TEXT: Diogenes Laërtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book 3: The Platonists (tr C.D. Yonge)

Diogenes Laërtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, 

Book 3: The Platonists (tr C.D. Yonge, 1895)

LIFE OF PLATO.

I. Plato was the son of Ariston and Perictione or Potone, and a citizen
of Athens; and his mother traced her family back to Solon; for Solon
had a brother named Dropidas, who had a son named Critias, who was
the father of Callæschrus, who was the father of that Critias who was
one of the thirty tyrants, and also of Glaucon, who was the father of
Charmides and Perictione. And she became the mother of Plato by her
husband Ariston, Plato being the sixth in descent from Solon. And Solon
traced his pedigree up to Neleus and Neptune. They say too that on the
father’s side, he was descended from Codrus, the son of Melanthus, and
they too are said by Thrasylus to derive their origin from Neptune. And
Speusippus, in his book which is entitled the Funeral Banquet of Plato,
and Clearchus in his Panegyric on Plato, and Anaxilides in the second
book of his History of Philosophers, say that the report at Athens was
that Perictione was very beautiful, and that Ariston endeavoured to
violate her and did not succeed; and that he, after he had desisted from
his violence saw a vision of Apollo in a dream, in consequence of which
he abstained from approaching his wife till after her confinement.

II. And Plato was born, as Apollodorus says in his Chronicles, in the
eighty-eighth Olympiad, on the seventh day of the month Thargelion, on
which day the people of Delos say that Apollo also was born. And he died,
as Hermippus says, at a marriage feast, in the first year of the hundred
and eighth Olympiad, having lived eighty-one years. But Neanthes says
that he was eighty-four years of age at his death. He is then younger
than Isocrates by six years; for Isocrates was born in the archonship of
Lysimachus, and Plato in that of Aminias, in which year Pericles died.

III. And he was of the borough of Colytus, as Antileon tells us in
his second book on Dates. And he was born, according to some writers,
in Ægina, in the house of Phidiades the son of Thales, as Phavorinus
affirms in his Universal History, as his father had been sent thither
with several others as a settler, and returned again to Athens when the
settlers were driven out by the Lacedæmonians, who came to the assistance
of the Æginetans. And he served the office of choregus at Athens, when
Dion was at the expense of the spectacle exhibited, as Theodorus relates
in the eighth book of his Philosophical Conversations.

IV. And he had brothers, whose names were Adimantus and Glaucon, and a
sister called Potone, who was the mother of Speusippus.

V. And he was taught learning in the school of Dionysius, whom he
mentions in his Rival Lovers. And he learnt gymnastic exercises under
the wrestler Ariston of Argos. And it was by him that he had the name
of Plato given to him instead of his original name, on account of his
robust figure, as he had previously been called Aristocles, after the
name of his grandfather, as Alexander informs us in his Successions. But
some say that he derived this name from the breadth (πλατύτης) of his
eloquence, or else because he was very wide (πλατὺς) across the forehead,
as Neanthes affirms. There are some also, among whom is Dicæarchus in the
first volume on Lives, who say that he wrestled at the Isthmian games.

VI. It is also said that he applied himself to the study of painting, and
that he wrote poems, dithyrambics at first, and afterwards lyric poems
and tragedies.

VII. But he had a very weak voice, they say; and the same fact is stated
by Timotheus the Athenian, in his book on Lives. And it is said that
Socrates in a dream saw a cygnet on his knees, who immediately put forth
feathers, and flew up on high, uttering a sweet note, and that the next
day Plato came to him, and that he pronounced him the bird which he had
seen.

VIII. And he used to philosophize at first in the Academy, and afterwards
in the garden near Colonus, as Alexander tells us in his Successions,
quoting the testimony of Heraclitus; and subsequently, though he was
about to contend for the prize in tragedy in the theatre of Bacchus,
after he had heard the discourse of Socrates, he learnt his poems,
saying:—

    Vulcan, come here; for Plato wants your aid.

And from henceforth, as they say, being now twenty years old, he became a
pupil of Socrates. And when he was gone, he attached himself to Cratylus,
the disciple of Heraclitus, and to Hermogenes, who had adopted the
principles of Parmenides. Afterwards, when he was eight and twenty years
of age, as Hermodorus tells us, he withdrew to Megara to Euclid, with
certain others of the pupils of Socrates; and subsequently, he went to
Cyrene to Theodorus the mathematician; and from thence he proceeded to
Italy to the Pythagoreans, Philolaus and Eurytus, and from thence he went
to Eurytus to the priests there; and having fallen sick at that place, he
was cured by the priests by the application of sea water, in reference to
which he said:—

    The sea doth wash away all human evils.

And he said too, that, according to Homer, all the Egyptians were
physicians. Plato had also formed the idea of making the acquaintance of
the Magi; but he abandoned it on account of the wars in Asia.

IX. And when he returned to Athens, he settled in the Academy, and that
is a suburban place of exercise planted like a grove, so named from an
ancient hero named Hecademus, as Eupolis tells us in his Discharged
Soldiers.

    In the well-shaded walks, protected well
    By Godlike Academus.

And Timon, with reference to Plato, says:—

    A man did lead them on, a strong stout man,
    A honeyed speaker, sweet as melody
    Of tuneful grasshopper, who, seated high
    On Hecademus’ tree, unwearied sings.

For the word academy was formerly spelt with E. Now our philosopher
was a friend of Isocrates; and Praxiphanes composed an account of a
conversation which took place between them, on the subject of poets, when
Isocrates was staying with Plato in the country.

X. And Aristoxenus says that he was three times engaged in military
expeditions; once against Tanagra; the second time against Corinth,
and the third time at Delium; and that in the battle of Delium he
obtained the prize of pre-eminent valour. He combined the principles of
the schools of Heraclitus, and Pythagoras and Socrates; for he used
to philosophize on those things which are the subjects of sensation,
according to the system of Heraclitus; on those with which intellect is
conversant, according to that of Pythagoras; and on politics according to
that of Socrates.

XI. And some people, (of whom Satyrus is one,) say that he sent a
commission to Sicily to Dion, to buy him three books of Pythagoras from
Philolaus for a hundred minæ; for they say that he was in very easy
circumstances, having received from Dionysius more than eighty talents,
as Onetor also asserts in his treatise which is entitled, Whether a wise
Man ought to acquire Gains.

XII. And he was much assisted by Epicharmus the comic poet, a great part
of whose works he transcribed, as Alcimus says in his essays addressed
to Amyntas, of which there are four. And in the first of them he speaks
as follows:—“And Plato appears to utter a great many of the sentiments
of Epicharmus. Let us just examine. Plato says that that is an object
of sensation, which is never stationary either as to its quality or its
quantity, but which is always flowing and changing; as, for instance,
if one take from any objects all number, then one cannot affirm that
they are either equal, or of any particular things, or of what quality
or quantity they are. And these things are of such a kind that they
are always being produced, but that they never have any invariable
substances.”

But that is a subject for intellect from which nothing is taken, and
to which nothing is added. And this is the nature of things eternal,
which is always similar and the same. And, indeed, Epicharmus speaks
intelligibly on the subject of what is perceived by the senses and by the
intellect:—

    _A._ But the great Gods were always present, nor
         Did they at any moment cease to be;
         And their peculiar likeness at all times
         Do they retain, by the same principles.

    _B._ Yet chaos is asserted to have been
         The first existent Deity.

    _A._                 How can that be?
         For ’tis impossible that we should find
         Any first principle arise from anything.

    _B._ Is there then no first principle at all?

    _A._ Nor second either in the things we speak of;
         But thus it is—if to an even number,
         Or e’en an odd one, if you so prefer it,
         You add a unit, or if you deduct one,
         Say will the number still remain the same?

    _B._ Certainly not.

    _A._                 So, if you take a measure
         A cubit long, and add another cubit,
         Or cut a portion off, the measure then
         No longer is the same?

    _B._                 Of course it is not.

    _A._ Now turn your eyes and thoughts upon mankind—
         We see one grows, another perishes
         So that they all exist perpetually
         In a condition of transition. That
         Whose nature changes must be different
         At each successive moment, from the thing
         It was before. So also, you and I
         Are different people now from what we were
         But yesterday; and then, again, to-morrow
         We shall be different from what we’re now;
         So that, by the same rule, we’re always different.

And Alcimus speaks as follows:—“The wise men say that the soul perceives
some things by means of the body, as for instance, when it hears and
sees; but that it also perceives something by its own power, without
availing itself at all of the assistance of the body.” On which account
existent things are divisible into objects of sensation and objects of
understanding. On account of which Plato used to say, that those who
wished to become acquainted with the principles of everything, ought
first of all to divide the ideas as he calls them, separately, such as
similarity, and unity, and multitude, and magnitude, and stationariness,
and motion. And secondly, that they ought to form a notion of the
honourable and the good, and the just, and things of that sort, by
themselves, apart from other considerations. And thirdly, that they
ought to ascertain the character of such ideas as are relative to one
another, such as knowledge, or magnitude, or authority; considering that
the things which come under our notice from partaking of their nature,
have the same names that they have. I mean that one calls that just which
partakes of the just; and that beautiful which partakes of the beautiful.
And each of these primary species is eternal, and is to be understood
by the intellect, and is not subject to the influence of external
circumstances. On which account he says, that ideas exist in nature as
models; and that all other things are like them, and, as it were, copies
of them. Accordingly Epicharmus speaks thus about the good, and about the
ideas.

