Chuang Tzu 2.3

If we were to follow the judgments of the predetermined mind, who would be left alone and without a teacher? Not only would it be so with those who know the sequences of knowledge and feeling and make their own selection among them, but it would be so as well with the stupid and unthinking. 

For one who has not this determined mind, to have his affirmations and negations is like the case described in the saying, "He went to Yüeh to-day, and arrived at it yesterday." It would be making what was not a fact to be a fact. But even the spirit-like Yü could not have known how to do this, and how should one like me be able to do it? 

But speech is not like the blowing of the wind; the speaker has a meaning in his words. If, however, what he says, be indeterminate as from a mind not made up, does he then really speak or not? He thinks that his words are different from the chirpings of fledgelings; but is there any distinction between them or not? 

But how can the Tâo be so obscured, that there should be "a True" and "a False" in it? How can speech be so obscured that there should be "the Right" and "the Wrong" about them? Where shall the Tâo go to that it will not be found? Where shall speech be found that it will be inappropriate? 

Tâo becomes obscured through the small comprehension of the mind, and speech comes to be obscure through the vain-gloriousness of the speaker. So it is that we have the contentions between the Literati and the Mohists, the one side affirming what the other denies, and vice versa. If we would decide on their several affirmations and denials, no plan is like bringing the proper light of the mind to bear on them. 

All subjects may be looked at from two points of view—from that and from this. If I look at a thing from another's point of view, I do not see it; only as I know it myself, do I know it. 

Hence it is said, "That view comes from this; and this view is a consequence of that," which is the theory that that view and this—the opposite views—produce each the other. 

Although it be so, there is affirmed now life and now death; now death and now life; now the admissibility of a thing and now its inadmissibility; now its inadmissibility and now its admissibility. The disputants now affirm and now deny; now deny and now affirm. Therefore the sagely man does not pursue this method, but views things in the light of his Heavenly nature, and hence forms his judgment of what is right. 

This view is the same as that, and that view is the same as this. But that view involves both a right and a wrong; and this view involves also a right and a wrong—are there indeed, or are there not the two views, that and this? 

They have not found their point of correspondency which is called the pivot of the Tâo. As soon as one finds this pivot, he stands in the center of the ring of thought, where he can respond without end to the changing views—without end to those affirming, and without end to those denying. 

Therefore I said, "There is nothing like the proper light of the mind."