M. Should Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato say to me, “Why are you dejected or sad? Why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which, perhaps, may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite unman you? There is great power in the virtues; rouse them, if they chance to droop.
“Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you such spirits that you will despise everything that can befall man, and look on it as a trifle.
“Add to this temperance, which is moderation, and which was just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to do anything base or bad—for what is worse or baser than an effeminate man?
“Not even justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she seems to have the least weight in this affair; but still, notwithstanding, even she will inform you that you are doubly unjust when you both require what does not belong to you, inasmuch as though you who have been born mortal demand to be placed in the condition of the immortals, and at the same time you take it much to heart that you are to restore what was lent you.
“What answer will you make to prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself both to teach you a good life and also to secure you a happy one? And, indeed, if she were fettered by external circumstances, and dependent on others, and if she did not originate in herself and return to herself, and also embrace everything in herself, so as to seek no adventitious aid from any quarter, I cannot imagine why she should appear deserving of such lofty panegyrics, or of being sought after with such excessive eagerness.”
Now, Epicurus, if you call me back to such goods as these, I will obey you, and follow you, and use you as my guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my misfortunes; and I will do this the more readily from a persuasion that they are not to be ranked among evils at all.
But you are for bringing my thoughts over to pleasure. What pleasures? Pleasures of the body, I imagine, or such as are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is this all? Do I explain your opinion rightly? For your disciples are used to deny that we understand at all what Epicurus means.
This is what he says, and what that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them, used, when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk so loudly of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present pleasure, and who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy it without pain, either during the whole or the greatest part of his life; or if, should any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it must be short; should it be of longer continuance, it would have more of what was sweet than bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these things would be happy, especially if satisfied with the good things which he had already enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or of the Gods.
“Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you such spirits that you will despise everything that can befall man, and look on it as a trifle.
“Add to this temperance, which is moderation, and which was just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to do anything base or bad—for what is worse or baser than an effeminate man?
“Not even justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she seems to have the least weight in this affair; but still, notwithstanding, even she will inform you that you are doubly unjust when you both require what does not belong to you, inasmuch as though you who have been born mortal demand to be placed in the condition of the immortals, and at the same time you take it much to heart that you are to restore what was lent you.
“What answer will you make to prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself both to teach you a good life and also to secure you a happy one? And, indeed, if she were fettered by external circumstances, and dependent on others, and if she did not originate in herself and return to herself, and also embrace everything in herself, so as to seek no adventitious aid from any quarter, I cannot imagine why she should appear deserving of such lofty panegyrics, or of being sought after with such excessive eagerness.”
Now, Epicurus, if you call me back to such goods as these, I will obey you, and follow you, and use you as my guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my misfortunes; and I will do this the more readily from a persuasion that they are not to be ranked among evils at all.
But you are for bringing my thoughts over to pleasure. What pleasures? Pleasures of the body, I imagine, or such as are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is this all? Do I explain your opinion rightly? For your disciples are used to deny that we understand at all what Epicurus means.
This is what he says, and what that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them, used, when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk so loudly of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present pleasure, and who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy it without pain, either during the whole or the greatest part of his life; or if, should any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it must be short; should it be of longer continuance, it would have more of what was sweet than bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these things would be happy, especially if satisfied with the good things which he had already enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or of the Gods.
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.17
While the hedonism of Epicurus is far from the boundless consumption and gratification we are so familiar with in our everyday lives, it remains a form of hedonism nonetheless, for it still makes the presence of pleasure, however moderated, and the absence of pain, however endured, the necessary conditions for a good life.
Observe how many people will automatically assume that happiness is no more than a subjective feeling, and you will then recognize how deeply imbedded such a dependence on the appetites is in our attitudes. You will be met with a blank stare if you suggest that the value of the passions is relative to the value of the thoughts and the actions that stand behind them.
