Epictetus on Friendship 6

For this reason if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured: but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way being borne down by the weight of interest.

 For where the ‘I’ and the ‘Mine’ are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines: if in the flesh, there is the ruling power: if in the will, it is there: and if it is in externals, it is there.

If then I am there where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and father; for this will he my interest, to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active cooperation, of observing my relations.

But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that which opinion holds to be honest.

—Epictetus, Discourses 2.22, tr Long

Self-interest can easily be misunderstood. We have already seen Epictetus say that it is natural for human beings, as it is for all living things, to desire what is good for themselves. Now only a certain type of person will immediately assume that what is good for himself is at odds with what is good for others, but self-interest is not the same thing as selfishness.

The Stoic looks at human nature, and sees that we are creatures of mind and will, which means that the perfection of that nature is to know what is true and to love what is good. We are ordered toward the purpose of living and acting in accordance with wisdom and virtue.

To act according to wisdom and virtue is to see that one’s own good is in harmony with the good of others, and the good of all of the order of Nature. My own good is not in conflict with the good of any of other thing, but rather is a very part of the good of the whole of each and every thing.

It is a false dichotomy, therefore, to believe that my good and the good of another are ever in opposition. I help myself to live well precisely by helping others to live well. This is why Epictetus says that self-interest combines together sanctity, goodness, country, parents, and friends. It is only when I start separating one of these from the other that self-interest becomes selfishness.

Where will I place what defines me? Where I place my very identity will determine what I consider to rule above all else in my life. Will I place it in the body? Then I will make pleasure and gratification my goal. Will I place it in externals? Then I will make wealth and reputation my goal.

In either of those cases, I will make all other things relative to those goals. I will, like Epicurus, make right and wrong relative to my pleasure, or I will, like Thrasymachus, make right and wrong relative to my worldly power. Down this path lies the struggle between self and others, and either one will make true friendship impossible.

But if place my very identity in the goodness of my own will, then the good of all things, combined and united together as a whole, will be my goal. I can practice faithfulness, modesty, self-control, cooperation with others, and good relations. Now I can start to be a true friend. 

Written on 2/2002

Image: Hermann Kern, "Good Friends" (1904)