    _A._ Tell me, is flute-playing now a thing at all?

    _B._ Of course it is.

    _A._                 Is man then flute-playing?

    _B._ No, nothing of the sort.

    _A._                 Well, let us see—
         What is a flute-player? what think you now
         Of him—is he a man, or is he not?

    _B._ Of course he is a man.

    _A._                 Think you not then
         The case is just the same about the good.
         That the good is something by itself, intrinsic
         And he who’s learnt, does at once become
         Himself a good man? just as he who’s learnt
         Flute-playing is a flute-player; or dancing,
         A dancer; weaving, a weaver. And in short,
         Whoever learns an art, does not become
         The art itself, but just an artist in it.

Plato, in his theory of Ideas, says, “That since there is such a thing
as memory, the ideas are in existent things, because memory is only
conversant about what is stable and enduring; and that no other thing
is durable except ideas, for in what way,” he continues, “could animals
be preserved, if they had no ideas to guide them, and if, in addition
to them, they had not an intellect given to them by nature?” But as it
is they recollect similitudes, and also their food, so as to know what
kind of food is fit for them; which they learn because the notion of
similarity is implanted naturally in every animal; owing to which notion
they recognize those of the same species as themselves. What is it then
that Epicharmus says?

    Eumæus’ wisdom?—not a scanty gift
    Appropriated to one single being;
    But every animal that breathes and lives,
    Has mind and intellect.—So if you will
    Survey the facts attentively, you’ll find,
    E’en in the common poultry yard, the hen
    Brings not her offspring forth at first alive,
    But sits upon her eggs, and by her warmth,
    Cherishes them into life. And all this wisdom
    She does derive from nature’s gift alone,
    For nature is her only guide and teacher.

And in a subsequent passage he says:—

    There is no wonder in my teaching this,
    That citizens please citizens, and seem
    To one another to be beautiful:
    And so one dog seems to another dog
    The fairest object in the world; and so
    One ox seems to another, ass to ass,
    And swine to swine.

And these and similar speculations are examined and compared by Alcimus
through four books, where he shows how much assistance Plato has derived
from Epicharmus. And that Epicharmus himself was not indisposed to
appreciate his own wisdom, one may learn from these lines, in which he
predicts that there will arise some one to imitate him:—

    But as I think, I surely foresee this,
    That these my words will be preserved hereafter
    In many people’s recollection. And
    Another man will come, who’ll strip my reasons
    Of their poetic dress, and, clothing them
    In other garments and with purple broidery
    Will show them off; and being invincible,
    Will make all rivals bow the knee to him.

XIII. Plato also appears to have brought the books of Sophron, the
farce-writer,[31] to Athens, which were previously neglected; and to have
availed himself of them in his Speculations on Morals: and a copy of them
was found under his head.

XIV. And Plato made three voyages to Sicily, first of all for the purpose
of seeing the island and the craters of volcanoes, when Dionysius, the
son of Hermocrates, being the tyrant of Sicily, pressed him earnestly
to come and see him; and he, conversing about tyranny, and saying that
that is not the best government which is advantageous for one individual
alone, unless that individual is pre-eminent in virtue, had a quarrel
with Dionysius, who got angry, and said, “Your words are those of an old
dotard.” And Plato replied, “And your language is that of a tyrant.” And
on this the tyrant became very indignant, and at first was inclined to
put him to death; but afterwards, being appeased by Dion and Aristomenes,
he forebore to do that, but gave him to Pollis, the Lacedæmonian, who
happened to have come to him on an embassy just at that time, to sell
as a slave. And he took him to Ægina and sold him; and Charmander, the
son of Charmandrides, instituted a capital prosecution against him, in
accordance with the law which was in force, in the island of Ægina,
that the first Athenian who landed on the island should be put to death
without a trial; and he himself was the person who had originally
proposed that law, as Phavorinus says, in his Universal History. But when
some one said, though he said it only in joke, that it was a philosopher
who had landed, the people released him. But some say that he was brought
into the assembly and watched; and that he did not say a word, but stood
prepared to submit to whatever might befall him; and that they determined
not to put him to death, but to sell him after the fashion of prisoners
of war. And it happened by chance that Anniceris, the Cyrenean, was
present, who ransomed him for twenty minæ, or, as others say, for thirty,
and sent him to Athens, to his companions, and they immediately sent
Anniceris his money: but he refused to receive it, saying that they were
not the only people in the world who were entitled to have a regard for
Plato. Some writers again say, that it was Dion who sent the money, and
that he did not refuse it, but bought him the garden in the Academy. And
with respect to Pollis it is said that he was defeated by Chabrias, and
that he was afterwards drowned in Helice, in consequence of the anger of
the deity at his treatment of this philosopher. And this is the story
told by Phavorinus in the first book of his Commentaries. Dionysius,
however, did not remain quiet; but when he had heard what had happened he
wrote to Plato not to speak ill of him, and he wrote back in reply that
he had not leisure enough to think at all of Dionysius.

XV. But he went a second time to Sicily to the younger Dionysius,
and asked him for some land and for some men whom he might make live
according to his own theory of a constitution. And Dionysius promised
to give him some, but never did it. And some say that he was in danger
himself, having been suspected of exciting Dion and Theotas to attempt
the deliverance of the island; but that Archytas, the Pythagorean, wrote
a letter to Dionysius, and begged Plato off and sent him back safe to
Athens. And the letter is as follows:—

ARCHYTAS TO DIONYSIUS, GREETING.

“All of us who are the friends of Plato, have sent to you Lamiscus
and Photidas, to claim of you this philosopher in accordance with the
agreement which you made with us. And it is right that you should
recollect the eagerness which you had to see him, when you pressed us
all to secure Plato’s visit to you, promising to provide for him, and
to treat him hospitably in every respect, and to ensure his safety both
while he remained with you, and when he departed. Remember this too that
you were very delighted indeed at his arrival, and that you expressed
great pleasure at the time, such as you never did on any other occasion.
And if any unpleasantness has arisen between you, you ought to behave
with humanity, and restore the man unhurt; for by so doing you will act
justly, and do us a favour.”

XVI. The third time that he went to Sicily was for the purpose of
reconciling Dion to Dionysius. And as he could not succeed he returned
back to his own country, having lost his labour.

XVII. And in his own country he did not meddle with state affairs,
although he was a politician as far as his writings went. And the
reason was, that the people were accustomed to a form of government
and constitution different from what he approved of. And Pamphile, in
the twenty-fifth book of his Commentaries, says that the Arcadians
and Thebans, when they were founding a great city, appointed him its
lawgiver; but that he, when he had ascertained that they would not
consent to an equality of rights, refused to go thither.

XVIII. It is said also, that he defended Chabrias the general, when he
was impeached in a capital charge; when no one else of the citizens would
undertake the task: and as he was going up towards the Acropolis with
his client, Crobylus the sycophant met him and said, “Are you come to
plead for another, not knowing that the hemlock of Socrates is waiting
also for you?” But he replied, “And also, when I fought for my country I
encountered dangers: and now too I encounter them in the cause of justice
and for the defence of a friend.”

XIX. He was the first author who wrote treatises in the form of
dialogues, as Phavorinus tells us in the eighth book of his Universal
History. And he was also the first person who introduced the analytical
method of investigation, which he taught to Leodamus of Thasos. He
was also the first person in philosophy who spoke of antipodes, and
elements, and dialectics, and actions (ποιήματα), and oblong numbers,
and plane surfaces, and the providence of God. He was likewise the first
of the philosophers who contradicted the assertion of Lysias, the son
of Cephalus, setting it out word for word in his Phædrus. And he was
also the first person who examined the subject of grammatical knowledge
scientifically. And as he argued against almost every one who had lived
before his time, it is often asked why he has never mentioned Democritus.

XX. Neanthes of Cyzicus says, that when he came to the Olympic games
all the Greeks who were present turned to look at him: and that it was
on that occasion that he held a conversation with Dion, who was on
the point of attacking Dionysius. Moreover, in the first book of the
Commentaries of Phavorinus, it is related that Mithridates, the Persian,
erected a statue of Plato in the Academy, and put on it this inscription,
“Mithridates, the son of Rhodobates, a Persian, consecrated an image of
Plato to the Muses, which was made by Silanion.”

XXI. And Heraclides says, that even while a young man, he was so modest
and well regulated, that he was never once seen to laugh excessively.

