But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and they are of a more dangerous nature; for these very disorders are the more offensive because they belong to the mind and disturb it; and the mind, when disordered, is, as Ennius says, in a constant error: it can neither bear nor endure anything, and is under the perpetual influence of desires.
Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two distempers of the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire?
But how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe for itself, when she it is who has invented the medicines for the body, when, with regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find that effect instantly; but those minds which are disposed to be cured, and submit to the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state?
Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure.
But as to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius, sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves: since that, indeed, I have been continually either disputing or writing on its most material branches, and I have laid down in these books all the discussions which took place between myself and my particular friends at my Tusculan villa.
But as I have spoken in the two former of pain and death, this book shall be devoted to the account of the third day of our disputations.
We came down into the Academy when the day was already declining towards afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose a subject for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on in this manner. . . .
Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two distempers of the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire?
But how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe for itself, when she it is who has invented the medicines for the body, when, with regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find that effect instantly; but those minds which are disposed to be cured, and submit to the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state?
Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure.
But as to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius, sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves: since that, indeed, I have been continually either disputing or writing on its most material branches, and I have laid down in these books all the discussions which took place between myself and my particular friends at my Tusculan villa.
But as I have spoken in the two former of pain and death, this book shall be devoted to the account of the third day of our disputations.
We came down into the Academy when the day was already declining towards afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose a subject for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on in this manner. . . .
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.3
I have repeatedly been assured that, after millennia of barbarism, modernity has cracked the problem of mental health. Sadly, my own experience does not support this claim. I believe that many in the field mean well, and yet the dominant model of the human person is fatally flawed.
The talk therapy is largely grounded in a sloppy relativism, and they don’t like it if you pry into the arguments behind the dogma. The drugs serve to numb the senses and thereby dull the mind, while the underlying consciousness remains neglected. The patient is considered cured when he conforms to certain social restrictions, and if he does not comply, he is threatened with what amounts to imprisonment.
No, I don’t think much has changed since the time of Cicero, even as there are some who take up the timeless challenge of treating the mind with its rightful dignity, not merely as a slab of flesh to be prodded and poked, or as a bundle of feelings to be rewarded and punished.
It is precisely because the mind stands at the very center of our human identity that its health is so critical, that upon which all other aspects of our lives depend. My own judgments will determine my sense of meaning and value, and so any other conditions will be interpreted through such a fundamental attitude.
Simply put, psychology, like the whole range of the arts and sciences, builds upon philosophy, whether explicitly or implicitly, and so I must begin with a sound philosophy before I can put some purpose back into my thinking and feeling.
Ennius didn’t need an advanced degree in psychology to say it, and Cicero didn’t need to be licensed therapist to understand it: when a man is unable to think his way through his misfortunes, and when he further becomes a slave to his passions, he suffers from the worst possible disease.
Once I cry out that there is no hope, or I insist that I cannot help myself in the way I act, I have already made any cure impossible—not even the greatest miracle of modern science can now mend me. I will need to know why, and I will need to find the will, to restore my soul.
I have repeatedly been assured that, after millennia of barbarism, modernity has cracked the problem of mental health. Sadly, my own experience does not support this claim. I believe that many in the field mean well, and yet the dominant model of the human person is fatally flawed.
The talk therapy is largely grounded in a sloppy relativism, and they don’t like it if you pry into the arguments behind the dogma. The drugs serve to numb the senses and thereby dull the mind, while the underlying consciousness remains neglected. The patient is considered cured when he conforms to certain social restrictions, and if he does not comply, he is threatened with what amounts to imprisonment.
No, I don’t think much has changed since the time of Cicero, even as there are some who take up the timeless challenge of treating the mind with its rightful dignity, not merely as a slab of flesh to be prodded and poked, or as a bundle of feelings to be rewarded and punished.
It is precisely because the mind stands at the very center of our human identity that its health is so critical, that upon which all other aspects of our lives depend. My own judgments will determine my sense of meaning and value, and so any other conditions will be interpreted through such a fundamental attitude.
Simply put, psychology, like the whole range of the arts and sciences, builds upon philosophy, whether explicitly or implicitly, and so I must begin with a sound philosophy before I can put some purpose back into my thinking and feeling.
Ennius didn’t need an advanced degree in psychology to say it, and Cicero didn’t need to be licensed therapist to understand it: when a man is unable to think his way through his misfortunes, and when he further becomes a slave to his passions, he suffers from the worst possible disease.
Once I cry out that there is no hope, or I insist that I cannot help myself in the way I act, I have already made any cure impossible—not even the greatest miracle of modern science can now mend me. I will need to know why, and I will need to find the will, to restore my soul.
Whatever outside assistance I receive, the source of my healing will have to rise up from the inside. There is no substitute for an intensive self-awareness when it comes to managing grief of mind.
—Reflection written in 9/1996
IMAGE: Luke Fildes, The Doctor (1891)
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