M. But the principal medicine to be applied in consolation is, to maintain either that it is no evil at all, or a very inconsiderable one.
The next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of life, having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you comfort particularly.
The third is, that it is folly to wear one’s self out with grief which can avail nothing.
For the comfort of Cleanthes is suitable only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all; for could you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is base, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for such precepts is not well chosen.
Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to me sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that very thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune.
For what shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are told, that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from other people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him, though a man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades became uneasy at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes, to make him a man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position; what shall we say to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what afflicted Alcibiades thus?
What strange things does Lycon say? Who, making light of grief, says that it arises from trifles, from things that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind. What, then? did not the grief of Alcibiades proceed from the defects and evils of the mind?
I have already said enough of Epicurus’s consolation.
The next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of life, having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you comfort particularly.
The third is, that it is folly to wear one’s self out with grief which can avail nothing.
For the comfort of Cleanthes is suitable only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all; for could you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is base, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for such precepts is not well chosen.
Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to me sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that very thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune.
For what shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are told, that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from other people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him, though a man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades became uneasy at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes, to make him a man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position; what shall we say to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what afflicted Alcibiades thus?
What strange things does Lycon say? Who, making light of grief, says that it arises from trifles, from things that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind. What, then? did not the grief of Alcibiades proceed from the defects and evils of the mind?
I have already said enough of Epicurus’s consolation.
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.32
For making things right in the world, nothing beats an earth-shattering insight, where I realize how I have had my wires crossed. Once I truly learn why all those things I thought were deeply evil are hardly evil for me at all, and I finally discover the good to be in my own willingness to understand and to love, I can already feel the grief slipping away, slowly but surely.
The problem, however, is that such epiphanies do not come easy, and they will not always arrive conveniently during a moment of crisis. Even I, the sort of fellow who turns to books for comfort when the going gets tough, do not necessarily take well to radical reflections on the subtleties of ethics when I am in thrall to a turbulent passion.
If a grand change of attitude isn’t in the cards right now, there are other ways to diminish grief, at least for a time. When people are troubled, I am inclined to seek out answers for them, but answers are not always welcome while the pain is still so fresh.
I was a little slow to realize how friends find comfort in simply being listened to, and in knowing that they are not alone. We all share in the same human condition, for the creature gifted with reason is also strengthen by a consciousness of solidarity.
Furthermore, if it is too much to ponder the first principles, there is also a place for looking at the immediate consequences. While the situation may appear overwhelming, what actual good will come from feeling sorry for ourselves?
Any initial satisfaction from playing the victim quickly degrades into even greater suffering—it’s something like drinking to numb the pain, and then waking up with the worst hangover. There’s no need to be a philosopher to learn why dwelling upon the sadness only increases the sadness.
Finally, there will be cases, and usually the most critical ones, where the source of grief is genuinely what we would now call “an existential crisis”, a crippling realization of our own grievous moral failings. When this happens, it won’t help to say that fortune cannot truly harm us, because the evil is now rising up from within.
The fact is, of course, that we then become brutally aware of how we are the only ones who can fix ourselves, also from within. I can’t speak for what Cleanthes or Lycon intended, but the Stoics did argue that there could never properly be such a thing as a fitting or rational grief, since once we recognize why any human evil proceed from our own judgments, it is then within our power to remove them.
In other words, there can cease to be a problem, right there and then, when the problem can come or go by means of a voluntary choice. Nonetheless, the philosopher needs to remember that while the solution may be simple in theory, it is not always so easy in practice. The emotions are powerful, the habits are stubborn, and the courage of conviction is typically slow to fire up.
In both history and philosophy, Alcibiades is hard to figure out, a mess of seeming contradictions, yet surely that is reflective of the entire human condition. If he sank into despair when Socrates helped him to perceive his own weakness, he was just as confused as the rest of us. The process of self-healing will inevitably take some time and effort.
For making things right in the world, nothing beats an earth-shattering insight, where I realize how I have had my wires crossed. Once I truly learn why all those things I thought were deeply evil are hardly evil for me at all, and I finally discover the good to be in my own willingness to understand and to love, I can already feel the grief slipping away, slowly but surely.
The problem, however, is that such epiphanies do not come easy, and they will not always arrive conveniently during a moment of crisis. Even I, the sort of fellow who turns to books for comfort when the going gets tough, do not necessarily take well to radical reflections on the subtleties of ethics when I am in thrall to a turbulent passion.
If a grand change of attitude isn’t in the cards right now, there are other ways to diminish grief, at least for a time. When people are troubled, I am inclined to seek out answers for them, but answers are not always welcome while the pain is still so fresh.
I was a little slow to realize how friends find comfort in simply being listened to, and in knowing that they are not alone. We all share in the same human condition, for the creature gifted with reason is also strengthen by a consciousness of solidarity.
Furthermore, if it is too much to ponder the first principles, there is also a place for looking at the immediate consequences. While the situation may appear overwhelming, what actual good will come from feeling sorry for ourselves?
Any initial satisfaction from playing the victim quickly degrades into even greater suffering—it’s something like drinking to numb the pain, and then waking up with the worst hangover. There’s no need to be a philosopher to learn why dwelling upon the sadness only increases the sadness.
Finally, there will be cases, and usually the most critical ones, where the source of grief is genuinely what we would now call “an existential crisis”, a crippling realization of our own grievous moral failings. When this happens, it won’t help to say that fortune cannot truly harm us, because the evil is now rising up from within.
The fact is, of course, that we then become brutally aware of how we are the only ones who can fix ourselves, also from within. I can’t speak for what Cleanthes or Lycon intended, but the Stoics did argue that there could never properly be such a thing as a fitting or rational grief, since once we recognize why any human evil proceed from our own judgments, it is then within our power to remove them.
In other words, there can cease to be a problem, right there and then, when the problem can come or go by means of a voluntary choice. Nonetheless, the philosopher needs to remember that while the solution may be simple in theory, it is not always so easy in practice. The emotions are powerful, the habits are stubborn, and the courage of conviction is typically slow to fire up.
In both history and philosophy, Alcibiades is hard to figure out, a mess of seeming contradictions, yet surely that is reflective of the entire human condition. If he sank into despair when Socrates helped him to perceive his own weakness, he was just as confused as the rest of us. The process of self-healing will inevitably take some time and effort.
—Reflection written in 12/1998
IMAGE: Kristian Zahrtmann, Socrates and Alcibiades (1911)
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