Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.2

But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my Hortensius. And what I had to say in favor of the Academics, is, I think, explained with sufficient accuracy in my four books of the Academic Question.

 

But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against me, that it is what I most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having. 

 

Thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at such perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time. 

 

Let philosophy, then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us lend it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and refuted; and although those men may dislike such treatment who are bound and devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves wholly approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, can confute others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted ourselves without resentment. 

 

Besides, if these studies are ever brought home to us, we shall not want even Greek libraries, in which there is an infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of authors among them; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the same things which have been written by others, which serves no purpose but to stuff their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many apply themselves to this study. 

—from Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.2 

 

One of the reasons I have developed an admiration for Cicero is that his thinking is eclectic. He does not limit himself to this or that “school” of philosophy, but rather seeks out what he finds to be true in any and all of them. He does not succumb to what I call the bondage of the “-isms”, where a loyalty to narrow dogma hinders us from appreciating a wider truth, but rather is open to a broad range of possibilities, often to be taken in different senses. 

 

At the same time, he does not succumb to the opposing extreme of relativism, because he understands why philosophy demands sound thinking, and thereby provides the only firm foundation for all our actions. Where I cannot grasp the meaning of what I am doing, I’m not really doing much of anything at all. 

 

Much of my interest these days in in Stoicism, and yet I think it would be foolish to limit myself only to Stoicism, or to reject the wisdom of any other traditions. A greater harmony can be found far more often than I might initially believe. If it happens to be true, it shouldn’t matter where I happened to find it. So, some Stoics are shocked to learn of my love for Aquinas, and some Thomists are aghast at my admiration for Wittgenstein. 

 

While the Tusculan Disputations have a strong Stoic influence, to be sure, one particular way in which Cicero diverges from that creed is in his appreciation of certain aspects of Academic skepticism. 

 

There would be enough material for a whole shelf of books here, but in the simplest of terms, the Stoic stress on “grasping” a certainty in impressions (katalepsis) is contrasted by the Academic stress on accepting that our knowledge will only be more or less likely. A firm direct realism is countered by an emphasis on moderate doubt. 

 

Can I know for sure? For the Stoic it can be done with great effort, and for the Academic it can merely be approached by degrees. 

 

Whatever our own conclusions on the matter, I would suggest that Cicero’s sort of skepticism is quite healthy, and hardly destructive. It reflects his greater intent of taking in multiple points of view, balancing them against one another, and then holding to the most probable solution. 

 

Accordingly, there need be no bitterness or animosity in the act of philosophical discourse. Sadly, far too many in intellectual circles find a pleasure in combat, yet that need not be our concern; our only concern should be to employ the dialectic to discover a shared awareness that can get the job done. 

 

Don’t let the partisan pundits get you down. Those who are immovable in their opinions will always put the conclusion before the evidence, instead of the evidence before the conclusion. 

 

Rome was always known for the high quality of its rhetoric, and it was Cicero’s hope that the great city might also become brilliant in its philosophy. Just as good orators can debate, while still remaining respectful to one another, so good philosophers can dispute, while still remaining united in a common goal of happiness. 

 

Having more books, or the oldest books, or the newest books, makes little difference. To deal with the pains of life calls for a more comprehensive and a far more forgiving awareness. 

—Reflection written in 7/1996