M. And let this be principally considered: that this bearing of pain, which I have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of the soul, should be the same in everything.
For you meet with many who, through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights, or their liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up under them; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a disease; for they did not support themselves under their former sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory.
Therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness like men; but the Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to be visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly spirit; and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle, but bemoan themselves in sickness.
For nothing can be consistent which has not reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led by inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an evil whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by virtue as quite to disappear.
And I would have you think of this night and day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune, especially if we have recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in our yesterday’s discussion; for, as if some God had advised a man who was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, “There is something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as it did Arion of Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops (who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. Cast away all fear.”
So, though your pains be ever so sharp and disagreeable, if the case is not such that it is worth your while to endure them, you see whither you may betake yourself. I think this will do for the present. But perhaps you still abide by your opinion.
A. Not in the least, indeed; and I hope I am freed by these two days’ discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded.
M. Tomorrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. But I see we must not drop our philosophy.
A. No, indeed; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the usual time.
M. It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable inclinations.
For you meet with many who, through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights, or their liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up under them; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a disease; for they did not support themselves under their former sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory.
Therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness like men; but the Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to be visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly spirit; and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle, but bemoan themselves in sickness.
For nothing can be consistent which has not reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led by inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an evil whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by virtue as quite to disappear.
And I would have you think of this night and day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune, especially if we have recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in our yesterday’s discussion; for, as if some God had advised a man who was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, “There is something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as it did Arion of Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops (who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. Cast away all fear.”
So, though your pains be ever so sharp and disagreeable, if the case is not such that it is worth your while to endure them, you see whither you may betake yourself. I think this will do for the present. But perhaps you still abide by your opinion.
A. Not in the least, indeed; and I hope I am freed by these two days’ discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded.
M. Tomorrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. But I see we must not drop our philosophy.
A. No, indeed; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the usual time.
M. It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable inclinations.
—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.27
Constancy, as opposed to caprice, is a mark of being guided by reason, as opposed to being at the mercy of impulse. Let me act with bravery whenever it is right, not merely whenever it is most gratifying.
I notice, for example, how many people are willing to endure pain when it will protect their riches or increase their fame, and yet they will run away when asked to stand up for the dignity of a stranger who can do nothing for them.
Similarly, there is much praise for physical courage, and very little concern for moral courage, out of an ignorance that the former is completely useless without the latter. The guy who’s so tough with himself when it comes to football is no longer so tough with himself when it comes to charity.
I must remember, it is only the virtue of fortitude if strength is in the service of conscience, and so the stability or the variability of man’s actions will reveal much about his deeper values. I am always pleasantly surprised by someone who publicly stands for the truth to a hostile crowd, just as readily as he privately commiserates with his sympathetic friends.
I have now been around long enough to hear politicians change their positions completely from one decade to the next. Once they are called out on this, they explain that their views have “evolved”. Now I’m all for learning and growing, though I will be more inclined to believe it when one of them forms a conviction that happens to go contrary to the prevailing fashion.
Whatever qualities we may admire, all of them must derive from philosophy, for anything of worth can only be understood by means of the very discipline that defines such worth. By focusing on such thoughts, I slowly but surely become as capable of facing torture at the hands of a tyrant as I am at enduring a toothache.
Cicero brings me back to the same principles Nature has been trying to teach me for so long, and yet I have often resisted her, because I would like to have my cake and eat it too. If I truly know where my priorities lie, then there is nothing that can do me any abiding harm. If my sincere goal is to always be the best man I can be, then this pain ceases to be a hindrance, and actually becomes a means for becoming better.
Whether the Stoics are correct in claiming pain is not an evil, or Cicero is correct in claiming it is a relatively insignificant evil, my conclusion still needs to be the same. As my judgment about the integrity of character increases, so my terror at the possibility of pain decreases. Once I foolishly insist it can’t be done, the limits of my estimation have already lowered the bar.
Arion preferred to throw himself into the sea than submit to pirates, and I should stick to my standards before I bow to convenience. I don’t necessarily expect dolphins to save me from drowning, but I can certainly be at peace with a job well done. The rewards are from what I recognize to be within my power.
For the next book, Cicero will turn to the more particular problem of mental suffering, which can often affect us far more deeply than any physical suffering . . . .
Constancy, as opposed to caprice, is a mark of being guided by reason, as opposed to being at the mercy of impulse. Let me act with bravery whenever it is right, not merely whenever it is most gratifying.
I notice, for example, how many people are willing to endure pain when it will protect their riches or increase their fame, and yet they will run away when asked to stand up for the dignity of a stranger who can do nothing for them.
Similarly, there is much praise for physical courage, and very little concern for moral courage, out of an ignorance that the former is completely useless without the latter. The guy who’s so tough with himself when it comes to football is no longer so tough with himself when it comes to charity.
I must remember, it is only the virtue of fortitude if strength is in the service of conscience, and so the stability or the variability of man’s actions will reveal much about his deeper values. I am always pleasantly surprised by someone who publicly stands for the truth to a hostile crowd, just as readily as he privately commiserates with his sympathetic friends.
I have now been around long enough to hear politicians change their positions completely from one decade to the next. Once they are called out on this, they explain that their views have “evolved”. Now I’m all for learning and growing, though I will be more inclined to believe it when one of them forms a conviction that happens to go contrary to the prevailing fashion.
Whatever qualities we may admire, all of them must derive from philosophy, for anything of worth can only be understood by means of the very discipline that defines such worth. By focusing on such thoughts, I slowly but surely become as capable of facing torture at the hands of a tyrant as I am at enduring a toothache.
Cicero brings me back to the same principles Nature has been trying to teach me for so long, and yet I have often resisted her, because I would like to have my cake and eat it too. If I truly know where my priorities lie, then there is nothing that can do me any abiding harm. If my sincere goal is to always be the best man I can be, then this pain ceases to be a hindrance, and actually becomes a means for becoming better.
Whether the Stoics are correct in claiming pain is not an evil, or Cicero is correct in claiming it is a relatively insignificant evil, my conclusion still needs to be the same. As my judgment about the integrity of character increases, so my terror at the possibility of pain decreases. Once I foolishly insist it can’t be done, the limits of my estimation have already lowered the bar.
Arion preferred to throw himself into the sea than submit to pirates, and I should stick to my standards before I bow to convenience. I don’t necessarily expect dolphins to save me from drowning, but I can certainly be at peace with a job well done. The rewards are from what I recognize to be within my power.
For the next book, Cicero will turn to the more particular problem of mental suffering, which can often affect us far more deeply than any physical suffering . . . .
—Reflection written in in 8/1996
IMAGE: William-Adolphe Bouguereau, Arion on a Sea Horse (1855)
_-_Arion_on_a_Sea_Horse_(1855).jpg)
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