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Saturday, September 3, 2022

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.5


A. Should this be the case, is it not to be feared that you are dressing up philosophy in false colors? For what stronger argument can there be that it is of little use than that some very profound philosophers live in a discreditable manner? 

 

M. That, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all the fields which are cultivated are not fruitful (and this sentiment of Accius is false, and asserted without any foundation,

 

“The ground you sow on is of small avail; 

To yield a crop good seed can never fail”), 

 

it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces fruit; and, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may be naturally fruitful, cannot produce a crop without dressing, so neither can the mind without education; such is the weakness of either without the other. 

 

Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this it is which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the receiving of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in the hope that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful harvest. Let us proceed, then, as we began. Say, if you please, what shall be the subject of our disputation. 

 

A. I look on pain to be the greatest of all evils.

 

M. What, even greater than infamy? 

 

A. I dare not indeed assert that; and I blush to think I am so soon driven from my ground.

 

M. You would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered in it; for what is so unbecoming—what can appear worse to you, than disgrace, wickedness, immorality? To avoid which, what pain is there which we ought not (I will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our own accord to encounter, and undergo, and even to court? 

 

A. I am entirely of that opinion; but, notwithstanding that pain is not the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil.

 

M. Do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you have given up on a small hint?

 

A. I see that plainly; but I should be glad to give up more of it.

 

M. I will endeavor to make you do so; but it is a great undertaking, and I must have a disposition on your part which is not inclined to offer any obstacles.

 

A. You shall have such: for as I behaved yesterday, so now I will follow reason wherever she leads. 


—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.5  

 

Besides growing some vegetables and herbs in a small backyard, to varying degrees of success, I cannot speak with any authority about agriculture. I deeply admire those who practice the art of farming, and I wish I understood more about how to put the pieces together; despite all my bourgeois pretensions, I do admit how a man who works the land has little need for fancy texts to get in touch with Nature. 

 

I don’t grasp the tricks involved, but I can see how a field of fertile soil is useless without the commitment to caring for it. So it is also with every other facet of life—where the environment is not properly nurtured, there will be no harvest. 

 

I hear all sorts of compliments given to young people, where the assumption is that the presence of such qualities is an assurance of success in scholarship. “He’s intelligent, confident, quick-witted, well-spoken, sophisticated, and professional—an ideal candidate for graduate studies.” 

 

Such attributes may help him play the academic game, though they won’t make him a philosopher. Did we ever bother to ask whether he is in love with the truth, driven to toil from morning to night in the service of wisdom? Is he willing to endure hardships and forgo luxuries for the sake of the smallest insight? That will make all the difference. 

 

Philosophers, of all people, should be able to distinguish between the conditions and the action, between the material and the efficient causes. What makes the philosopher is the way he decides to put his gifts to use. 

 

It will take that sort of intellectual dedication to tackle the problem of pain. When asked about their next topic, the Auditor immediately seizes upon the severity of suffering, and I am quite sympathetic. For all the things I may consider to be bad, however extensive the scale or penetrating the depth, nothing seems to have such a mighty effect on me as the power of pain. Whether it be physical or emotional, I feel an almost irrepressible urge to avoid it at all costs. 

 

Would I go so far as to say than pain is an even greater evil than infamy? My conscience might be greatly offended by such a claim, and yet my instincts are still begging me to flee from any prospects of hurt. Without the calming influence of reason, my passions would have me act without any reflection. 

 

Cicero’s simple question has already helped the Auditor to recognize how easily action without deliberate awareness can lead us astray. I too feel ashamed when I catch myself preferring comfort to integrity, and I suppose it is at least a good sign that I am able to correct my mistake after the fact, though it would be better if I could possess the habits to avoid the confusion from the start. 

 

Already, the second book is getting straight to a most fundamental philosophical dilemma: should my priority be in the merit of what I choose to do or in the quality of how I happen to feel? Is it vice or is it pain that is more dreadful? Put positively, is it virtue or is it pleasure that is most worthy? To comprehend the relationship between these aspects is a way to solving so many puzzles about the human condition, not just in theory but in daily practice. 

 

There are a number of impressions that fill me with abject terror, some of which I can explain, and others where I have not yet managed to unravel the causes. Once I permit my anxieties to take a hold of me, rather than working through them, I make myself a slave instead of a master. 

—Reflection written in 7/1996 

IMAGE: Hubert von Herkomer, Farm Workers Tilling and Sowing a Hillside (1885) 



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