XXII. But though he was of such a grave character himself, he was
nevertheless ridiculed by the comic poets. Accordingly, Theopompus, in
his Pleasure-seeker, says:—

    For one thing is no longer only one,
    But two things now are scarcely one; as says
    The solemn Plato.

And Anaxandrides in his Theseus, says:—

    When he ate olives like our worthy Plato.

And Timon speaks of him in this way, punning on his name:—

    As Plato placed strange platitudes on paper.[32]

Alexis says in his Meropis:—

    You’ve come in time: since I’ve been doubting long,
    And walking up and down some time, like Plato;
    And yet have hit upon no crafty plan,
    But only tir’d my legs.

And in his Ancylion, he says:—

    You speak of what you do not understand,
    Running about like Plato: hoping thus,
    To learn the nature of saltpetre and onions.

Amphis says in his Amphicrates:—

    _A._ But what the good is, which you hope to get
         By means of her, my master, I no more
         Can form a notion of, than of the good
         Of Plato.

    _B._                 Listen now.

And in his Dexidemides he speaks thus:—

    O Plato! how your learning is confined
    To gloomy looks, and wrinkling up your brows,
    Like any cockle.

Cratinas in his Pseudypobolimæus, says:—

    You clearly are a man, endued with sense,
    And so, as Plato says, I do not know;
    But I suspect.

Alexis, in his Olympiodorus speaks thus:—

    My mortal body became dry and withered:
    But my immortal part rose to the sky.
    Is not this Plato’s doctrine?

And in his Parasite he says:—

    Or to converse alone, like Plato.

Anaxilas also laughs at him in his Botrylion, and Circe, and his Rich
Women.

XXIII. And Aristippus, in the fourth book of his treatise upon Ancient
Luxury, says that he was much attached to a youth of the name of Aster,
who used to study astronomy with him; and also to Dion, whom we have
already mentioned. And some say that he was also attached to Phædrus,
and that the following epigrams which he wrote upon them are evidences of
the love he felt for them:—

    My Aster, you’re gazing on the stars (ἀστέρες),
    Would that I were the heavens, that so I might
    Gaze in return with many eyes on thee.

Another of his epigrams is:—

    Aster, you while among the living shone,
    The morning star. But now that you are dead,
    You beam like Hesperus in the shades below.

And he wrote thus on Dion:—

    Once, at their birth, the fates did destine tears
    To be the lot of all the Trojan women.
    And Hecuba, their Queen—to you, O Dion,
    As the deserved reward for glorious deeds,
    They gave extensive and illustrious hopes.
    And now you lie beneath your native soil;
    Honoured by all your countrymen, O Dion,
    And loved by me with ardent, lasting love.

And they say that this epigram is inscribed upon his tomb at Syracuse.
They say, also, that he was in love with Alexis, and with Phædrus, as I
have already mentioned, and that he wrote an epigram on them both, which
runs thus:—

    Now when Alexis is no longer aught,
    Say only how beloved, how fair he was,
    And every one does turn his eyes at once.
    Why, my mind, do you show the dogs a bone?
    You’re but preparing trouble for yourself:
    Have we not also lost the lovely Phædrus!

There is also a tradition that he had a mistress named Archianassa, on
whom he wrote the following lines:—

    I have a mistress fair from Colophon,
    Archianassa, on whose very wrinkles
    Sits genial love: hard must have been the fate,
    Of him who met her earliest blaze of beauty,
    Surely he must have been completely scorched.

He also wrote this epigram on Agathon:—

    While kissing Agathon, my soul did rise,
    And hover’d o’er my lips; wishing perchance,
    O’er anxious that it was, to migrate to him.

Another of his epigrams is:—

    I throw this apple to you. And if you
    Love me who love you so, receive it gladly,
    And let me taste your lovely virgin charms.
    Or if that may not be, still take the fruit,
    And in your bosom cherish it, and learn
    How fleeting is all gracefulness and beauty.

And another:—

    I am an apple, and am thrown to you,
    By one who loves you: but consent, Xanthippe;
    For you and I shall both with time decay.

They also attribute to him the following epigram on the Eretrians who had
been surprised in an ambuscade:—

    We were Eretrians, of Eubœan race?
    And now we lie near Susa, here entomb’d,
    Far from my native land.

And this one also:—

    Thus Venus to the muses spoke:
    Damsels submit to Venus’ yoke,
      Or dread my Cupid’s arms.
    Those threats, the Virgins nine replied,
    May weigh with Mars, but we deride
      Love’s wrongs, or darts, or charms.

Another is:—

    A certain person found some gold,
    Carried it off, and in its stead
    Left a strong halter neatly roll’d.
    The owner found his treasure fled;
    And powerless to endure his fortune’s wreck,
    Fitted the halter to his hapless neck.

XXIV. But Molon, who had a great dislike to Plato, says “There is not
so much to wonder at in Dionysius being at Corinth, as in Plato’s being
in Sicily.” Xenophon, too, does not appear to have been very friendlily
disposed towards him: and accordingly they have, as if in rivalry of
one another, both written books with the same title, the Banquet, the
Defence of Socrates, Moral Reminiscences. Then, too, the one wrote the
Cyropædia and the other a book on Politics; and Plato in his Laws says,
that the Cyropædia is a mere romance, for that Cyrus was not such a
person as he is described in that book. And though they both speak so
much of Socrates, neither of them ever mentions the other, except that
Xenophon once speaks of Plato in the third book of his Reminiscences. It
is said also, that Antisthenes, being about to recite something that he
had written, invited him to be present; and that Plato having asked what
he was going to recite, he said it was an essay on the impropriety of
contradicting. “How then,” said Plato, “can you write on this subject?”
and then he showed him that he was arguing in a circle. But Antisthenes
was annoyed, and composed a dialogue against Plato, which he entitled
Sathon; after which they were always enemies to one another; and they say
that Socrates having heard Plato read the Lysis, said, “O Hercules! what
a number of lies the young man has told about me.” For he had set down a
great many things as sayings of Socrates which he never said.

Plato also was a great enemy of Aristippus; accordingly, he speaks ill
of him in his book on the Soul, and says that he was not with Socrates
when he died, though he was in Ægina, at no great distance. He also had
a great rivalry with Æschines, for that he had been held in great esteem
by Dionysius, and afterwards came to want, and was despised by Plato, but
supported by Aristippus. And Idomeneus says, that the speech which Plato
attributes to Crito in the prison, when he counselled Socrates to make
his escape, was really delivered by Æschines, but that Plato attributed
it to Crito because of his dislike to the other. And Plato never makes
the slightest mention of him in any of his books, except in the treatise
on the Soul, and the Defence of Socrates.

XXV. Aristotle says, that the treatises of Plato are something between
poems and prose; and Phavorinus says, when Plato read his treatise on
the Soul, Aristotle was the only person who sat it out, and that all the
rest rose up and went away. And some say that Philip the Opuntian copied
out the whole of his books upon Laws, which were written on waxen tablets
only. Some people also attribute the Epinomis to him. Euphorion and
Panætius have stated that the beginning of the treatise on the Republic
was often altered and re-written; and that very treatise, Aristoxenus
affirms, was found almost entire in the Contradictions of Protagoras;
and that the first book he wrote at all was the Phædrus; and indeed
that composition has a good many indications of a young composer. But
Dicæarchus blames the whole style of that work as vulgar.

XXVI. A story is told, that Plato, having seen a man playing at dice,
reproached him for it, and that he said he was playing for a trifle; “But
the habit,” rejoined Plato, “is not a trifle.” On one occasion he was
asked whether there would be any monument of him, as of his predecessors
in philosophy? and he answered, “A man must first make a name, and the
monument will follow.” Once, when Xenocrates came into his house, he
desired him to scourge one of his slaves for him, for that he himself
could not do it because he was in a passion; and that at another time
he said to one of his slaves, “I should beat you if I were not in a
passion.” Having got on horseback he dismounted again immediately, saying
that he was afraid that he should be infected with horse-pride. He used
to advise people who got drunk to look in the glass, and then they would
abandon their unseemly habit; and he said that it was never decorous to
drink to the degree of drunkenness, except at the festivals of the God
who had given men wine. He also disapproved of much sleeping: accordingly
in his Laws he says, “No one while sleeping is good for anything.”
Another saying of his was, “That the pleasantest of all things to hear
was the truth;” but others report this saying thus, “That the sweetest of
all things was to speak truth.” And of truth he speaks thus in his Laws,
“Truth, my friend, is a beautiful and a durable thing; but it is not easy
to persuade men of this fact.”

XXVII. He used also to wish to leave a memorial of himself behind, either
in the hearts of his friends, or in his books.

XXVIII. He also used to travel a good deal as some authors inform us.

XXIX. And he died in the manner we have already mentioned, in the
thirteenth year of the reign of Philip of Macedon, as Phavorinus mentions
in the third book of his Commentaries; and Theopompus relates that Philip
on one occasion reproached him. But Myronianus, in his Resemblances, says
that Philo mentions some proverbs that were in circulation about Plato’s
lice; implying that he had died of that disease.

