poor, the question is, would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or would you contend that a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly, this last is the best course; for should you not convince him with regard to poverty, you must allow him to grieve; but if you remove grief by particular arguments, such as I used yesterday, the evil of poverty is in some manner removed. 

—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.27 
 
In the current trend, mental health is usually treated in much the same way as physical health, with a heavy reliance on the liberal use of prescription drugs. There are some wonderful exceptions, of course, but you will have to seek them out, and you will then run the risk of being labeled as a heretic, for failing to worship at the altar of Holy Science. 
 
I have seen it in our clients, I have seen it in my students, and I have seen it as a patient myself, desperately trying to eradicate a clinging melancholy as if it were no more than a persistent fungus. If this particular pill isn’t working, let’s increase the dosage, or maybe try this cocktail that just came on the market; I sometimes wonder, only half in jest, if we might find more success with cupping or leeching.
 
I do not wish to engage in any metaphysical bickering about matter and spirit, since for practical purposes it should be more than sufficient to observe how the mind and the body are bound as one, while still operating in so markedly different ways. Whatever mode of existence we attribute to the “soul”, the flow of consciousness is not the same as the flow of blood. 
 
Applying the remedy of philosophy to the diseases of the mind may appear odd, and yet this will only be the case when we turn to a purely academic philosophy, the sort that retains the word, but not the task. If we already begin with assumptions of skepticism and relativism, such philosophy will merely increase our feelings of existential dread, but if we are open to the order of Nature, we can discover a deeper meaning and purpose. 
 
I feel as if Cicero is speaking directly to me when he tells the Auditor that his objection is not really about the merits of philosophy at all, but about his own personal confusion. I, too, will despair of wisdom’s comfort, even as the very cause of my grief is my own ignorance. It is properly humbling to be reminded that, if the wise man is free from distress, I have far more learning to do before I am at peace. 
 
While the body finds its sustenance and support from the outside, the mind has a strength from the inside, through the actions of its own judgments. I am always grateful when someone has the insight and the decency to ask me to challenge my own thinking, and so to become the agent of my own healing. This is a far cry from the usual talk therapy, which is little more than scolding, or the usual philosophical discussion, which is little more than posturing. 
 
When my passions are perturbed, what is the root cause of my illness? I go back to the Stoic distinctions about the healthy and the unhealthy emotions, and I ask myself honestly if I am afflicted with gratification, lust, grief, or fear. Perhaps there are many bound together, and so I must first untangle them, while also recognizing how all of them are equally in conflict with reason. In each case, depending on the ailment, the treatment will be different, much like it is with the guidance from a physician. 
 
If I grieve, for example, I will be tempted to remove the object of my grief, and yet wouldn’t it be even better to manage my very tendency toward distress itself? Poverty has not made me sad—my unwillingness to cope with poverty has made me sad. It will be quite hard to convince the poor man that his hardship isn’t an evil, though he may be more willing to understand why he doesn’t need to be defeated by such circumstances. 

—Reflection written in 1/1999 

IMAGE: Asclepius, a god of healing 



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