Boethius, The Consolation 3.33

. . . “It is plain that the others have some relation to the good. It is for that reason, namely because it is held to be good, that this satisfaction is sought, and power likewise, and the others too; we may suppose the same of veneration, renown, and pleasure.

“The good then is the cause of the desire for all of these, and their consummation also. Such a thing as has in itself no real or even pretended good, cannot ever be sought.

“On the other hand, such things as are not by nature good, but seem to be so, are sought as though they were truly good. Wherefore we may justly believe that their good quality is the cause of the desire for them, the very hinge on which they turn, and their consummation.

“The really important object of a desire, is that for the sake of which anything is sought, as a means. For instance, if a man wishes to ride for the sake of his health, he does not so much desire the motion of riding, as the effect, namely health. As, therefore, each of these things is desired for the sake of the good, the absolute good is the aim, rather than themselves.

“But we have agreed that the other things are desired for the sake of happiness, wherefore in this case too, it is happiness alone which is the object of the desire. Wherefore it is plain that the essence of the good and of happiness is one and the same.”

“I cannot see how anyone can think otherwise.”

''But we have shown that God and true happiness are one and the same?”

“Yes.”

“Therefore,” said she, “we may safely conclude that the essence of God also lies in the absolute good and nowhere else.”

—from Book 3, Prose 10

So when it comes to happiness, I need to stop thinking of it as collecting a whole bunch of different pieces from here and there. I should rather recognize that there is only one complete and perfect whole, leaving nothing more to be desired.

Once again, I think back to the shopping list of happiness, and I can admit more and more how truly ridiculous that all sounds. Give me as much money as I may need, and then also a secure position, and then add a healthy pinch of influence, and then mix in a fine reputation with others. Oh, and I almost forgot, sprinkle it with plenty of pleasure, because nothing tastes any good if there isn’t lots of fun to go along with it!

I may believe all of these things to be desirable, yet the whole time I am only looking at them individually. Note also how I may worry that I have left out some important ingredient, which actually reveals that I don’t really understand what makes the recipe. I am failing to ask myself what the common quality really is, the single good that I mysteriously attribute to all of the components, even as I am clueless as to what really defines it.

A shared term refers to something held in common, not many things that have nothing in common. A dog, a cat, a cow, and a horse are all mammals, types of animals that possess certain properties. When we similarly say that wealth, and power, and honor, and pleasure are good things, what is really the same about all of them?

That we consider them all to be good is, after all, precisely why we say we want them. In this sense, the fact that they are good is the very cause of their desirability, and if we no longer perceived anything good in them, they would cease to entice us. But don’t we sometimes pursue bad things? Yes, but only because we mistakenly see some benefit in them.

All actions are directed to this good, that happiness for the sake of which we do anything we do. The different means all point to the common end. I want a job so I can make money, and I want money so I can buy things, and I want to buy things so. . . I can be happy? Notice how I may not be thinking through the progression from the means to the end as carefully as I should.

Why ride a horse? Some people may do so, as Boethius suggests, for their health, though others may do so because they are herding cattle, or because they are trying to win a race, or simply because they love animals. Whatever the particular reason, they have a higher goal in mind, that it will somehow make them happy.

I may still only be taking baby steps here, but if I recognize that the highest good is happiness, I can also identify these two terms with another term. God is the highest good, and God is happiness. Here again is that one common thing, which nothing greater can be conceived, and even as we may give it all sorts of names, it still ends up being the same thing.

I may not always be aware that I am really seeking God as my final end, and I may even vehemently deny it; I may insist I’m quite content with all these far more practical things, like a career, or getting the kids into a fancy college, or a relaxing fishing trip. Yet I still want them for their goodness, which is simply a finite expression of an infinite cause.

I once had a very romantic and poetic friend, who was sipping a glass of fine whiskey, and smoking a fat cigar. As he wallowed in the glow of it all, he went off on a rambling monologue. It was quite amusing to listen to him, but also quite profound:

“. . . So I am only now realizing that I always wanted love in my life, but I didn’t know I wanted it, so I tried all other sorts of things to take its place, but they weren’t really love, now were they? After all, love is all we need, and they say God is love!”

He paused for a moment, his mouth hung open, and he almost dropped his cigar.

“Wait, have I been wanting God this whole time? Oh crap!” 

Written in 9/2015