Epictetus, Discourses 1.7.4

In a word, if they remain to the end as we granted them, we are absolutely bound to remain by our concessions and accept what follows the premises; if, on the other hand, they do not remain as they were granted, we are also absolutely bound to abandon the concession and no longer to accept what is inconsistent with the premises; for since we have abandoned our agreement as to the premises, this inference which is drawn no longer concerns us or touches us. 

 

We must then examine into premises of this sort and into such changes and alterations in them, by which they are changed in the actual process of question or answer or syllogism or the like, and so afford occasion to the foolish to be troubled because they do not see the sequence of the argument. 

 

Why must we do so? That in this sphere we may do what is fitting by avoiding what is random or confused in argument.

 

And we ought to do the same with hypotheses and hypothetical arguments. For it is necessary sometimes to assume a hypothesis as a step to the next argument. 

 

Must we then concede every given hypothesis or not? And if not every one, which? And, having conceded it, must we abide by it once for all and maintain it, or are we sometimes to abandon it, and are we to accept what follows from it and reject what conflicts with it?

 

“Yes.”

 

To say that we can refine or alter the premises we work from is not a rejection of the truth, but rather an admission that our own awareness of the truth ought to develop and improve. We are the ones who are changing, to conform more fully to what is real. 

 

The very process of learning involves becoming clearer in our apprehension of terms, more accurate in our assertion of judgments, and more orderly in our demonstration of conclusions. 

 

Have I held a falsehood as if it were true? Then I am obliged to correct myself, and to begin again. I have often found that obstinacy in an error is far more harmful than any accidental mistake; let me humbly admit where my thinking has gone wrong, and then I can also start doing better with the consequent living. There is a certain strength in that, not a weakness. 

 

We unwittingly erect so many stumbling blocks when we vaguely define our terms, and we then further stray from the path by taking false premises for granted. I can find myself frustrated when I observe how easily others don’t reflect on first principles, but all I really need is to feel a bit of shame for how often I do it myself. 

 

Here I am, making all sorts of specific decisions about this or that thing in my life as being beneficial or harmful, and the entire time I have a flawed estimation of what constitutes the good to begin with. I make demands about my many human needs, and yet I cannot properly explain what it even means to be human. 

 

If I don’t start from the right place, I won’t end up in the right place. Best to go back and fix that. 

 

In running that unending rat race, I may assume that money, or pleasure, or reputation are the highest goals, and there is the problem with assuming. I pick all my means to achieve those ends, and I find myself miserable, not because I have failed in my work, but because I have failed to work for the best purpose. It was my use of false premises that got me into the mess. 

 

If I can find the courage to change my mind, I can then also find the courage to change my ways. 

 

This is why considering hypothetical arguments, where different alternatives are followed through to their conclusions, can be of such great assistance. To correctly play the devil’s advocate is not an act of malice, but an opportunity for a broader awareness.

 

Comparing and contrasting opposing points of view, examining them all but not initially committing to any, provides for a greater certainty when it finally becomes time to tie down our convictions.

Written in 10/2000