Neither Cicero nor the admittedly more rigorous Stoic wish to deny the place of the emotions, but they rather argue why they must be understood within the greater context of character. The good man may well feel good about his deeds, but it is the way that he judges and chooses to live that are the root of his self-worth.
And so the study and practice of philosophy, undertaken in my own peculiar way, have encouraged me to always ask myself whether I am merely gaining pleasure or seeking after the virtues. Which of these will be my highest goal?
Over the years, the story about Hercules at the Crossroads, where he had to decide between pursuing gratification or conscience as the best path for his life, has become something of an ideal standard for my own choices, however mundane. I believe all of us must make that determination, sooner or later, and when I feel the lure of Pleasure, I then imagine what Virtue might say to offer me a better option. If only I bother to listen, her advice does not steer me wrong.
Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato always mirror her wisdom, and while different schools of philosophy will stress different methods and principles, those who embrace human nature as essentially rational will also revere moral excellence as the greatest quality any person can possess.
If I have the integrity of my convictions, how can fortune ever stand against me? As long as I am loyal to the cardinal virtues, I can know with certainty that I am doing what I was made to do, for these virtues are the perfection of my very identity. They are the pillars that support happy living.
Fortitude makes worldly obstacles seem insignificant in the face of a noble spirit.
Temperance allows me to rise above temptations by showing me how little I really need.
Justice reminds me to be content with what is my own, and to share freely with my neighbors, so that there is no cause for making an enemy of any man.
Prudence guides me with the fundamental and profound awareness that the happy man is first and foremost the good man.
I can make as much of a fuss as I like about increasing pleasure or diminishing pain, but all of that avoids the more pressing matter of clinging to righteousness and fleeing from wickedness.
While the hedonism of Epicurus is far from the boundless consumption and gratification we are so familiar with in our everyday lives, it remains a form of hedonism nonetheless, for it still makes the presence of pleasure, however moderated, and the absence of pain, however endured, the necessary conditions for a good life.
Observe how many people will automatically assume that happiness is no more than a subjective feeling, and you will then recognize how deeply imbedded such a dependence on the appetites is in our attitudes. You will be met with a blank stare if you suggest that the value of the passions is relative to the value of the thoughts and the actions that stand behind them.
Neither Cicero nor the admittedly more rigorous Stoic wish to deny the place of the emotions, but they rather argue why they must be understood within the greater context of character. The good man may well feel good about his deeds, but it is the way that he judges and chooses to live that are the root of his self-worth.
And so the study and practice of philosophy, undertaken in my own peculiar way, have encouraged me to always ask myself whether I am merely gaining pleasure or seeking after the virtues. Which of these will be my highest goal?
Over the years, the story about Hercules at the Crossroads, where he had to decide between pursuing gratification or conscience as the best path for his life, has become something of an ideal standard for my own choices, however mundane. I believe all of us must make that determination, sooner or later, and when I feel the lure of Pleasure, I then imagine what Virtue might say to offer me a better option. If only I bother to listen, her advice does not steer me wrong.
Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato always mirror her wisdom, and while different schools of philosophy will stress different methods and principles, those who embrace human nature as essentially rational will also revere moral excellence as the greatest quality any person can possess.
If I have the integrity of my convictions, how can fortune ever stand against me? As long as I am loyal to the cardinal virtues, I can know with certainty that I am doing what I was made to do, for these virtues are the perfection of my very identity. They are the pillars that support happy living.
Fortitude makes worldly obstacles seem insignificant in the face of a noble spirit.
Temperance allows me to rise above temptations by showing me how little I really need.
Justice reminds me to be content with what is my own, and to share freely with my neighbors, so that there is no cause for making an enemy of any man.
Prudence guides me with the fundamental and profound awareness that the happy man is first and foremost the good man.
I can make as much of a fuss as I like about increasing pleasure or diminishing pain, but all of that avoids the more pressing matter of clinging to righteousness and fleeing from wickedness.
—Reflection written in 10/1996
IMAGE: Adamo Scultori, Hercules at the Crossroads (c. 1550)
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