Just as it is possible to interchange terms which are equivalent to one another, so and in just as many ways it is allowable to vary in argument the types of disputative argument and enthymeme.
Take for instance this kind of argument: “If you borrowed and did not repay, you owe me the money. You did not borrow without repaying; therefore, you do not owe me the money.”
And the philosopher above all others is the proper person to handle such arguments with skill. For if enthymeme is imperfect syllogism, plainly he who is trained in perfect syllogism would be equally capable in dealing with imperfect.
Having argued, in the previous chapter, that the ability to reason soundly is critical to the good life, Epictetus will now warn us that there can also be grave dangers in committing ourselves to the study of logic.
Is he somehow backpedaling here? Hardly, since, like any good Stoic, Epictetus understands that the value in any human exercise will be in how well it assists us with the formation of character.
Have you studied hard to become a lawyer, or learned to play the guitar like a real virtuoso, or uncovered some hidden secret of the sciences? What will be the point if you don’t employ it to be a better person?
It will be no different with the skills of formal thinking. I have spent a good number of years in the company of philosophy students, and most of them are deeply intelligent. The historians are like walking encyclopedias of citations, and the logicians are fluent in the most complex of proofs.
Yet what impresses me the most, and what brings me the greatest joy, is when I run across that one in the bunch who is a genuinely decent huma being, a true mensch. There is the fellow who knows how to put his philosophy to proper use!
When ordered toward the right end, a familiarity with different forms of arguments, and the variety of ways we might go about expressing them, is a powerful means for distinguishing wisdom from sophistry.
Many of us are barely aware, for example, how regularly we assume the definition of a certain term, or don’t explicitly state a premise in a demonstration, and the good philosopher will have the knack to spot such instances.
Sometimes, of course, there is no harm done, since we are just abbreviating what we think is abundantly clear. At other times, however, we are being lazy, or perhaps even deliberately manipulative. It will take a sharp mind to catch the difference.
Logicians call it an enthymeme when a step in an argument is passed over, as in the example above. It makes complete sense, and yet there is something taken for granted, that a debt is something that should be repaid to begin with.
I recall this version from my childhood: “Don’t do that, it’s stupid!” Quite often, I may have seen that it was stupid, but it might have helped to be reminded that I shouldn’t be doing stupid things from the get-go.
No comments:
Post a Comment