Book 2
Chapter 1: That there is no conflict between confidence and caution.
Perhaps the contention of philosophers that it is possible in everything we do to combine confidence with caution may appear a paradox, but nevertheless we must do our best to consider whether it is true.
In a sense, no doubt, caution seems to be contrary to confidence, and contraries are by no means compatible. But I think that what seems to many a paradox in this subject depends on a confusion, and it is this:
If we really called upon a man to use caution and confidence in regard to the same things, they might fairly find fault with us as uniting qualities which cannot be united.
But as a matter of fact there is nothing strange in the statement: for if it is true, as has often been said and often proved, that the true nature of good and also of evil depends on how we deal with impressions, and if things outside the will's control cannot be described as good or bad, we cannot surely call it a paradoxical demand of the philosophers if they say, “Be confident in all that lies beyond the will's control, be cautious in all that is dependent on the will.”
For if evil depends on evil choice, it is only in regard to matters of will that it is right to use caution; and if things outside the will's control, which do not depend on us, concern us in no way, we should use confidence in regard to these.
And in that way, we shall be at once cautious and confident and indeed confident because of our caution. For because we are cautious as to things which are really evil, we shall get confidence to face things which are not so.
Chapter 1: That there is no conflict between confidence and caution.
Perhaps the contention of philosophers that it is possible in everything we do to combine confidence with caution may appear a paradox, but nevertheless we must do our best to consider whether it is true.
In a sense, no doubt, caution seems to be contrary to confidence, and contraries are by no means compatible. But I think that what seems to many a paradox in this subject depends on a confusion, and it is this:
If we really called upon a man to use caution and confidence in regard to the same things, they might fairly find fault with us as uniting qualities which cannot be united.
But as a matter of fact there is nothing strange in the statement: for if it is true, as has often been said and often proved, that the true nature of good and also of evil depends on how we deal with impressions, and if things outside the will's control cannot be described as good or bad, we cannot surely call it a paradoxical demand of the philosophers if they say, “Be confident in all that lies beyond the will's control, be cautious in all that is dependent on the will.”
For if evil depends on evil choice, it is only in regard to matters of will that it is right to use caution; and if things outside the will's control, which do not depend on us, concern us in no way, we should use confidence in regard to these.
And in that way, we shall be at once cautious and confident and indeed confident because of our caution. For because we are cautious as to things which are really evil, we shall get confidence to face things which are not so.
—from Epictetus, Discourses 2.1
Most anywhere I look, I see people insisting upon false dichotomies, basing their points of view on the assumption that contradictions exist where none need be present. I am regularly told that justice cannot admit of mercy, or freedom is incompatible with duty, or a state of poverty excludes the possibility of happiness.
Observe any contemporary debate, and you will find that the exclusion of the “other” is taken for granted, and there is little patience for moving from an “either/or” to a “both/and”.
Some of this has to do with our attachment to conflict, since aggression, like lust, has a peculiar way of stifling reason. We forget that in order to be right, it doesn’t necessarily mean that someone else has to be wrong. We manufacture contradictions when they are gratifying, and we overlook them when they are inconvenient.
Yet a deeper problem is the rush to judgment that comes from lazy thinking. We wish to dash ahead to the conclusion, like a reader who skips to the end of a whodunit novel, and so we neglect to consider the actual argument, or even define our terms with any clarity.
Furthermore, we don’t take the time to examine the subtleties of context, and the particular senses in which a term can be employed. This leaves us full of narrow opinions at the expense of an open understanding.
For example, aren’t some people confident, while other people are cautious, and they stand in sharp opposition to one another? Let me be picky—how are they being confident or cautious, and with regard to what sorts of things?
I may feel quite optimistic about cycling for 26 miles, though rather apprehensive about my ability to run for 26 miles. I should be fearless in cuddling a kitten, leery of petting an alligator. These are distinctions, not contradictions.
Where we choose to be most careful in life depends on what we think to be the most decisive measure. Now while the person who defines his worth by the arrangement of his circumstances might be extremely cautious about how to invest his money, he is also tempted to become causally confident about any matters of character. After all, he believes, losing money could be catastrophic, but morals are really just about whims.
The Stoic, or any person who looks behind the impressions, will reverse the priorities; this is one of the reasons why he appears insane to the followers of the herd. He cares first for being a good man, and so he is extremely cautious in his principles, and about discerning right from wrong in his actions. Knowing this, he is able to be evenly confident about whatever may or may not happen to him, since he cares less about being a rich man.
Do you see what Epictetus just did there? He flipped it. Be judicious about what is within your power, and be carefree about what is beyond your power. Attend meticulously to the formation of the will, and accept the unfolding of events with ease. Indeed, it is precisely because of the former that the latter is possible.
Where do I find the good? That is where I ought to be cautious. How do I face what is indifferent? That is where I can accordingly be confident.
Most anywhere I look, I see people insisting upon false dichotomies, basing their points of view on the assumption that contradictions exist where none need be present. I am regularly told that justice cannot admit of mercy, or freedom is incompatible with duty, or a state of poverty excludes the possibility of happiness.
Observe any contemporary debate, and you will find that the exclusion of the “other” is taken for granted, and there is little patience for moving from an “either/or” to a “both/and”.
Some of this has to do with our attachment to conflict, since aggression, like lust, has a peculiar way of stifling reason. We forget that in order to be right, it doesn’t necessarily mean that someone else has to be wrong. We manufacture contradictions when they are gratifying, and we overlook them when they are inconvenient.
Yet a deeper problem is the rush to judgment that comes from lazy thinking. We wish to dash ahead to the conclusion, like a reader who skips to the end of a whodunit novel, and so we neglect to consider the actual argument, or even define our terms with any clarity.
Furthermore, we don’t take the time to examine the subtleties of context, and the particular senses in which a term can be employed. This leaves us full of narrow opinions at the expense of an open understanding.
For example, aren’t some people confident, while other people are cautious, and they stand in sharp opposition to one another? Let me be picky—how are they being confident or cautious, and with regard to what sorts of things?
I may feel quite optimistic about cycling for 26 miles, though rather apprehensive about my ability to run for 26 miles. I should be fearless in cuddling a kitten, leery of petting an alligator. These are distinctions, not contradictions.
Where we choose to be most careful in life depends on what we think to be the most decisive measure. Now while the person who defines his worth by the arrangement of his circumstances might be extremely cautious about how to invest his money, he is also tempted to become causally confident about any matters of character. After all, he believes, losing money could be catastrophic, but morals are really just about whims.
The Stoic, or any person who looks behind the impressions, will reverse the priorities; this is one of the reasons why he appears insane to the followers of the herd. He cares first for being a good man, and so he is extremely cautious in his principles, and about discerning right from wrong in his actions. Knowing this, he is able to be evenly confident about whatever may or may not happen to him, since he cares less about being a rich man.
Do you see what Epictetus just did there? He flipped it. Be judicious about what is within your power, and be carefree about what is beyond your power. Attend meticulously to the formation of the will, and accept the unfolding of events with ease. Indeed, it is precisely because of the former that the latter is possible.
Where do I find the good? That is where I ought to be cautious. How do I face what is indifferent? That is where I can accordingly be confident.
—Reflection written in 5/2001
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