" 'But it might be something of the kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap up his head while a horse was running which he favored; and when contrary to expectation the horse won, he required sponges to recover from his fainting fit.
. . . " 'What then is the thing which moved? The exact discussion of this does not belong to the present occasion perhaps; but it is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philosophers say is true, that we must not look for it anywhere without, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not saying something, of being elated or depressed, of avoiding anything or pursuing: the very thing which is now the cause to me and to you, to you of coming to me and sitting and hearing, and to me of saying what I do say. And what is this? Is it any other than our will to do so?'
" 'No other.'
" 'But if we had willed otherwise, what else should we have been doing than that which we willed to do?
" 'This, then, was the cause of Achilles' lamentation, not the death of Patroclus; for another man does not behave thus on the death of his companion; but it was because he chose to do so.
" 'And to you this was the very cause of your then running away, that you chose to do so; and on the other side, if you should stay with her, the reason will be the same.
" 'And now you are going to Rome because you choose; and if you should change your mind, you will not go thither. And in a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the kind is the cause of our doing anything or not doing; but our own opinions and our wills.' " . . .
--Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 11 (tr Long)
So what was happening in the Magistrate's thinking? Was it pain, fear, uncertainty, anxiety? Whatever passion had consumed him, we can certainly know two things: it was he who allowed the passion to rule him, and it is therefore only within his own judgment and will that we will find the cause of abandoning his daughter.
But surely it is the actions of others, and the circumstances of our fortune, that move us back and forth between joy and misery? These things do indeed push at the outside of us, and sometimes with great weight, but it is only the will that decides what it will do with its conditions. It is we who decide what we do with what is given to us.
Achilles, for example, did not suffer because of the loss of Patroclus; he took the death of Patroclus, and chose to let himself suffer loss. How differently they heroic history of the Greeks and Trojans would have been if but one man had not allowed himself to be ruled by his sadness and rage.
From the very great to the very small, how much different my own life would be if I had not willed my own grief or despair. One might express this even more fully and positively: how much better any life can still be when it chooses to rule itself. Nothing hinders us but our own choices, not the past, the present, or the future.
Like the Magistrate, or like Achilles, I might like to blame the world. The world will be what it is, regardless of myself. But what I am quite able to do is to determine my own response, and how I choose to cope with my circumstances and passions.
I can understand anyone feel as he does when he suffers pain. I can now also choose to understand that my own actions are within my power to will. This may change nothing or no one buy myself, but that is all it needs to change.
Written in 11/2002
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