Epictetus, Discourses 1.8.5

You ask me, do I then count these faculties as of no effect?

 

Heaven forbid! No more than I ignore the faculty of vision. 

 

Nevertheless, if you ask me what is the true good of man, I can only say to you that it lies in a certain disposition of the will.

 

Perhaps it is peculiar to my own experience, but I find that, right behind appealing to unclear terms, the next most common mistake in thinking is the assumption of a false dichotomy. It’s bad enough that I might not even be able to define what I am talking about, and then I compound the error by insisting on contradictions where none need to be present. 

 

“Ignatz, do you love me more than Imogen?”

 

“I don’t love you any more or any less than I love Imogen.”

 

“Hah! I knew you didn’t love me!”

 

So when Epictetus says that training in logic isn’t the most important part of being a philosopher, the rationalist may see red, and he takes it as a claim that dialectic is unimportant. A red herring can’t be far behind. As a rationalist, he should know better. 

 

It certainly matters, for example, if we are able to see, and yet what matters more will be what we choose to do with what we see. You can show me all sorts of wondrous things, but it won’t make any real difference unless I decide to engage them. The eye is only as good as the hand that follows through. 

 

The skills of reasoning provide the form, while actions make up the content—thinking well is ordered toward living well. The most profound reflections and sublime demonstrations are empty without putting them into practice. 

 

In middle school, I had a teacher who was understandably growing frustrated with my newfound adolescent stubbornness, and she constantly had to remind me to complete the simplest of tasks. 

 

“Yes, I know, I know!” was always my reply. 

 

One day she looked at me firmly but calmly and gave me an excellent lesson. “If you really knew, you would already be doing something about it.”

 

To put the mind in service to our conduct is not to deny it or to denigrate it; each piece of us has its crucial part to play, but ultimately a man is defined by his convictions working through his deeds. The true philosopher commits himself to being a good man, not just a smart man—he wills what he understands. 

Written in 11/2000