XXX. He was buried in the Academy, where he spent the greater part of
his time in the practice of philosophy, from which his was called the
Academic school; and his funeral was attended by all the pupils of that
sect. And he made his will in the following terms:—“Plato left these
things, and has bequeathed them as follows.—The farm in the district of
the Hephæstiades, bounded on the north by the road from the temple of
the Cephisiades, and on the south by the temple of Hercules, which is
in the district of the Hephæstiades; and on the east by the estate of
Archestratus the Phrearrian, and on the west by the farm of Philip the
Chollidian, shall be incapable of being sold or alienated, but shall
belong to my son Adimantus as far as possible. And so likewise shall my
farm in the district of the Eiresides, which I bought of Callimachus,
which is bounded on the north by the property of Eurymedon the
Myrrhinusian, on the south by that of Demostratus of Xypeta, on the east
by that of Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian, and on the west by the Cephisus;—I
also leave him three minæ of silver, a silver goblet weighing a hundred
and sixty-five drachms, a cup weighing forty-five drachms, a golden ring,
and a golden ear-ring, weighing together four drachms and three obols.
Euclides the stone-cutter owes me three minæ. I leave Diana her liberty.
My slaves Tychon, Bictas, Apolloniades, and Dionysius, I bequeath to
my son; and I also give him all my furniture, of which Demetrius has
a catalogue. I owe no one anything. My executors shall be Sosthenes,
Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, and Thrasippus.”
This was his will. And on his tomb the following epigrams were inscribed.
First of all:—

    Here, first of all men for pure justice famed,
      And moral virtue, Aristocles lies;
    And if there e’er has lived one truly wise,
      This man was wiser still; too great for envy.

A second is:—

    Here in her bosom does the tender earth
      Embrace great Plato’s corpse.—His soul aloft
    Has ta’en its place among the immortal Gods.
      Ariston’s glorious son—whom all good men,
    Though in far countries, held in love and honour,
      Remembering his pure and god-like life.

There is another which is more modern:—

    _A._ Eagle, why fly you o’er this holy tomb?
         Or are you on your way, with lofty wing,
         To some bright starry domicile of the Gods?

    _B._ I am the image of the soul of Plato,
         And to Olympus now am borne on high;
         His body lies in his own native Attica.

We ourselves also have written one epigram on him, which is as follows:—

    If fav’ring Phœbus had not Plato given
    To Grecian lands, how would the learned God
    Have e’er instructed mortal minds in learning?
    But he did send him, that as Æsculapius
    His son’s the best physician of the body,
    So Plato should be of the immortal soul.

And others, alluding to his death:—

    Phœbus, to bless mankind, became the father
    Of Æsculapius, and of god-like Plato;
    _That_ one to heal the body, _this_ the mind.
    Now, from a marriage feast he’s gone to heaven,
    To realize the happy city there,
    Which he has planned fit for the realms of Jove.

These then are the epigrams on him.

XXXI. His disciples were, Speusippus the Athenian, Zenocrates of
Chalcedon, Aristotle the Stagirite, Philip of Opus, Histiæus of
Perinthus, Dion of Syracuse, Amyclus of Heraclea, Erastus and Coriscus of
Sceptos, Timolaus of Cyzicus, Eudon of Lampsacus, Pithon and Heraclides
of Æmus, Hippothales and Callippus, Athenians, Demetrius of Amphipolis,
Heraclides of Pontus, and numbers of others, among whom there were also
two women, Lasthenea of Mantinea, and Axiothea of Phlius, who used even
to wear man’s clothes, as we are told by Dicæarchus. Some say that
Theophrastus also was a pupil of his; and Chamælion says that Hyperides
the orator, and Lycurgus, were so likewise. Polemo also asserts that
Demosthenes was. Sabinus adds Mnesistratus of Thasos to the number,
quoting authority for the statement in the fourth book of his Meditative
Matter; and it is not improbable.

XXXII. But as you, O lady, are rightly very much attached to Plato, and
as you are very fond of hunting out in every quarter all the doctrines
of the philosopher with great eagerness, I have thought it necessary
to subjoin an account of the general character of his lectures, and of
the arrangement of his dialogues, and of the method of his inductive
argument; going back to their elements and first principles as far as
I could, so that the collection of anecdotes concerning his life which
I have been able to make, may not be curtailed by the omission of any
statement as to his doctrines. For it would be like sending owls to
Athens, as the proverb is, if I were to descend to particular details.

They say now, that Zeno, the Eleatic, was the first person who composed
essays in the form of dialogue. But Aristotle, in the first book of his
treatise on Poets, says that Alexamenus, a native of Styra, or Teos,
did so before him, as Phavorinus also says in his Commentaries. But it
seems to me that Plato gave this kind of writing the last polish, and
that he has therefore, a just right to the first honour, not only as
the improver, but also as inventor of that kind of writing. Now, the
dialogue is a discourse carried on by way of question and answer, on
some one of the subjects with which philosophy is conversant, or with
which statesmanship is concerned, with a becoming attention to the
characters of the persons who are introduced as speakers, and with a
careful selection of language governed by the same consideration. And
dialectics is the art of conversing, by means of which we either overturn
or establish the proposition contended for, by means of the questions and
answers which are put in the mouths of the parties conversing. Now, of
the Platonic discourse there are two characteristics discernible on the
very surface; one fitted for guiding, the other for investigating.

The first of these has two subordinate species, one speculative, the
other practical; and of these two again, the speculative is divided into
the natural and the logical, and the practical into the ethical and the
political. Again, the kind fitted for investigating has also two primary
divisions with their separate characteristics, one object of which is
simply practice, the other being also disputatious: and the first of
these two is again subdivided into two; one of which may be compared
to the art of the midwife, and the other is as it were tentative;
the disputatious one is also divided into the demonstrative and the
distinctive.

But we are not unaware that some writers distinguish the various
dialogues in a different manner from what we do. For they say that
some of them are dramatic, and others narrative, and others of a mixed
nature. But they, in this division, are classifying the dialogues in a
theatrical rather than in a philosophical manner. Some of the dialogues
also refer to subjects of natural philosophy, such as the Timæus. Of the
logical class, there are the Politics, the Cratylus, the Parmenides, and
the Sophist. Of the ethical kind there is the defence of Socrates, the
Crito, the Phædo, the Phædrus, the Banquet, the Menexenus, the Clitophon,
the Epistles, the Philebus, the Hipparchus, and the Rival Lovers. Of
the political class there is the Republic, the Laws, the Minos, the
Epinomis, and the Atlanticus. Of the midwife description we have the
two Alcibiades’s, the Theages, the Lysis, the Laches. Of the tentative
kind, there is the Euthyphro, the Meno, the Ion, the Charmides, and the
Theætetus. Of the demonstrative description, we have the Protagoras,
and of the distinctive class the Euthydemus, the two Hippias’s, and the
Gorgias. And this is enough to say about the dialogues as to what they
are, and what their different kinds are.

XXXIII. But since there is also a great division of opinion respecting
them, from some people asserting that in them Plato dogmatizes in a
positive manner, while others deny this, we had better also touch upon
this part of the question. Now, dogmatizing is laying down dogmas, just
as legislating is making laws. But the word dogma is used in two senses;
to mean both that which we think, and opinion itself. Now of these,
that which we think is the proposition, and opinion is the conception
by which we entertain it in our minds. Plato then explains the opinions
which he entertains himself, and refutes false ones; and about doubtful
matters he suspends his judgment. His opinions of matters as they appear
to him he puts into the mouth of four persons, Socrates, Timæus, an
Athenian poet, and an Eleatic stranger. But the strangers are not, as
some people have supposed, Plato and Parmenides, but certain nameless
imaginary characters. Since Plato asserts as undeniable axioms all the
opinions which he puts into the mouth of Socrates or Timæus. But when
he is refuting false propositions, he introduces such characters as
Thrasymachus, and Callicles, and Polus, and Gorgias, and Protagoras,
Hippias too, and Euthydemus, and men of that stamp. But when he is
demonstrating anything, then he chiefly uses the inductive form of
argument, and that too not of one kind only, but of two. For induction is
an argument, which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally
other truths which resemble them. But there are two kinds of induction;
the one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. Now,
the one which proceeds from contraries, is one in which from the answer
given, whatever that answer may be, the contrary of the principle
indicated in the question must follow. As for instance. My father is
either a different person from your father, or he is the same person.
If now your father is a different person from my father, then as he is
a different person from a father, he cannot be a father. If, on the
other hand, he is the same person as my father, then, since he is the
same person as my father, he must be my father. And again, if man be not
an animal, he must be either a stone or a piece of wood; but he is not
a stone or a piece of wood, for he is a living animal, and capable of
independent motion. Therefore, he is an animal. But, if he is an animal,
and a dog or an ox is likewise an animal, then man must be an animal, and
a dog, and an ox.—This then is the method of induction in contradiction
and contention, which Plato was accustomed to employ, not for the purpose
of establishing principles of his own, but with the object of refuting
the arguments of others.

