Living with Nature 1

"When he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances.

" 'Miserable,' the man said.

"Then Epictetus asked, 'In what respect? for men do not marry and beget children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy.'

 " 'But I,' the man replied, 'am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered.'

"' Well then,' said Epictetus, 'do you think that you acted right?'

 " 'I acted naturally,' the man replied.

" 'But convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything which takes place according to nature takes place rightly.' "

" 'This is the case,' said the man, 'with all or at least most fathers.'

" 'I do not deny that: but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behavior is right; for in respect to this matter we must say that tumors also come for the good of the body, because they do come; and generally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then how your behavior is natural?'

" 'I cannot,'  he said; 'but do you rather show me how it is not according to nature and is not rightly done.'

--Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 11 (tr Long)

I dare not point fingers. I have been as guilty as the next.  We dispose of those who are inconvenient to us.

When a friend who has amused me, even for years and years, ceases to be amusing, he suddenly ceases to be my friend.

When a lover is no longer as enticing as she once was, she is tossed aside. Find a new one.

When a person is too weak or old, I will lock him up where someone else can take care of him. The problem is no longer mine.

 When a child is inconvenient or unwanted, I will dispose of him. That is my choice.

When I have a worker who is going through hard times, and not as productive as I wish him to be,  I will fire him. It's just business, and not personal, of course. 

Let us not assume malice each and every time we run away from others. The Magistrate Epictetus is speaking to hardly seems a bad man. He is deeply troubled, in great pain, and he runs away from his pain. We can understand why he does it, but we need not agree with what he does.

Is it natural to run from what is painful? Is that the same thing as doing what is right? Most of us will do what is easy, convenient, or expedient. Is that always the right thing to do?

Consider the relationship of Nature and morality. If these two aren't in harmony, what could we possibly mean by either? The Magistrate means by Nature, of course, what most of us think as convention and custom. That isn't morality.  That is simple utility.

Written in 11/2002