Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy 5.9

“And, further, I cannot approve of an argument by which some men think that they can cut this knot; for they say that a result does not come to pass for the reason that Providence has foreseen it, but the opposite rather, namely, that because it is about to come to pass, therefore it cannot be hidden from God's Providence.

“In that way it seems to me that the argument must resolve itself into an argument on the other side. For in that case it is not necessary that that should happen which is foreseen, but that that which is about to happen should be foreseen; as though, indeed, our doubt was whether God's foreknowledge is the certain cause of future events, or the certainty of future events is the cause of Providence.

“But let our aim be to prove that, whatever be the shape which this series of causes takes, the fulfilment of God's foreknowledge is necessary, even if this knowledge may not seem to induce the necessity for the occurrence of future events. For instance, if a man sits down, it must be that the opinion, which conjectures that he is sitting, is true; but conversely, if the opinion concerning the man is true because he is sitting, he must be sitting down. There is therefore necessity in both cases: the man must be sitting, and the opinion must be true. But he does not sit because the opinion is true, but rather the opinion is true because his sitting down has preceded it.

“Thus, though the cause of the truth of the opinion proceeds from the other fact, yet there is a common necessity on both parts. In like manner we must reason of Providence and future events. For even though they are foreseen because they are about to happen, yet they do not happen because they are foreseen. None the less it is necessary that either what is about to happen should be foreseen of God, or that what has been foreseen should happen; and this alone is enough to destroy all free will.”

—from Book 5, Prose 3

I can’t help but admire how thorough Boethius’ entire objection is, such a far cry from the thoughtless determinism I see around me far too often. He doesn’t merely take things for granted, or avoid his own responsibility by passing it on to greater powers; he genuinely wishes to understand if human freedom can possibly exist in the presence of any kind of omniscience.

Now the problem may arise from assuming that we somehow have to act because God knows what we will do, when the reverse could also be true, that God knows what we will do because we decide to act. This could seemingly retain our free choice within God’s perfect awareness, by pointing out that the certitude of the latter proceeds from the liberty of the former.

But notice how we are still speaking in terms of what is certain, what has to be, and the fact that Providence is absolutely necessary, having within it no possibility of error or contingency, is really what is getting in the way.

In other words, it hardly matters if we bicker about whether the egg came before the chicken or the chicken came before the egg. The unavoidable fact seems to be that if God knows it, He knows it without a doubt.

I can talk all I want about how my own judgments were the cause behind it turning out the way it did, and that still doesn’t get around the final inevitability of it all. There is no other way it could ever turn out. It is written in stone, in whatever way I speak of it, and so it will come to pass, however much I may object or try to take it back.

Though the scale and degree are obviously rather different, it would be a bit like someone telling me he has written a brilliant computer program, one capable of calculating all the relevant variables, and thereby able to predict all of my actions.

I protest, of course, and insist that I’m the one in charge, that I am following my own way, however clever his technology and programming might be. Of all the nerve!

Yet when it’s properly put to the test, it turns out that the program manages to forecast every move I make, long before I come to a particular decision. It’s uncanny, seemingly to be known better than I know myself.

This imaginary computer is not God, of course, and its scope could never be omniscient, but it offers a similar challenge. Where is the freedom, if it has already been prophesied? This is the troubling problem of foreknowledge.

Written in 1/2016