Now, the inductive kind of argument drawn from consequents is of a
twofold character. The one proving a particular opinion by an admitted
fact of an equally particular nature; or else going from particulars to
generals. And the first of these two divisions is the oratorical one,
the second the dialectic one. As for instance, in the former kind the
question is whether this person has committed a murder; the proof is that
he was found at the time covered with blood. But this is the oratorical
method of employing the induction; since oratory is conversant about
particulars, and does not concern itself about generals. For its object
is not to ascertain abstract justice, but only particular justice.
The other is the dialectic kind, the general proposition having been
established by particular ones. As for instance, the question is whether
the soul is immortal, and whether the living consist of those who have
once been dead; and this proposition Plato establishes in his book on
the Soul, by a certain general proposition, that contraries arise out
of contraries; and this identical general proposition is established by
certain particular ones. As, for instance, that sleep follows on waking,
and waking from sleeping, and the greater from the less, and reversely
the less from the greater. And this kind of induction he used to employ
for the establishment of his own opinions.

XXXIV. Anciently, in tragedy, it was only the chorus who did the whole
work of the play; but subsequently, Thespis introduced one actor for the
sake of giving the chorus some rest, and Æschylus added a second, and
Sophocles a third, and so they made tragedy complete. So in the same
manner, philosophical discourse was originally uniform, concerning itself
solely about natural philosophy; then Socrates added to it a second
character, the ethical: and Plato a third, the dialectic: and so he
brought philosophy to perfection.

XXXV. But Thrasybulus says that he published his dialogues as the
dramatic poets published their tetralogies. For, they contended with
four plays, (and at four festivals, the Dionysiac, the Lenæan, the
Panathenæan, and the Chytri), one of which was a satiric drama, and
the whole four plays were called a tetralogy. Now, people say, the
whole of his genuine dialogues amount to fifty-six; the treatise on the
Republic being divided into ten books, (which Phavorinus, in the second
book of his Universal History, says may be found almost entire in the
Contradictions of Protagoras), and that on Laws into twelve. And there
are nine tetralogies, if we consider the Republic as occupying the place
of one book, and the Laws of another. He arranges, therefore, the first
tetralogy of these dialogues which have a common subject, wishing to show
what sort of life that of the philosopher may have been. And he uses two
titles for each separate book, taking one from the name of the principal
speaker, and the other from the subject.

This tetralogy then, which is the first, is commenced by the Euthyphron,
or what is Holy; and that dialogue is a tentative one. The second is the
Defence of Socrates, a moral one. The third is the Criton, or What is to
be done, a moral one. The fourth is the Phædo, or the Dialogue on the
Soul, a moral one.

The second tetralogy is that of which the first piece is the Cratylus, or
the correctness of names, a logical one. The Theætetus, or Knowledge, a
tentative one. The Sophist, or a dialogue on the Existent, a logical one.
The Statesman, or a dialogue of Monarchy, a logical one.

The first dialogue in the third tetralogy is the Parmenides, or a
dialogue of Ideas, a logical one. The second is the Philebus, or on
Pleasure, a moral one. The Banquet, or on the Good, a moral one. The
Phædrus, or on Love, a moral one.

The fourth tetralogy opens with the Alcibiades, or a treatise on the
Nature of Man, a midwife-like work. The second Alcibiades, or on Prayer,
a piece of the same character. The Hipparchus, or on the Love of Gain, a
moral one. The Rival Lovers, or a treatise on Philosophy, a moral one.

The first dialogue in the fifth is the Theages, or another treatise on
Philosophy, another midwife-like work. The Charmides, or on Temperance,
a tentative essay. The Laches, or on Manly Courage, midwife-like. The
Lysis, or a dissertation on Friendship, also midwife-like.

The sixth tetralogy commences with the Euthydemus, or the Disputatious
Man, a distinctive dialogue. Then comes the Protagoras, or the Sophists,
a demonstrative one. The Gorgias, or a dissertation on Rhetoric, another
distinctive one. And the Meno, or on Virtue, a tentative dialogue.

The seventh begins with the two Hippias’s. The first being a dissertation
on the Beautiful, the second one on Falsehood, both distinctive. The
third is the Ion, or a dissertation on the Iliad, a tentative one. The
fourth is the Menexenus, or the Funeral Oration, a moral one.

The first dialogue in the eighth is the Clitophon, or the Exhortation,
a moral piece. Then comes the Republic, or the treatise on Justice, a
political one. The Timæus, or a dissertation on Nature, a dialogue on
Natural Philosophy. And the Critias, or Atlanticus, a moral one.

The ninth begins with the Minos, or a treatise on Law, a political work.
The Laws, or a dissertation on Legislation, another political work. The
Epinomis, or the Nocturnal Conversation, or the Philosopher, a third
political one.

XXXVI. And this last tetralogy is completed by thirteen epistles, all
moral; to which is prefixed as a motto, εὖ πράττειν, just as Epicurus
inscribed on his εὖ διάγειν, and Cleon on his χαίρειν. They are, one
letter to Aristodemus, two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to
Hermeias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one to Leodamas, one to Dion, one to
Perdiccas, and two to the friends of Dion.

XXXVII. And this is the way in which some people divide his works. But
others, among whom is Aristophanes, the grammarian, arrange his dialogues
in trilogies; and they make the first to consist of the Republic, the
Timæus and the Critias.

The second of the Sophist, the Statesman, the Cratylus.

The third of the Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis.

The fourth of the Theætetus, the Euthyphro, the Defence of Socrates.

The fifth of the Crito, the Phædo, the Epistles.

And the rest they arrange singly and independently, without any regular
order. And some authors, as has been said already, place the Republic at
the head of his works: others begin with the Greater Alcibiades: others
with the Theages; some with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon;
some with the Timæus, some with the Phædrus, others again with the
Theætetus. Many make the Defence of Socrates the first piece.

There are some dialogues attributed to him which are confessedly
spurious. The Midon, or the Horse-breeder; the Eryxias, or Erasistratus;
the Alcyon; the Acephali, or Sisyphi; the Axiochus; the Phæacians; the
Demodorus; the Chelidon; the Seventh; the Epimenides. Of which the Alcyon
is believed to be the work of a man named Leon; as Phavorinus tells us in
the seventh book of his Commentaries.

XXXVIII. But he employs a great variety of terms in order to render his
philosophical system unintelligible to the ignorant. In his phraseology
he considers wisdom as the knowledge of things which can be understood
by the intellect, and which have a real existence: which has the Gods
for its object, and the soul as unconnected with the body. He also, with
a peculiarity of expression, calls wisdom also philosophy, which he
explains as a desire for divine wisdom. But wisdom and experience are
also used by him in their common acceptation; as, for instance, when he
calls an artisan wise (σοφὸς). He also uses the same words in different
senses at different times. Accordingly he uses φαῦλος in the sense of
ἁπλοῦς, _simple_, in which meaning also the word occurs in Euripides, in
the Licymonius, where the poet speaks of Hercules in the following terms:—

    Mean looking (φαῦλος), rude, virtuous in great affairs,
    Measuring all wisdom by its last results,
    A hero unrefined in speech.

But Plato uses the word sometimes even for what is beautiful; and
sometimes for small and insignificant; and very often he uses different
words to express the same idea. Accordingly, besides the word ἰδέα for
a class, he uses also εἶδος, and γένος, and παράδειγμα, and ἀρχὴ, and
αἴτιον. Sometimes he uses opposite expressions for the same thing;
accordingly, he says that it is an object of sensation that exists, while
at other times he says it is that which does not exist; speaking of it
as existing because of its origin, and as non-existent with reference to
its continual changes. Then again, he defines his ἰδέα as something which
is neither moving nor stationary, at one time calling the same thing, at
another time one thing, at a third time many things. And he is in the
habit of doing this in many instances.

And the explanation of his arguments is three-fold. For first of all, it
is necessary to explain what each thing that is said is; secondly, on
what account it is said, whether because of its bearing on the principal
point, or figuratively, and whether it is said for the purpose of
establishing an opinion of his own, or of refuting the arguments brought
forward by the other party to the conversation; and thirdly, whether it
has been said truly.

XXXIX. But since there are some particular marks put in his books, we
must also say something about them. × indicates peculiar expressions and
figures of speech, and generally any peculiarities of Plato’s style. When
doubled it points to the doctrines and peculiar opinions of Plato; ※
when dotted all round, points to some select bits of beautiful writing.
When doubled and dotted it indicates corrections of some passages. A
dotted obelus indicates hasty disapprovals. An inverted sigma dotted
all round points out passages which may be taken in a double sense, and
transpositions of words. The Ceraunium[33] indicates a connection of
philosophical ideas. An asterisk points out an agreement in doctrine. And
an obelus marks the rejection of the expression or of the passage. These
then are the marginal marks which occur, and the writings of which Plato
was the author:—which, as Antigonus the Carystian says, in his treatise
on Zeno, when they had been but lately published, brought in some gain to
the possessors, if any one else was desirous of reading them.

