But to pass these questions by: either these so-called goods are not goods, or else man is more fortunate than God, because God has no enjoyment of the things which are given to us. For lust pertains not to God, nor do elegant banquets, nor wealth, nor any of the things that allure mankind and lead him on through the influence of degrading pleasure.
Therefore, it is either not incredible that there are goods which God does not possess, or else the very fact that God does not possess them is in itself a proof that these things are not goods.
Besides, many things which are wont to be regarded as goods are granted to animals in fuller measure than to men. Animals eat their food with better appetite, are not in the same degree weakened by sexual indulgence, and have a greater and more uniform constancy in their strength.
Consequently, they are much more fortunate than man. For there is no wickedness, no injury to themselves, in their way of living. They enjoy their pleasures and they take them more often and more easily, without any of the fear that results from shame or regret.
—from Seneca, Moral Letters 74
Here is the sort of passage that reminds me how the Stoics could be just as elegant in their reasoning as an Aristotle or an Aquinas. Once I examine something precisely, and squint at it from all the angles, I often find that my hasty assumptions had been leading me in entirely the wrong direction.
If, for example, I claim that God is perfect, let me be careful about what I mean by such a term. At first, I may speak of the Divine as “owning” everything, like a landlord gazing upon his vast estate, but would it not be better to say that God is complete in identity, not in a relation to a possession? In other words, what is perfect never needs anything added to it from the outside, for it already “has” everything on the inside.
A creature is hardly a supplement to the Creator, merely a contingent expression of the Creator’s absolute existence. As Boethius argued so beautifully in his Consolation, a thing is more or less perfect by its degrees of self-sufficiency, and God is therefore the only total subsistence—what the Peripatetic and the Thomist call pure act without any potency.
In human terms, why would I believe myself to be any better by an increase of fortune and fame? I am at my best when I the master of my own nature, and I am thereby a reflection of the order pervading all of Nature. Having more “stuff” has nothing to do with excellence, which is why God doesn’t require any “stuff” at all.
Along similar lines, I have sometimes wondered why humble animals seem to have advantages over us haughty humans. For all of our supposed intelligence, the beasts are usually stronger, more resilient, and seemingly impervious to our many vices. Oh, to be a simple bird, without a care in the world!
And yet this is precisely as it should be, because they are defined by their instincts, while we are defined by our reason: the animal thrives on fortune, and the man thrives on character. We are intended to rise above our circumstances, even as they are bound by them.
Is it not terrible that a man can choose evil, and that the animal has no malice in its soul? No, it is remarkable that a man has a freedom of judgment, and how even its abuse provides just another opportunity in the struggle for virtue—the errors are then paths for improvement. The animal knows nothing of this, nor should it.
As much as the romantic in me daydreams about the beasts attending magical banquets in the forest, their particular purpose is of a very different sort. A man has the power of understanding, and he has the power of love, and for this he has no need to rely on accidents. In this, he is a little image and likeness of his Maker.
—Reflection written in 10/2013