XL. These now were his chief opinions. He affirmed that the soul was
immortal and clothed in many bodies successively, and that its first
principle was number, and that the first principle of the body was
geometry. And he defined it as an abstract idea of spirit diffused in
every direction. He said also, that it was self-moving and threefold. For
that that part of it which was capable of reasoning was situated in the
head, that that portion which was affected by passion was seated around
the heart, and that which was appetitive was placed around the navel and
the liver. And that it is placed in the middle of the body, and embraces
it at the same time in all its parts, and that it consists of elements;
and that when it is divided according to harmonic intervals it forms
two connected circles; of which the inner circle is divided into six
portions, and makes in all seven circles; and that this is placed on the
left hand of the diameter, and situated in the interior. But the other
is on the right hand of the same line; on which account, and because it
is one only, it is the superior of the two. For the other is divided
internally; and this too, is the circle of that which is always the same;
the other, the circle of that which is changeable and different. And the
one he says is the motion of the soul, but the other is the motion of the
universe and of the planets.

On the other side, the division of the circles from the centre to the
extremities, being harmoniously appropriated to the essence of the soul,
the one knows existing things and establishes harmony between them,
because it is itself composed of harmonious elements. The circle of what
is changeable, engenders opinion by its regular movements; but the circle
of that which is always the same produces knowledge.

XLI. Plato lays down two primary causes or principles of all things, God
and matter, which he also calls mind, and the cause. And he defines
matter as something without shape and without limitation, and says that
from it all concretions arise. He affirms also that as it was moving
about at random, it was brought by God into one settled place, as God
thought order better than disorder; and that this nature is divided into
four elements, fire, water, air, and earth, of which the world itself and
everything in it was made. But he says that the earth is the only thing
that is unchangeable, as he considers the cause to be the difference of
the figures of which it is composed; for he says that the figures of the
others are homogeneous; for that they are all composed equally of scalene
triangles. The figure of the earth, however, is peculiar to itself;
for the element of fire is a pyramid; of air, an octagon; of water, an
eicosagon; and of the earth, a cube; owing to which these things cannot
be changed into earth, nor earth into them. He teaches also that these
elements are not separated so as to occupy each a peculiar and distinct
place; for the spherical motion collects and compresses all the small
things towards the centre, and the small things separate the great ones,
on which account the species, as they change, do also change their
positions.

Moreover he asserts that the world is one, and has been produced,
since it has been made by God, in such a manner as to be an object
of sensation. And he considers it endowed with life, because that
which is so endowed, is superior to that which is not, and it must be
the production of the most excellent producer. It is also one, and
illimitable; because the model after which it was made was one; and it
is spherical, because its creator was of that form; for it also contains
all other animals, and God who made it comprises all forms. And it is
smooth, and has no instruments whatever all round it, because it has no
need of any. But the whole world remains imperishable, because it cannot
be resolved into God; and God is the cause of universal production,
because it is the nature of the good to be productive of good; and the
best is the cause of the production of the heaven; for the best of all
productions can have no other cause than the best of all intelligible
existences. And since God is of that character, and since heaven
resembles the best, inasmuch as it is at least the most beautiful of all
things, it cannot be like anything else that is produced, except God.

He also teaches that the world consists of fire, water, air, and earth;
of fire, in order that it may be visible; of earth, in order that it may
be firm; of water and air, that it may not be destitute of proportion;
for two middle terms are indispensable to keep the solid bodies in due
proportion to one another, and to realize the unity of the whole. In
short, the world is formed of all the elements together, in order that it
may be perfect and imperishable.

Again, time is the image of eternity; eternity subsists for ever; but the
motion of the heaven is time; for day, and night, and the months, and all
such divisions, are parts of time, on which account there could be no
such thing as time apart from the nature of the world; for time existed
contemporaneously and simultaneously with the world. And it was with
reference to time that the sun, and the moon, and the planets were made;
and it was in order that the number of the seasons might be manifest, and
that the animals might partake of number, that God kindled the light of
the sun; and that the moon was above the circle of the earth, and that
the sun was next to it, and in the still higher circles were the planets.
And that the universe was animated, because it was altogether bound up
in animated motion, and that the race of all other animals was produced
in order that the world might be made perfect, and resembling an animal
such as could be comprehended by intellect. Since then God had life, the
heaven also must have life; and the Gods are to a great extent composed
of fire. And there are three other races of animals, those which fly in
the air; those which live in the water; those which walk in the earth.
The oldest of all the deities in heaven is the Earth; she was formed in
order to be the dispenser of night and day; and as she is placed in the
centre, she is constantly in motion around the centre.

And since there are two efficient causes, some things must, he says,
be affirmed to exist in consequence of intellect, and some from some
necessary cause. Now necessary causes are the air, fire, earth, and
water, these not being real elements, but rather receptacles; and
they too are formed of triangles in combination, and are resolvable
into triangles; and their elements are the scalene triangle and the
isosceles. These two before mentioned elements are the principles and
causes of things, of which the models are God and matter, which last must
necessarily be destitute of form, as is the case of other receptacles.
And that the cause of these things was a necessary cause, which,
receiving the ideas, produced the substances, and was moved by the
dissimilarity of its own power, and again by its motion compelled those
things which were moved by it to move other things in their turn.

But all these things were formerly moved without any reason or order;
but after they began to form the world by their combination, they then
received symmetry and regularity from God, according to the principles
applicable to them; for the efficient causes, even before the creation
of the heaven, were two in number. There was also a third, namely
production; but these were not very evident, but rather traces than
actual things, and quite devoid of regularity. But after the world was
made, then they too assumed a regular form and arrangement; but the
heaven was made of all existing bodies. And Plato considers that God is
incorporeal just as the soul is, and that it is owing to that that he is
not affected by any destruction or external circumstances. And ideas, as
we have said before, he defines as certain causes and principles, owing
to which it is that such and such things are by nature what they are.

XLII. On the subject of good and evil, these were his sentiments: that
the end was to become like God; and that virtue was sufficient of herself
for happiness, but nevertheless required the advantages of the body as
instruments to work with; such as health, strength, the integrity of
the senses, and things of that kind; and also external advantages, such
as riches, and noble birth, and glory. Still that the wise man would be
not the less happy, even if destitute of these auxiliary circumstances;
for he would enjoy the constitution of his country, and would marry, and
would not transgress the established laws, and that he would legislate
for his country, as well as he could under existing circumstances,
unless he saw affairs in an unmanageable condition, in consequence of
the excessive factiousness of the people. He thinks too that the Gods
superintend all the affairs of men, and that there are such beings
as dæmons. And he was the first person who defined the notion of the
honourable, as that which borders on the praiseworthy, and the logical,
and the useful, and the becoming, and the expedient, all which things are
combined with that which is suitable to, and in accordance with, nature.

XLIII. He also discussed in his dialogues the correctness of terms, so
that he was the first person who reduced the science of giving correct
answers, and putting correct questions to a system, which he himself used
to satiety.

XLIV. In his dialogues he used to speak of justice as a kind of law of
God, as being of influence sufficient to excite men to act justly, in
order to avoid suffering punishment as malefactors after death. Owing
to which he appeared to some people rather fond of mythical stories,
as he mingled stories of this kind with his writings, in order by the
uncertainty of all the circumstances that affect men after their death,
to induce them to abstain from evil actions. And these were his opinions.

XLV. He used too, says Aristotle, to divide things in this manner:—Of
good, some have their place in the mind, some in the body, and some are
wholly external. As, for instance, justice, and prudence, and manly
courage, and temperance, and qualities of that sort exist in the soul.
Beauty, and a good constitution, and health, and strength exist in the
body. But friends, and the prosperity of one’s country, and wealth, are
external goods. There are then three species of goods, some in the soul,
some in the body, and some external to either.

XLVI. There are also three species of friendship. For one kind is
natural, another that which arises from companionship; and the third
is that which is produced by ties of hospitality. We call that natural
friendship which parents feel towards their offspring, and relations
towards one another; and this is partaken of by other animals besides
men. We call that the friendship of companionship which arises from a
habit of association, and which has no reference to ties of blood, such
as the friendship of Pylades for Orestes. That which arises from ties
of hospitality is one which owes its origin to agreements, and which is
carried on by means of letters between strangers. There is, therefore,
natural friendship, and friendship between companions, and between
strangers. Some also add a fourth kind, namely, the friendship of love.

XLVII. Of political constitutions there are five species. There is one
kind which is democratical, a second which is aristocratical, a third is
oligarchical, a fourth monarchical, and the fifth is tyrannical. Now,
the democratical form of constitution exists in those cities in which
the multitude has the chief power, and elects magistrates, and passes
laws at its own pleasure. But an aristocracy is that form in which
neither the rich, nor the poor, nor the most illustrious men of the
city rule, but the most nobly born have the chief sway. And oligarchy is
that constitution in which the magistracies are distributed according
to some sort of rating: for the rich are fewer in number than the poor.
The monarchical constitution is either dependent on law or on family.
That in Carthage depends on law; that in Lacædemon and Macedonia on
family; for they select their sovereign out of some particular family.
But a tyranny is that kind of government in which the people are either
cajoled or constrained into being governed by a single individual. Forms
of government then, are divided into democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy,
monarchy, and tyranny.

XLVIII. Again, of justice there are three species. For there is one kind
which is conversant with the gods; a second which has reference to men;
and a third, which concerns the dead. For they who sacrifice according to
the laws, and who pay due respect to the temples, are manifestly pious
to the gods. And those who repay what has been lent to them, and restore
what has been deposited with them, act justly as to men. And those who
pay due respect to the tombs, clearly are pious towards the dead. There
is, therefore, one justice towards the Gods, a second towards men, and a
third towards the dead.

XLIX. In the same way, there are also three species of knowledge. There
is one kind which is practical, a second which is productive, a third
which is theoretical. For the science of building houses or ships, is
production. For one can see the work which is produced by it. Political
science, and the science of playing the flute, or the harp, or such
things as that, is practical; for one cannot see any visible result which
has been produced by them, and yet they are doing something. For one man
plays the flute or plays the harp, and another occupies himself with
state affairs. Again, geometrical, and harmonic, and astronomical science
are all theoretical, for they do nothing, and produce nothing. But the
geometrician theorizes as to what relation lines bear to one another; and
the harmonist speculates about sounds, and the astronomer about stars and
about the world. Accordingly, of sciences some are theoretical, others
productive, and a third species is practical.

L. Of medical science there are five species: one, pharmaceutical; a
second, manual; a third, conversant about the regulation of the manner
of life, and the diet; a fourth, the business of which is to detect
diseases; and the fifth is remedial. The pharmaceutical relieves
infirmities by means of medicines; the manual heals men by cutting and
cauterizing; the one which attends to the diet, gets rid of diseases
by altering and regulating the diet; the fourth produces its effects
by a thorough comprehension of the nature of the disease; and the last
relieves men from suffering by bringing prompt assistance at the moment.
Medical science, then, is divided into the pharmaceutical, the manual,
the dietetic, the diagnostic, and the remedial.

LI. Of law there are two divisions. For there is a written and an
unwritten law. The one by which we regulate our constitutions in our
cities, is the written law; that which arises from custom, is the
unwritten law. As, for instance, for a man to come naked into the market
place, or to wear woman’s clothes, are actions which are not prohibited
by any law, and yet we never do them because they are forbidden by the
unwritten law. Law, therefore, is divided into the written and the
unwritten law.

LII. Discourse is divided into five heads; one of which heads is that
which statesmen employ when they speak in the public assemblies; and
this is called political. Another division is that which orators use in
their written harangues, and bring forward for the sake of display in
panegyrics or reproaches, or impeachments. And such a description of
discourse as this is the rhetorical. A third class is that which private
individuals use when conversing with one another. This is called private
discourse. Another kind is that which is employed when men converse
by means of putting short questions and giving brief answers to those
who question them. This is called the dialectic kind of discourse.
The fifth division is that which artists adopt when conversing on
their own particular art, and this is called professional discourse.
Thus discourse, then, is divided into political, rhetorical, private,
dialectic, and professional.

LIII. Music again is divided into three species. For there is the music
of the mouth alone, such as song; secondly, there is the music which is
performed by the hands and mouth together, such as singing to the harp;
thirdly, there is that which is executed by the hands alone, such as harp
playing. Music, therefore, is divided into music of the mouth, music of
the mouth and hands, and music of the hands.

LIV. Nobleness of birth is divided into four species; the first is when
one’s ancestors are noble, and valiant, and just; in which case they
say that their posterity are nobly born. The second kind is when one’s
ancestors have been princes and rulers of nations, and their posterity
also we call noble. Another kind is when one’s ancestors have been
distinguished for personal renown, such, for instance, as is gained by
generalship or by victory at the games. For their offspring also we
address as nobly born. And the last kind is when a man is himself noble
in his spirit, and magnanimous. For that man also we call noble, and this
is the last kind of nobility. There is, therefore, nobility arising from
virtuous ancestors, from royal ancestors, from illustrious ancestors, and
from one’s own excellent qualities.

LV. Beauty also is divided into three kinds. For there is one kind
which is praiseworthy, as that of a beautiful face. Another which is
useful, as an instrument or a house, and things of that kind which are
beautiful, with reference to our use of them. There is also a beauty with
reference to laws, and habits, and things of that kind, which is likewise
beautiful, because of its utility. So that beauty again is looked at in
three ways, with reference to its praise, its utility, and to our use of
it.

LVI. The soul is divided into three parts; for one part of it is capable
of reason, another is influenced by appetite, the third part is liable to
passion. Of these the reasoning part is the cause of deliberating, and
reasoning, and understanding, and everything of that kind. The appetite
part is that portion of the soul which is the cause of desiring to eat,
and to embrace and things of that kind. The passionate part is the cause
of men feeling confidence and delight, and grief and anger. The soul
therefore is divided into the reasoning part, the appetitive part, and
the passionate part.

LVII. Of perfect virtue there are four species. One is prudence, one is
justice, the third is manly gallantry, and the fourth is temperance.
Of these, prudence is the cause of a man acting rightly in affairs;
justice is the cause of his acting justly in partnerships and bargains;
manly gallantry is the cause of a man’s not being alarmed amid dangers
and formidable circumstances, but standing firm; and temperance is the
cause of his subduing his appetites, and being enslaved by no pleasure,
but living decorously. So that virtue is divided into prudence, justice,
manly gallantry, and temperance.

LVIII. Rule is divided into five parts. One is rule according to law;
another is rule according to nature; a third kind is rule according to
custom; a fourth division is rule with reference to family; the fifth is
rule by force. Now when the rulers in cities are elected by the citizens,
then they rule according to law; those who rule according to nature are
the males, not only among men, but also among all other animals; for
everywhere we shall find it as a general rule that the male rules the
female; the rule of him who rules according to custom is such as this,
when schoolmasters rule their pupils, and teachers their disciples. Rule
according to family is that which prevails in places like Lacedæmon,
where hereditary sovereigns reign. For the kingdom there belongs to a
certain family; and in Macedonia they rule on the same principle. For
there, too, the kingdom depends on family. But those who rule by force,
only cajoling the citizens, rule in spite of them; and such a sway is
called rule by force. So that there is rule by law, and by nature, and by
custom, and by family, and by force.

LIX. Of rhetoric he speaks of six species. For when orators exhort the
people to make war upon or to form alliances against any one, this
species of oratory is called exhortation. When they persuade the people
not to make war, or to form alliances, but to keep quiet, this kind of
rhetoric is called dissuasion. The third species of rhetoric, is when any
one says that he has been injured by some one else, and impeaches that
person as guilty of many crimes; for this species is called accusation.
The fourth kind of rhetoric is called defence, when a man shows that he
has done no wrong, and that he is not guilty of anything out of the way.
Such a kind of speech they call a defence. The fifth species of rhetoric,
is when any one speaks well of another, and shows him to be virtuous and
honourable; and this kind is called encomium. The sixth species, is when
any one shows that another person is worthless; and this kind is called
blame. So that rhetoric is divided into encomium and blame, exhortation
and dissuasion, accusation and defence.

Speaking correctly is divided under four heads. One, the saying what is
right; one, the saying as much as is right; thirdly, the saying it to the
proper people; and fourthly, the saying it at the proper time. Now as to
the saying what is right, that is the saying what will be advantageous
both to the speaker and to the hearer. The saying as much as is right, is
saying neither more nor less than what is sufficient. The saying it to
the proper people, is supposing one is speaking to one’s elders who are
mistaken in any point, the using expressions proper to be addressed to
those older than one’s self; or, on the other hand, if one is addressing
those younger, then the using language such as is suitable to young
people. The saying it at the proper time, is speaking neither too soon
nor too late; for if one does, one will err and speak improperly.

LX. Beneficence is divided under four heads. For it may be exerted
either in money, or by personal exertion, or by knowledge, or by words.
In money when any one assists those who are in want, so as to put them
at ease with respect to money. And men benefit one another by personal
exertion when they come upon those who are being beaten and assist them.
Again, those who instruct, or heal, or who teach any good thing, benefit
others by their knowledge; and when one person comes down to the court
of justice as an advocate for another, and delivers some speech full of
sense and good feeling in his behalf, that man assists his friend by
words. So that there is one beneficence which is displayed in money,
another in personal exertion, a third by means of knowledge, and the
fourth kind by words.

LXI. Again, Plato divides the end of all affairs into four species. An
affair has one end in accordance with law, when a decree is passed, and
when the law establishes it; it has an end in accordance with nature,
when it is such a thing as a day, or a year, or the seasons. It has an
end according to art, when it is architecture for instance, for a man
builds a house; or when it is ship-building, for it makes a ship. And
affairs also come to an end by chance, when they turn out differently
from what any one expected. So that an end of an affair is regulated
either by law, or by nature, or by art, or by chance.

LXII. Power again is divided into four species. There is one power which
we possess by our ability to reason and form conceptions by means of our
intellect. There is another power which we owe to the body, such as the
power of walking, or giving, or taking, and such like. There is a third
which we possess through the multitude of soldiers or riches, on which
account a king is said to have great power. And the fourth division of
power consists in the being well or ill treated, and treating others well
or ill; as, for instance, we may be sick, or we may be taught, or we may
be in vigorous health, and many more cases of that sort. So that one kind
of power dwells in the intellect, another in the body, another in an army
and riches, and another in our capacity as agents or patients.

LXIII. Of philanthropy there are three sorts. One which is displayed
in addressing people, when some persons address every one whom they
meet, and give them their right hand, and greet them heartily; another
species is when one is disposed to assist every one who is unfortunate.
The last kind is that sort of philanthropy which makes men pleasant
boon companions. So that there is one kind of philanthropy displayed in
addressing people, another in benefiting them, and a third in feasting
and making merry with them.

LXIV. Happiness is divided into five parts. For one part of it is wisdom
in counsel; another is a healthy condition of the sensations and general
health of body; a third is good fortune in one’s affairs; a fourth kind
is good reputation among men; a fifth is abundance of riches and of all
those things which are useful in life. Now wisdom in counsel arises from
good instruction, and from a person’s having experience of many things.
A healthy condition of the sensations depends on the limbs of the body;
as, for instance, when one sees with one’s eyes, and hears with one’s
ears, and smells with one’s nose, and feels with one’s body, just what
one ought to see, and hear, and smell, and feel. Such a condition as
this is a healthy condition. And good fortune is when a man does rightly
and successfully what a good and energetic man ought to do. And good
reputation is when a man is well spoken of. And abundance of riches is
when a man has such a sufficiency of everything which relates to the uses
of life, that he is able to benefit his friends, and to discharge all
public obligations in a splendid and liberal manner. And the man who has
all these different parts of happiness, is a perfectly happy man. So
that happiness is made up of wisdom in counsel, a good condition of the
sensations and health of body, good fortune, good reputation, and riches.

LXV. The arts are divided into three kinds. The first, the second, and
the third. The first are those of working mines and cutting wood, for
these are preparatory arts. The second are such as working metals and
carpentry, for they are alterative arts. For working in metals makes arms
out of iron; and carpentry makes flutes and lyres out of wood. The third
is the art which makes use of instruments; such as horsemanship, which
uses bridles; the military art, which uses arms; music, which uses flutes
and lyres. So that there are three species of art; one of which is the
first, another the second, and another the third.

LXVI. Good is divided into four kinds. One of which we mean when we speak
of a man endowed with private virtue, as good; another kind is that which
we indicate, when we call virtue and justice, good. A third kind is that
which we attribute to suitable food, and exercise, and medicine. The
fourth good, is that which we mean, when we speak of good flute playing,
good acting, and things of that sort. There are therefore four kinds of
good. One the having virtue; another, virtue itself; a third, useful food
and exercise; and fourthly, we call skill in flute playing and acting,
good.

LXVII. Of things existing, some are bad, some good, and some neither
one thing nor the other. Of these, we call those things bad, which
are invariably capable of doing injury, such as intemperance, folly,
injustice, and things of that sort. And the opposites to these qualities
are good. But those things, which may at times be beneficial, and at
times injurious, such as walking, sitting down, and eating; or which have
absolutely no power in any case to benefit or injure any one; these are
neither bad nor good. Of things existing then, there are some bad, and
some good, and some of a neutral character, neither bad nor good.

LXVIII. A good state of affairs with reference to the laws, is divided
under three heads. One when the laws are good, for that is a good state
of affairs; so too is it, when the citizens abide by the existing laws;
and the third case is, when although there are no positive laws,
still men are good citizens in deference to custom and to established
institutions; and this is also called a good state of affairs. So that
of these three heads, one depends on the laws being good, another on
obedience to existing laws, and the third on men yielding to good customs
and institutions.

So again, lawlessness is divided into three heads. One of which is,
when the laws are bad, both as concerns strangers, and the citizens;
another, when the citizens do not obey the laws that are established; and
the third is when there is actually no law at all. So that one kind of
lawlessness arises from bad laws, another from disobedience to existing
laws, and the third from the absence of laws.

LXIX. Contraries are of three sorts; for instance, we say that good
is contrary to evil, as justice to injustice, wisdom to folly, and so
on. Again, some evils are contrary to others, as extravagance is to
stinginess, and the being tortured with justice to the being tortured
with injustice. And such evils as these are the contraries of other
evils. Again, the heavy is contrary to the light, the swift to the slow,
the black to the white; so that some things which are of a neutral
character, neither good nor evil, are contrary to other things of a
neutral character. Of contraries then, there are some which are so, as
what is good is contrary to what is evil; others, as one evil is contrary
to another; and others again, as neutral things are contrary to other
things of a neutral character.

LXX. Of good things there are three kinds; for there are some which can
be possessed; others, which can be shared; others, which one realizes
in one’s self. Those which can be possessed, are those which it is
possible for a person to have, such as justice, or good health; those
can be shared, which it is not possible for a person to have entirely
to himself, but which he may participate in; as for instance, a person
cannot be the sole possessor of abstract good, but he may participate in
it. Those again a person realizes in himself, when they are such, that
he cannot possess them himself, or share them with others, and yet they
ought to exist; as for instance, it is good to be virtuous and just, but
yet a man does not possess the being virtuous, or participate in it;
but the being virtuous and just ought to exist in him. Of good things,
therefore, there are those which are possessed, those which are shared,
and those which ought to exist in a man.

LXXI. In the same manner, good counsel is divisible into three kinds.
For there is one kind which is derived from past time, another from the
future, another from the present. That which is derived from past time is
made up of instances, as for instance what the Lacedæmonians suffered by
trusting to such and such people. That which relates to the present, is
when what is wanted, is to show that the fortifications are weak, the men
cowardly, or the provisions scanty. That which concerns the future, is
when the speaker urges that no injury ought to be offered to ambassadors,
in order that Greece may not get an evil reputation; and supports his
argument by instances. So that good counsel has reference, firstly to
what is past, secondly to what is present, and thirdly to the future.

LXXII. Voice is divided into two parts, one of which is animated, and the
other inanimate. That is animated, which proceeds from living animals,
while sounds and echoes are inanimate. Again, animated voice may be
divided into that which can be indicated by letters, and that which
cannot; that which can be so indicated being the voice of men, and that
which cannot being the voice of animals; so that one kind of voice is
animated, the other inanimate.

LXXIII. Of existing things, some are divisible and some indivisible.
Again, those which are divisible, consist either of similar or of
dissimilar parts. Those which are indivisible are such as have no
separate parts, and are not formed by any combination, such as unity,
a point, or a sound. But those are divisible which are formed by some
combination; as, for instance, syllables, and symphonies, and animals,
and water, and gold. These too consist of similar parts, which are made
up of particles resembling one another, and of which the whole does
not differ from any part, except in number. As for instance, water and
gold, and everything which is fusible, and so on. And these consist of
dissimilar parts, which are made up of various things not resembling one
another; as for instance, a house, and things of that sort; so that of
existing things, some are divisible and others indivisible. And of those
which are divisible, some consist of similar and others of dissimilar
parts.

LXXIV. Again, of existing things, some are spoken of as having an
independent, and some only a relative existence. Those which are spoken
of as having an independent existence, are those which require nothing
else to be added to them, when we are explaining their nature; as man, a
horse, and the other animals; for these have no need of any additional
explanation. But those things are said to have a relative existence which
do require some additional explanation. As for instance, that which is
greater than something else, or less, or swifter, or more beautiful,
and so on. For that which is greater, is greater than something which
is less; and that which is swifter, is swifter than something else. So
that, of existing things, some are spoken of as independently, and other
relatively. And thus he divided them at first, according to Aristotle.

LXXV. There was also another man of the name of Plato, a philosopher of
Rhodes, a disciple of Panætius, as Seleucus, the grammarian says in the
first book of his treatise on Philosophy; and another was a Peripatetic,
a pupil of Aristotle; and there was a third, a pupil of Praxiphanes; and
there was besides all these, the poet of the Old Comedy. 

[31] The Greek is τοῦ μιμογράφου. “A _mime_ was a kind of prose drama,
intended as a familiar representation of life and character, without any
distinct plot. It was divided into μῖμιοι ἀνδρεῖοι and γυναικεῖοι, also
into μῖμοι σπουδαίων and γελοίων.”—_L. &. S. in voc._ μῖμος.

[32] The Greek is, ὡς ἀνέπλαττε Πλάτων πεπλασμένα θαύματα εἰδώς.

[33] This figure was like a barbed arrow, according to Zevort.